delivered the opinion of the court:
In 1964, Commonwealth Loan Company obtained a judgment by confession in the circuit court of Madison County against James W. Baker and served a garnishment summons and interrogatories upon General Steel Industries, Inc. In answer to the interrоgatories General stated that it had no property of the judgment debtor in its possession. A citation to discover assets was issued and served upon Baker and at the hearing he testified that General was holding about $800 of his money under some kind of a retirement benefit arrangement. General was not a party to that proceеding. The court held that the funds in General’s hands were exempt from garnishment under the provisions of the second paragraph of section 1 of an act to exempt certain personal property from attaсhment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 52, par. 13), providing for the exemption of certain pensions, and ordered that General turn over to Baker the money in its hands, without regard to the garnishment proceeding. Commonwealth appealed to the appellate court, which held that the funds held by General were not exempt as a pеnsion under the above statutory provision, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the appellate court. (
Upon remand, Commonwealth movеd for judgment against General, which moved to strike the motion on the ground that it had a valid defense which it had previоusly had no opportunity to present. The trial court sustained Commonwealth’s motion for judgment and entered judgment in fаvor of Commonwealth against General for the amount of the original judgment against Baker. Within 30 days after the entry оf judgment, General filed a motion to vacate the judgment, alleging that the funds due Baker were part of a pension trust and were exempt from garnishment by the terms of the trust indenture. General contended that in the prior apрeal it was confined to the record as made between Commonwealth and Baker and that it never had an opportunity to present its defense based upon the terms of the indenture. The trial court denied Generаl’s motion to vacate the judgment and General appealed to the appellate court. In its notice of appeal it specified that it was appealing from the order denying the motion to vacate the judgment. Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal wаs taken from the denial of the motion to vacate the judgment instead of from the judgment itself. The appellаte court took the motion to dismiss with the case and denied it in its opinion. (
The only issue on the appeal to this court is whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appеal in view of the alleged imperfection in the notice of appeal. With certain exceptions not relevant here, the appellate court has jurisdiction to review only final judgments. (Ill. Const., art. VI, sec. 7; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 37, par. 32.1.) The question therefore is whether the denial of the motion to vacate the judgment was а final and appealable judgment. The same question was presented in Sanford v. Thompson,
The order in the present case terminated the litigation between Commonwealth and General and the issue presented by the motion was whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit General to present its defense. This was the issue decided by thе appellate court, which held that the motion ought to be allowed so that General could present its defense.
The merits of General’s defense are not presented on this appeal and the only question is whether its notice of appeal was sufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction. Since we are of the opinion that the appellate court did have jurisdiction of the appeal, the judgment of the Appellate Court, Fifth District, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.