572 A.2d 227 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1990
Appellant is the natural mother of J.F. who was born on June 9, 1976, and who resides with her father and his wife, M.D. Litigation between the parties, including the paternal grandparents, concerning J.F. has been extensive and lengthy.
Appellant now appeals this Order, raising ten issues:
1. Did the court err in its opinion and order denying the motion for contempt thereby allowing parties to refuse visits contrary to an order of court which was allegedly justified because an involuntary termination petition was filed?
2. Did the court err in its opinion and order justifying non compliance of an existing order based solely on the best interests of the child where there was no modification of said prior order?
3. Is the opinion and order contrary to the evidence where the court had no evidence to show a material change to allow an open violation of an order of court and no modification of said order but still allowed parties not to comply with same even when there was a stipulation signed as to certain specific facts admitting the refusal to allow visits?
4. Did the court err in refusing to sequester M.D. as a witness?
*52 5. Did the court err in allowing M.D.’s attorneys the right to jump up as they pleased throughout the proceedings and enter objections to the unfair disadvantage of G.F.?
6. Did the court err in not allowing relevant questions as to other attempts to see J.F. and the denial of visits they had when they went to see the said child?
7. Did the court err in not allowing relevant evidence to show bias and hostility of M.D. towards G.F.?
8. Did the court err in repeatedly allowing attorneys for M.D. to ask questions about G.F.’s effort to get the child returned to her?
9. Did the court err in its opinion and Order in that same was made upon a capricious disbelief of competent and credible evidence and not based on competent evidence?
10. Did the court err in that the opinion and order are contrary to the law in that it has allowed parties to violate a custody order without any finding of a material change in circumstances and without any modification of said order?2
Appellant’s issues can be condensed into one basic argument: the court erred in denying her motion for contempt when appellee willfully denied her the right to see J.F. even though a court Order gave her that right. The trial court, in an effort to protect the child, held appellant’s visitation rights in abeyance until the termination proceedings were resolved. The court found no reason to force visitation as appellant had not exercised her visitation rights at all since the 1982 Order granting her visitation, and she did not seek visitation until two months after the termination petition had been filed by appellee. We find the trial court acted properly in this situation and we affirm the Order of June 27, 1989.
Actually, this case lends more support to the trial court’s Order denying appellant’s motion for contempt than it does appellant’s position. In Patricia S., we denied the foster mother’s claim because her intent was obvious in filing the adoption proceeding:
[W]e note that if we were to decide the case as appellant urges, we would do real damage to the operation of the Juvenile Court and the laws it administers. This action began in Juvenile Court with the aim of reuniting Patty with her father. Only a few weeks before that contemplated result was to be achieved appellant sought to derail the proceedings. We cannot permit attempts like that made in this case to interfere with an ongoing proceeding.
Id., 326 Pa. Superior Ct. at 439, 474 A.2d at 320.
This reasoning may also be applied in the instant case. Appellant had no contact with her daughter for three years prior to the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights. Two months after the petition is filed and hearings are scheduled on the matter, appellant attempts to enforce her visitation rights which had been granted three years earlier. Under these circumstances, the trial court could not force visitation but properly decided to wait and see if the father had grounds to seek termination; if he did, visitation privileges would become a nullity once appellant’s
Following the finding by the trial court that termination was in the best interest of the child, resulting in the Order of May 25, 1988, terminating appellant’s rights, the issues presented in this appeal concerning enforcement of the visitation stipulation and alleging appellee to be in contempt for refusing visitation and the court’s action in suspending visitation, are rendered moot. By analogy, this case may be decided on the principle flowing from In re D.K.W., 490 Pa. 134, 415 A.2d 69 (1980). There, the Supreme Court held that termination of the natural mother’s rights under the Adoption Act rendered the issue of custody under the Juvenile Act moot
Order affirmed.
. This Court affirmed the trial court’s Order of May 25, 1988, terminating appellant’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a). See companion case of In re: Adoption of J.F., 392 Pa.Super. 39, 572 A.2d 223 (1989).
. Issues 4-9 are identical to six of the issues raised in In re: Adoption of J.F., supra. As we said in that Opinion, we find no reversible error on the part of the trial court in its rulings concerning the procedure and conduct of the hearings.
. The termination of appellant’s parental rights was affirmed by this Court in In re Adoption of J.F., 392 Pa.Super. 223, 557 A.2d 223 (1990).