Lead Opinion
Opinion
Joseph McNeair, serving a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. He appeals, alleging errors, which are here considered seriatim:
1. The police officer who arrested him did not serve him with a search and seizure warrant. Nothing taken at the time of his arrest was used against him at the trial. Since the petitioner was charged with a felony, and the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to believe that McNeair had committed it, they could legally arrest him without a warrant. (Com. ex rel. Spencer v. Ashe,
2. The petitioner had no counsel at the preliminary hearing before a magistrate or at the coroner’s inquest. The petitioner claims that had he been represented at these proceedings he could have raised the defense of insanity. This issue was available to him at the trial when he was duly represented by counsel. The petitioner cites White v. Maryland,
3. Petitioner did not have counsel to prosecute an appeal from his conviction. He was duly represented at the trial by counsel who certainly would have advised him on his rights of appeal. There is no averment he did not. The district attorney suggests that the reason the defendant did not appeal is that, considering the heinous and brutal nature of the killing,
4. The Commonwealth introduced a record showing that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder in the second degree, the conviction being based on a plea of guilty. In the present case the defendant took the stand and admitted killing his victim as well as having shot another person while aiming at still a third person, a five-year-old child. The petitioner relies on the ease of United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller,
Order affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
Concurring Opinion by
I concur in the result. However, my concurrence as to point number 3 is based on the fact that the petition does not allege facts sufficient to support a finding of denial of counsel on an appeal of right.
But I am of the belief that we could not, as the majority suggests, constitutionally presume a waiver
