The government asks us to set aside a preliminary injunction stopping it from auctioning rights to drill for oil on 488 tracts near Georges Bank, a fishing area in the North Atlantic off the New England Coast. The district court,
I
NEPA requires that the Department of the Interior, before auctioning its oil leases, prepare а statement that describes “the environmental impact of the proposed action, .. . any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided ..., [and] alternatives to the proposed action . ... ” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Further regulations, binding throughout the Executive Branch,
Andrus v. Sierra Club,
We judge the lawfulness of the Department’s decision not to supplement the EIS by asking whether that decision was reasonable under the circumstances.
California v. Watt,
Our reading of the FEIS shows us that it was written with the 1.73 billion barrel mean in mind, and suggests that an FEIS written with a 56 million barrel mean expectation would be a very different document. We can best demonstrate the inadequacy of the FEIS — showing why, and how, expecting 31 times as much oil significantly affected the description of environmental consequences — by choosing as an example a key decision that the Secretary had to make: the decision whether or not to accept the Conservation Law Foundation’s preferred choice, “Alternative Five.” That alternative would have removed 207 blocks from the sale and left 333 for leasing. Did the FEIS adequately inform the Secretary about the adverse environmental consequences of not adopting this alternative?
The Secretary had before him a Secretarial Issue Document (SID) that framed the relevant issues for his choice. The SID was based upon the new (97% reduced) oil recov *949 ery estimates. It stated that by rejecting Alternative Five — by leasing 540 blocks instead of 333 — the Secretary would create only about $35 million in additional oil benefits, instead of the hundreds of millions of dollars previously thought possible. Had the Secretary simply balanced this $35 million benefit against the serious environmental harms described in the FEIS, he might well have chosen Alternative Five, and taken 207 tracts out of the sale.
The SID, however, goes on to tell him not to balance the “FEIS described” harms against this new benefit. It correctly tells him (in two sentences) that the new resource recovery estimates imply that the likely environmental harms have changed too. It states:
Since the revised resource estimates for this option are much lower than those assumed for the basis of the FEIS, a corresponding smaller number of platforms, wells, and pipelines needed to explore for and develop thеse resources should be assumed. This would significantly lower the expected impacts.
Although the SID thereby tells the Secretary. that the likely environmental harm is less than described in the FEIS, it does not tell him by how much the previous FEIS estimate of likely environmental harm should be reduced, (nor does it purport to do so).
The Secretary, alerted by the SID’s reference to a “corresponding smaller” amount of drilling and “significantly lower” impacts, might have looked to anоther document before him — an Environmental Assessment (EA) — for further explanation. But the EA contains only a very limited amount of further information. The EA states, as to Alternative Five:
The revised oil and gas resource estimates for Georges Bank mean fewer production platforms but ... approximately the same exploration and delineation structures. ... [Reductions would occur in estimated volumes of drill muds and cuttings, chronic and acute discharges, air еmissions, number of spills and number of pipelines needed. Reduced activity re-suits in a reduction of estimated impacts as described in the FEIS (see Table II.D. 1). ... While estimated impacts on all resources are reduced, impact severity for fisheries and biological resources are only slightly lower.
The reference to a table is presumably a reference to Table II.B.10 of the FEIS, for we could not find a Table II.D.l. Table II.B.10 compares the environmental impacts of the various alternatives in fifteen different categories, ranking each alternative in each category on a scale of “0” (“none”) to “3” (“major”). The FEIS states that leasing 540 blocks, instead of Alternative Five’s 333 blocks, would increase the severity of likely environmental harms from “minor” to “moderate” or “moderate” to “major” in seven of the fifteen environmental categories. The EA provides a revised version of this table in which all harms diminish across the board, and the relative harms of the full sale compared with Alternative Five increase from “minor” to “moderate” in four categories. In other words, the EA tells the Secretary more about harms than the SID, but not very much more about the specifies.
The Secretary might also have looked to the FEIS itself for further information on the environmental consequences of the reduced oil estimates, for the FEIS contains a one-page “Addendum” that mentions the changed oil recovery estimates. The Addendum, however, simply states that there will probably be “fewer oil spills” and “fewer wells drilled;” it goes no further. These words might be sufficient if it were obvious that the likely environmental harm would decline proportionately with the expected oil recovery, but the FEIS, EA, and SID make clear that the anticipated decline will not be proportional.
In fact, after reading the FEIS, the SID, and the EA, the Secretary would have no clear idea how to visualize the environmental harms under the new mean estimates. The entire FEIS is couched in terms of the old mean; the new documents merely say that the harm is “not as great.” But the crucial question for a rational decisionmaker is by how much the likely environmental *950 harm will be reduced. And here the documents offer contradictory signals. On the one hand, they suggest that estimates of some environmental harms do decline proportionately as the estimates of oil recovery decline. They state, for example, that because of the new oil estimate, the projected number of major oil spills falls from 10 in 30 years to 0.3 in 30 years. On the other hand, the documents strongly suggest that the reduction in many other harms is not proportional. A comparison of Tables II. B.10 in the FEIS and in the EA, for example, reveals that for eight categories of environmental harm the new oil recovery estimate reduces likely environmеntal harm by only half a step (from, say, “2” to “1-2”), for five categories it reduces harm by a full step, and for two categories it leaves the estimate of harm unchanged. Although resource recovery estimates have changed from “lots” to “very little,” the chart suggests that harms have not diminished correspondingly. Similarly, analysis of the FEIS suggests that the likelihood of fewer oil spills does not necessarily reduce environmental risks proportionately. The harm thаt an oil spill causes depends in part on where the oil is spilled; the FEIS makes clear, for example, that some oil spills are more likely to harm coastal areas than others. Yet, nothing in the FEIS, the SID, or the EA suggests that the “fewer wells” now contemplated will be dispersed in a geographical pattern similar to that thought likely when the FEIS was written.
In sum, the SID, the EA, and the FEIS addendum state that the likely environmental harms associated with rejecting Alternative Five havе changed. The SID makes clear that it is important to know the probable magnitude of this change. The documents indicate that this magnitude is considerable; they point out that there is no obvious way in which a decision maker could readily calculate this magnitude (by, for example, applying a rule of proportionality); and, they suggest that considerably more analysis can fairly easily be done. Under these circumstances, we do not see how the FEIS сan be said to have given the Secretary a reasonably adequate picture of the likely environmental harms associated with his choice. And, the Department of Interior’s decision not to supplement the FEIS therefore seems unreasonable.
We have considered several arguments to the contrary. First, the government claims that the change in oil recovery estimates is not important because the estimates were nоt very reliable in the first place; even for purposes of the FEIS the estimated recovery was expressed in terms of a range, which ran from a low expectation of 17 million barrels to a high expectation of 6.35 billion. And, the new mean of 55.7 million barrels falls within this range.
This argument is not convincing, however, for the FEIS primarily focuses on the mean estimate of 1.73 billion barrels. The FEIS was written and its alternatives were developed with this “mean” in mind. Of the several hundred pages in the FEIS and the numerous charts and tables, only six pages that we could find focus specifically upon the environmental impact under the low, or the high, range estimates.
Second, the government cites
California v. Watt,
Watt applied a standard of “reasonableness” to the agency’s decision not to supplement, and the court considered
the environmental significance of the new information, the probable accuracy of the information, thе degree of care with which the agency considered the information and evaluated its impact, and *951 the degree to which the agency supported its decision not to supplement with a statement of explanation or additional data.
Third, it was argued that the EA itself (or the SID and EA together) constitutes an adequate supplement. We have previously explained why we think that the EA did not contain enough information or analysis to inform the Secretary of the magnitude of the change in environmental harm. But, even if we are wrong, the EA and SID are legally insufficient as FEIS supplements, for they were not made public until the beginning of this litigation. As we have previously held, unless a document has been publicly circulated and available for public comment, it does not satisfy NEPA’s EIS requirements.
Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt,
Finally, the government suggested at oral argument that the Secretary’s decision refleсts the fact that a supplement could not have changed his mind. One cannot, however, argue that a NEPA statement is not legally necessary because the agency already knows what the statement will contain or because the agency plans to make its decision without regard to what the FEIS shows. In some instances, the statement may change a mind that previously thought itself unchangeable; in other instances the statement will simply allow the рublic to judge more fully the merits of the decision that was made. We note that the Secretary did delete 52 tracts from the proposed sale; 41 were in areas which most commenters urged should not be leased, and the rest were deleted at the request of the Navy. In any event, the statute requires an EIS according to its terms.
In sum, we conclude that the agency’s decision not to supplement the FEIS is likely to be found to be unreasonable, and, consequently, we find adequate support int the record for the district court’s finding of a probable NEPA violation.
II
The government argues that, regardless of any NEPA violation, the district court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs will suffer no “irreparable harm.” The government correctly states that the propriety of a preliminary injunction depends upon consideration of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, of “irreparable harm,” of an appropriate “balance” of the harms to the plaintiffs and defendants, and of the effect upon the public interest.
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti,
The government points out that the lease sale does not necessarily entitle the lease buyers to drill for oil. There are
*952
several further steps that must be taken, and further governmental permission must be obtained beforе oil exploration can begin.
See
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1331
et seq.; North Slope Borough v. Andrus,
The government’s argument, however, ignores an important fеature of NEPA. NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it foresees that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good reasons. Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process; its aim is to make government officials notice environmental considerations and take them into account. Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed environmental сonsideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered.
Alaska v. Andrus,
It is apрropriate for the courts to recognize this type of injury in a NEPA case, for it reflects the very theory upon which NEPA is based — a theory aimed at presenting governmental decision-makers with relevant environmental data before they commit themselves to a course of action. This is not to say that a likely NEPA violation automatically calls for an injunction; the balance of harms may point the other way. Cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, supra (a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not automatically wаrrant an injunction). It is simply to say that a plaintiff seeking an injunction cannot be stopped at the threshold by pointing to additional steps between the governmental decision and environmental harm.
In the present case plaintiffs would suffer harm if they were denied an injunction, if the lease sale then took place, and if the court
then
held that a supplemental EIS was required. In that event, the successful oil companies would have committed time and effort to planning the development of the blocks they had leased, and the Department of the Interior and the relevant state agencies would have begun to make plans based upon the leased tracts. Each of these events represents a link in a chain of bureaucratic commitment that will become progressively harder to undo the longer it continues. Once large bureaucracies are
*953
committed to a course of action, it is difficult to change that course — even if new, or more thorough, NEPA statements are prepared and the agency is told to “redecide.” It is this type of harm that plaintiffs seek to avoid, and it is the presence of this type of harm that courts have said can merit an injunction in an appropriate case.
See California v. Watt,
The more difficult question here involves balancing the harm caused plaintiffs without the injunction against the harm the injunction will cause defendants.
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti,
Thus, weighing the NEPA-type harm to plaintiffs against the fairly short delay, in light of the likelihood of unlawfulness, we conclude that the district court’s decision as to the “irreparable harm” and its balancing of the relevant harms was reasonable and adequate to support on appeal the issuance of this preliminary injunction. The district court’s weighing of the publiс interest and its conclusions thereon were likewise well within its sound discretion.
Ill
In concluding that the preliminary injunction is adequately supported by the likelihood of a NEPA violation, we have deliberately avoided passing upon the ESA, OCSLA and CZMA issues. It is unnecessary for us to do so now. They involve complex issues of law, and we doubt that the district court, in the short time available, had an adequate opportunity to consider them. If we are to decide them, it would be easier to do so with a more complete record before us. Presumably the district court will soon proceed to a full hearing on the merits. If the government issues a supplemental EIS before this litigation is concluded and seeks to have the preliminary injunction dissolved, the district court may wish to consider these other statutory issues again. If it does so, it should not regard its prior opinion concerning them as governing; but it should consider the issues anew.
The decision of the district court here .under review is
Affirmed.
