*1 498 Logue
we
hold,
as we did
that corroboration of
particular
requirements
confession in
material
satisfies the
it
law,
province
that
the exclusive
jury
determine
whether or not
confession
is corroborated;
question
may
determining
consider the
jury
along
independent
confession itself
other evidence
with
separate
relative
therefrom
to such issue.
case the
this
find,
jury
did, that the
they
was authorized to
confession
independent
facts and
corroborated
circumstances
separate
from the
since
confession; and
were satis-
they
quantum
corroborating
fied with
facts and circum-
stances, we
hold
the evidence
sufficient to
guilt
beyond
Hence,
accused
reasonable doubt.
overruling
court
err as movant contends in
did not
his motion
phase
trial on
connection,
new
this
the case.
In this
fo.r
State,
877).
see Davis v.
Judgment All the Justices concur. affirmed. Argued 12, 19, 1963. November 1963 Decided November Joseph Briley, H. Larsen, Jr., Eugene
W. Attorney W. Solicitor General, Cook, Bubye General, Attorney G. Assistant Jackson, General, contra. 22117. COMMONWEALTH INVESTMENT COMPANY
v. FRYE. Argued 15, 19 6 3 October 1963 Decided November Rehearing 1963. November 19 and November denied *2 Lloyd Miller Alston, Whitaker, & T. Gaines, Michael A. Doyle, for Greer, Buchanan,
DanW. & Sizemore, contra. Edenfield arguments Justice. Chief this case cause Duckworth, that an emphatic feel us to statement by should be made legislature, court that the and not the is empowered by courts, public the Constitution to decide implement and to policy, by enacting policy laws; and courts are bound to follow if constitutional. such laws With this principle fundamental thus stated, look the legislation, 3-807, we to see whether years the limitation statute four of to bring applies this suit until the fraud is discovered. provides This law plainly that: defendant, or those under “If whom claims, he shall have been guilty of a fraud which the shall have been from action, debarred'or deterred the period of limitation shall run only from time the discovery of of the fraud.” On There- pleaded are as true.
demurrer, properly treated fore, allegations forged petition Company of the that Pruett & signature plaintiff to the transfers shares corporation forged issuing accepting the stock and signature which is the defendant file transfer, here, had on a true petitioner which have shown the transfer would to be a forgery, are It trifling as true. with terms to treated the defendant claiming contend is not under Pruett & forger, is not Code 3-807. hence covered course, Of the amended shows that Pruett & alone placed fraudulently title the defendant. defend- so, If ant Company. claims under Pruett & They have no other basis claim, certainly petitioner their not under the who owner the victim the forgery, which the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care and in fulfillment duty could have comparison signatures. discovered light
We here regard surplusage further discussion Appeals. of the exhaustive rea- For the *3 opinion as well those in the sons stated above as stated the of Appeals, sustaining the trial in the demurrer court erred to the and petition, Appeals the Court of err amended did not in judgment. reversing except
Judgment Head, J., All the P. concur, Justices affirmed. dissent. Quillian, Mobley who JJ., and dissenting. Justice, plaintiff, The Dr. A. H. Presiding Head, Frye, in trover action to recover from the defendant Jr., his conveyed certain certificates of to have been to the stock unlawfully fraudulently by Company, Pruett defendant and and alleges Company agent. which that Pruett and was his paragraph plaintiff his amended the in alleges of5 part: Company, and Inc. “Said Pruett was stock broker said certificate . . . which and was issued to plaintiff owner, had been entrusted by Pruett, as to said safekeeping.” and Inc. for custodial Generally negotiable in stock broker is dealer plaintiff, securities. The however, relationship did not limit his with Pruett Company and negotiable the buying selling securities, to but made Pruett agent “for safekeeping” his custodial plain- of the agent the principal relationship the toAs tiff’s stock. dili- the care, bound for shall be principal “The provides: Code hence he shall business, agent fidelity of his his gence, and in the transaction agent neglect and fraud of his be for the bound the neither 4-311. While Code business.” of such § Co., Investment Frye v. Appeals, Commonwealth of the Court of court, opinion of this 569), the nor App. 107 Ga. SE2d applicable think it nevertheless section, I this Code refers having agent his having selected here and wrongful and to commit power agent the of his placed it within plain- property, to the plaintiff’s acts 'related fraudulent as wrongful his by such acts of loss tiff should occasioned bear agent. prior transac- defendant, by fact reason of some
The genuine of the defend- had in its files a tion, may have in the absence subject forgery, ant it to loss for the should not indicating wrongful. fact the transfer to be notice of some the provisions with of the Uni- believe this conclusion accords I (Ga. 1939, pp. 384, L. 387, 7; Act of form Transfer provides: “If indorsement or Supp. 22-1907), Ann. which (a) procured by duress, or or fraud delivery certificate, of a mistake to make indorsement or (b) under such made was, made delivery certificate delivery inequitable; or if owner, (d) or after the (c) authority from owner’s without possession legal may he incapacity, death or certificate (1) rescinded, unless: reclaimed and transfer thereof purchaser good been value in has transferred certificate making without notice wrongful, any facts transfer faith (2) person injured has to waive injury or elected has guilty endeavoring rights.” (Ita- laches enforce good supplied.) The term “in lics faith” the Uniform Stock *4 meaning Transfer defined as “in fact Act is done wheth- honestly, not.” Supp. er it be done or negligently Ann. 22-1902. (The recognizes the of Appeals Court that the Uni- form Stock Transfer Act was “force and effect” when the alleged place.) transfer took plaintiff
There the that by is no contention the defendant was good for nor purchaser faith, plaintiff not a value does the allege any to the either notice, fact defendant had any on constructive, actual or the endorsement the certificate alleged only it the defendant fraudulent, had being was “same plaintiff’s genuine by notice of reason of the the made upon original application previously the written appearing . not by plaintiff purchase to defendant of stock. .” It for is alleged made, alleged the nor application written was is it when paper a application that the defendant would was such existence, required it, be file or that fact in to was keep and it purchase at the time of Pruett and either from files the or records of defendant elsewhere. Under the Uni- and 1939, form Act if at the time of the purchase Stock Transfer good the and it by defendant from Pruett “in acted not faith,” it would be liable under that Act whether it acted Supp. not.” or Code Ann. "negligently 22-1902. diligence part plaintiff As to any on to discover agent his it agent, only is that his fraud of “did wil- actively fully misrepresent that said shares registered were by still defendant in name” and maliciously conceal wilfully “did from the fact that said stock had been fraudulently liquidated and value them, . . embezzled .” part: v. it is said in Dye, Sutton “Fraud which 60 Ga. diligence
must have if usual and reasonable had been discovered good reply is statute exercised, not of limitations. Where, factor cotton received principal, sold his and, payment being demanded, the proceeds, falsely on answered paid that he fraudulently money had third over upon then person, but not or thereafter called was to show receipt, exhibit books, pay- his or furnish evidence of the ment except word, bare and used no trick or artifice to support his an brought inquiry, money, statement or stifle action for the in 1877, principal against factor, barred; though setting fraud, forth declaration, averring its non- discovery years prior within until two to the institution suit, properly on demurrer.” It dismissed my view that present falls within squarely diligence case lack shown in the Sutton and that properly the trial court
503 general on present case action dismissed is required person It defrauded demurrer. rule 101 Reynolds, Little v. diligence discover the fraud. use (3) Ga. 114 (28 919); v. 134 Ga. Crawford, 594 SE Crawford Amaud, v. (67 Frost (NS) 353, 932); 19 AC SE 673, 28 LRA (5) Ga. (85 v. 172 1028); Johnstone, Morris 598 Ga. 26 SE 7). (188 308); Ga. SE Robbins, v. SE Brinsfield Mr. Mobley and say that Mr. Justice I am authorized Quillian this dissent. Justice concur al.
22261. et al. OF GEORGIA et v. WOODS STATE 1963. November Submitted November 1963 Decided Nelson-, Jr., & Nelson, plaintiffs Nelson Carl K.
Eugene Cook, Attorney General, Harper, L. Assistant William Attorney Channel, Rarnbo, G. Olin 0. Dale General, Wesley H. Thompson, Jr., B. Carl K. & Beverly Hayes, Nelson, Nelson Nelson, contra. having Justice. been of Appeals,
Almand, that it jurisdiction not have trans- did has exceptions and record court. Being bill to this mitted contrary opinion why we set below the court out reasons the Supreme jurisdiction judg- and not Court has to review the ment of trial court. originated equity an case
This case wherein State against Georgia, County T.' J. Hobbs and County, Hobbs, Commissioners of Laurens a former