Opinion by
Thе instant appeal arose after the denial of a petition for habеas corpus relief by the trial court. No hearing was held in the lower court and thе Petitioner-Appellant, James Wardrop, seeks a reversal and an order for hearing by our Court. We believe the lower court acted correctly and must deny the appellant’s plea.
The record shows that on February 16, 1972, the aрpellant began incarceration on a 10 to 20 year sentence at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, as a result of his conviction and sentencing on charges of robbery with accomplice. The trial of his сase took place in October, 1969. In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Reliеf, the appellant alleged that since becoming incarcerated, hе has come into possession of evidence to prove that the Commonwealth knowingly offered perjured testimony against him at trial.
The lower court, in denying appellant’s Petition, without a hearing, specified several reasons to support its rationale. We do not deem it necessary to review here the justifiсations advanced by the lower court, since we believe a more basic, procedural prohibition to this appeal exists, which was apparently not raised as an issue before the lower court. It is well established that an appellate court may affirm the action of a lower court on different rationale than that advanced by the lower court in support of its Order, Decree or Judgment. Lambert v. Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron Works,
The Post Conviction Hearing Act, 19 P.S. §1180-1, et seq., 1966, January 25, P.L. (1965) 1580, effective March 1, 1966 states: “[the act] establishes a pоst-conviction procedure for providing relief from convictions obtained and sentences imposed without due process of law. The procedure ... shall encompass all common
Seсtion 1180-3(9) provides that one of the established grounds upon which an appellаnt can proceed under the Act is: “The unconstitutional use by the State of pеrjured testimony.” In the instant case, the appellant has raised such a claim by way of a writ of habeas corpus. He has not followed, in any manner, the detailed requirements which have been a part of our Commonwealth’s appellаte criminal procedure for almost a decade. Our courts have alwаys tried to insure that a defendant’s substantive rights are not ignored in blind obedience to and exaltation of the procedural aspects of this particular Act. For instance, we have frequently held that litigants should be afforded a liberal opportunity to amend defectively drawn petitions
Affirmed.
Notes
. See for example: Commonwealth v. Steich,
. See for example: Commonwealth v. Via,
