10 Pa. Commw. 439 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1973
Opinion by
This is an action in mandamus brought in this Court against two judges of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia.
On February 9,1973, the District Attorney of Philadelphia filed a complaint in mandamus requesting this Court to order the Honorable Ralph M. Dennis and the Honorable Edward S. Cox, Judges of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, to “carry out their required duties as public officers and, more specifically, to remain on duty for their entire assignment when scheduled to preside at preliminary arraignments.” The District Attorney sought this relief in order to efficiently implement his program of a 24 hour-a-day arraignment court. The complaint alleges that the refusal of these two judges to work the entire eight hours of some of their assigned shifts and their failure to appear at all for other assignments have prevented the functioning
For a number of reasons we must sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss the complaint.
Initially, we hold that the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. “Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial as opposed to a discretionary duty. ‘The primary requisites of the action are that the plaintiff has a legal right to enforce which is specific, well defined and complete; that a corresponding positive duty rests upon the defendant; and that no other adequate, specific or appropriate remedy exists.’: Francis v. Corleto, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 280, 283, 203 A. 2d 520 (1964); Garratt v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 442, 448, 127 A. 2d 738 (1956).” Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 107-108, 232 A. 2d 729, 733 (1967). Subsequent judicial decisions have emphasized that the plaintiff must have a clear legal right. Garchinsky v. Clifton Heights Borough, 437 Pa. 312, 263 A. 2d 467 (1970). The District Attorney concedes that the eight-hour shift availability is not required by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nor is the alleged duty sought to be enforced found in any statute or other rule of court. Instead, the District Attorney contends that the “clear legal right” is the right of accused persons under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure to have a prompt arraignment and a prompt bail hearing and the “ministerial duty” is the judge’s physical presence dur
Mandamus will not lie for an additional reason: by way of either the Supreme Court’s inherent power to discipline judges or the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board created by Article V, Section 18(d), of the 1968 Constitution of Pennsylvania, there exists an adequate, specific or appropriate remedy.
The 1968 Constitution of Pennsylvania expressly provides for a “unified judicial system.” Article Y, Section 1, declares: “The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.” In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary that the people repose in the Supreme Court certain responsibilities. Thus, Article Y, Section 10, states: “(a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace, including authority to temporarily assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or district to another as it deems appropriate.” The Supreme Court’s inherent power of superintendency over inferior tribunals has been traced historically. Regarding the power to issue writs of prohibition, the Court said in Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 99-100, 61 A. 2d
In re DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 274 N.E. 2d 454 (1971), a decision of the Supreme Judicial
Although we may sympathize with the District Attorney’s objectives, we can find no legal basis upon which to support his complaint in mandamus. However, we believe that appropriate utilization of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board will aid in the realization of a unified judicial system with well-disciplined
Alternatively, the District Attorney’s action is hindered by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Collins v. Gessler, No. 264 January Term, 1973 (Filed July 2, 1973), in which the Court held that the Supreme Court, and not the Commonwealth Court, had original jurisdiction in an action in quo warranto filed by a district justice of the peace seeking a declaration that he was serving with lawful authority. The Court based its decision on Section 201 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. 673, 17 P.S. §211.201 (Supp. 1973-74), which states, inter alia:
“The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
“(2) All cases of mandamus or prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction;
“(3) All cases of quo warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court held that Section 201(3) controls against the applicability of Section 401 of the Act, 17 P.S. §211.401, which reads, inter alia:
“(a) The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of:
“(1) All civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity ....
“(b) The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court under this section shall be exclusive except as provided in section 201 of this act and except with respect to actions or proceedings by the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, where the jurisdiction of the court shall be concurrent with the several courts of common pleas.” (Emphasis added.)
The above discussion renders consideration of the issues of venue and standing to sue unnecessary.
Accordingly, we enter the following
ORDER
Now, August 2, 1973, the preliminary objections to the complaint in mandamus are sustained and the complaint is dismissed.
This latter function of the Board is described in “Reviewing the Review Board” 42 Pa. B. Ass’n Q. 33 (1970). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Borough of Strasburg, 90 Dauph. 7 (1968).