COMMONWEALTH ex rel. Lucretia JOHNSON, Appellant v. Melvin N. KING
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
April 2, 1982
444 A.2d 108
Appeal of Lucretia JOHNSON. Argued June 25, 1981. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Aug 3, 1982.
Sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing.
WATKINS, J., dissents.
Robert A. Banks, Ambridge, for appellee.
Roger Margolis, Harrisburg, for participating party.
Before CERCONE, President Judge, and SPAETH, HESTER, WICKERSHAM, BROSKY, JOHNSON, POPOVICH, DISALLE and SHERTZ, JJ.
JOHNSON, Judge:
This appeal concerns whether a civil action for support of a non-marital child is barred by the running of the two-year criminal statute of limitations when paternity is denied.1
This case was ordered argued along with Williams v. Wolfe, 297 Pa.Super. 270, 443 A.2d 831 (1982) because of the similarity of issues.
The minor child was born on June 19, 1975 to Appellant. She filed a civil complaint on June 29, 1977 for support of the child pursuant to the Civil Procedural Support Law,
On February 19, 1980, Appellee filed Preliminary Objections and a Motion to Dismiss in response to the civil support action.4 Argument on the issue was withdrawn and a Stipulation as to Facts and Issues, signed by each party‘s counsel, was presented. By Order dated June 17, 1980, the lower court sustained Appellee‘s Preliminary Objections “for the reasons set forth in Weyand v. Sharpless, 38 Beaver County Law Journal 17 (1979) and Gould v. Clayton, 38 Beaver County Law Journal 193 (1980).”5
Appellant argues that she may maintain a civil action for support pursuant to
Appellee argues that Appellant‘s right to file a paternity and support action expired in this case two years after the
For the reasons set forth in Williams v. Wolfe, supra, we reverse and remand.
The only factual difference between the instant case and Williams v. Wolfe, supra, is that Appellant in the instant case did institute both civil and criminal proceedings prior to the enactment of
The Order dated June 17, 1980 is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ., file concurring statements.
WICKERSHAM, J., files a dissenting statement.
DISALLE and SHERTZ, JJ., did not participate in the consideration of this case.
BROSKY, Judge, concurring:
For the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Williams v. Wolfe, 297 Pa.Super. 270, 443 A.2d 831 (1982), (Brosky, J. Concurring Opinion), I believe that to subject a child born out of wedlock to a limitation period, however reasonable, is to limit that child‘s unqualified right to receive support from his father. As other jurisdictions have held, such limitation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See: State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. West, 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla.1979); State of Montana, Department of Revenue, Department of Social Rehabilitative Services v. Wilson, 634 P.2d 172 (Mont.1981); Stringer v. Dudoich, 92 N.M. 98, 583 P.2d 462 (1978); County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C.App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980). However, since I agree with the majority that appellant‘s civil action for support is not barred, I agree with the majority‘s decision to reverse and remand.
POPOVICH, Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result; however, I am of the view that no statute of limitations can constitutionally preclude a child from asserting paternity during his minority.
WICKERSHAM, Judge, dissenting:
For the reasons noted in Williams v. Wolfe, 297 Pa.Super. 270, 443 A.2d 831 (1982) (Dissenting Opinion by Wickersham, J.) I respectfully dissent.
Notes
§ 4323. Neglect to support bastard
(b) Limitation of action.—All prosecutions under this section must be brought within two years of the birth of the child, except where the reputed father shall have voluntarily contributed to the support of the child, or shall have acknowledged in writing his paternity, in which case a prosecution may be brought at any time within two years of any such contribution or acknowledgement by the reputed father.
Repealed, April 28, 1978, P.L. 106, No. 46, § 3, eff. June 27, 1978.
