422 Pa. 297 | Pa. | 1966
Opinion by
This is an appeal from a denial by the Court of Common Pleas, without a hearing, of a petition for habeas corpus. On March 1, 1960, relator pleaded guilty to murder generally, while represented by two Court-appointed counsel. He was sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison after the Court en banc fixed the crime at second degree murder.
The facts of the homicide were as follows:
On August 28, 1959, while serving a burglary sentence in the Eastern State Penitentiary, relator became involved in an altercation with a fellow convict in the exercise yard and hilled him. When he was interrogated by the prison authorities concerning the killing, he signed a written statement in which he admitted the stabbing but said that immediately prior to the stabbing he and the victim had been fighting, and that the fight started when the victim “smashed me in the mouth”. This somewhat exculpatory statement, which he calls a confession, was admitted in the hearing or trial before the Court en banc after he had pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, while, we repeat, he was represented by counsel. Moreover, he took the witness stand and repeated exactly his aforesaid written statement.
Relator alleges three infringements of his Constitutional rights: (1) Failure of the prison authorities to inform relator of his right to counsel before signing
Relator’s first contention is without merit. His conviction became final prior to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478. We have held that Escobedo would not be given retroactive application. Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A. 2d 670; Commonwealth ex rel. Swilley v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 419, 218 A. 2d 242. As to finality, see Commonwealth ex rel. Keller v. Maroney, 419 Pa. 318, 214 A. 2d 249; Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Myers, 422 Pa. 294, 220 A. 2d 789. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, filed 6/20/66, 34 L.W. 4592.
Furthermore, relator’s guilty plea in open Court while represented by counsel is a confession of guilt of the crime or crimes with which he is charged in the indictment and also constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Russell, 419 Pa. 240, 213 A. 2d 628; Commonwealth ex rel. Swilley v. Maroney, 420 Pa., supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Hobbs v. Russell, 420 Pa. 1, 215 A. 2d 858; Commonwealth ex rel. Adderley v. Myers, 419 Pa. 536, 215 A. 2d 624; Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 380, 207 A. 2d 789; Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A. 2d 528; Commonwealth ex rel. Parker v. Myers, 414 Pa. 427, 200 A. 2d 770.
On the issue of “coercion”, relator alleges nothing more than the bare assertion that his rights were violated by “lengthy interrogational processes and maldng him physically sign a confession, that was later used against him.” A petitioner must state not merely his conclusions but all relevant facts in support of the aL leged error on which the petition is based. Cf. Post Conviction Hearing Act of January 25, 1966, §5(1), P. L. 1580, 19 P.S. §1180-5(1). The transcript of the
Relator’s last contention is equally without merit. In Pennsylvania, the relator’s appearance before a justice of the peace is not, in the absence of unusual and prejudicial circumstances, a “critical stage” in the proceedings. Commonwealth ex rel. Swilley v. Maroney, 420 Pa., supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Hobbs v. Russell, 420 Pa., supra; Commonwealth ex rel. McCant v. Rundle, 418 Pa. 394, 211 A. 2d 460; Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 11, 198 A. 2d 565.
We find no merit in any of relator’s contentions.
Order affirmed.
We note that relator thus expresses it in his petition: “The argument progressed into a fight and appellant protecting himself against not only the onslaught of the victim but also the victims friends who sought to intervene, pulled a knife out of his pocket and stabbed said William Brown.”
