28 A.2d 500 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1942
Argued September 29, 1942.
This case must go back to the lower court again. See
We pointed out in the opinion that the validity of the separation agreement depended on whether it had been entered into without fraud or coercion and was reasonable. And we remitted the matter to the court below that it might hear testimony and determine those issues before passing on the other matters involved in the proceeding.
When the case came up for reconsideration in the court below, no testimony was offered by either side as to the reasonableness of the agreement when it was entered into on August 31, 1937. Testimony was taken as to the respondent's financial condition at the date of the hearing; but this would be relevant only in case the separation agreement was held invalid, either (1) because it was obtained by fraud or coercion, or (2) because it was unreasonable in its terms and provisions. The court found — and properly so, in our opinion — that no fraud or coercion had been used by the husband to induce his wife to sign the agreement. She was represented by counsel when it was signed, *418 although he had no part in its preparation. But the court made no definite finding that the agreement was reasonable, and yet held it to be a bar to the wife's proceeding for support. The court's ruling was as follows:
"A full inquiry was had whether the husband fairly informed his wife of his financial circumstances [and] she had a full understanding of the nature and character of the agreement.
"On the basis of this inquiry, I find that the agreement was entered into in good faith without fraud or coercion. I cannot find as a fact that the agreement was a reasonable one. The petitioner, however, was represented by counsel. She knew the exact nature of the respondent's business, and knowing all this, she, nevertheless, entered into the agreement. I, therefore, conclude that she is bound by it." (Italics supplied).
Appellant contends that this was a finding by the court below that the separation agreement was an unreasonable one. We do not so understand it. As the parties produced no testimony at the hearing which would warrant a finding as to the husband's financial condition in August 1937 when the agreement was made, the trial judge could not find that it was reasonable, but he did not find that it was unreasonable. In our opinion the validity and enforceability of the agreement must now rest on the question of its reasonableness when entered into. See Com.v. Smith,
Order reversed and record remitted for further proceedings consistent herewith.