Opinion by
Thе question is whether a wife who has obtained a support order upon her husband may attach his wages.
The оrder of support in the present case was orginally made in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Cambria County, and was certified to the Court of Common Pleas *67 of that county pursuant to the Act of May 8,1901, P. L. 143, and there entered as a judgment. Relatrix, Freda Deutsch, caused an attachment execution to be issued on this judgment attaching the wages of her husband, Jacob Deutsch, in the hands of his employer, the Bethlehem Steel Company. The сourt made absolute a rule of defendant to quash the writ and dissolve the attachment.
The Act of April 15, 1845, P. L. 459, section 5, provides that the wages of any laborers, or the salary of any person in public or private еmployment, shall not be liable to attachment in the hands of the employer. But the Act of April 15, 1913, P. L. 72, empowеrs a court of quarter sessions making an order for support to enforce it by the issuance of “the appropriate writ of execution against any property, real or personal, belonging to the dеfendant,” and a “writ of attachment execution against any money or property to which he may be in аny way entitled, whether under what is known as a spendthrift trust or otherwise.” 1 This same authorization was extended by the Act оf May 10, 1921, P. L. 434, to “any court of competent jurisdiction” which “has made an order or entered a decreе or judgment against any husband requiring him to pay any sum or sums for the support of his wife or children or both.”
Whether, in construing the Act of 1921, we are guided by its literal phraseology, or whether we seek otherwise to ascertain the intention of the legislature in enacting it, our conclusion is the same, namely, that it overrides the Act of 1845 in the case of orders or judgments for the support of deserted and neglected wives. Its language is most comprehensive, since it authorizes the issuance of a writ of execution against any property belonging to the dеfendant and a writ of attachment execution against any money or property to which he may be in any toay entitled. While its primary object may have been to make the husband’s interest in a spend *68 thrift trust available for the support of the wife, the broadness of its phrasing indiсates the larger purpose of making all the property and assets of the husband, of whatever kind or naturе, liable in execution or attachment execution for the payment of the order made on him for suрport. Such an intention is further indicated by a provision in the act that he shall not be entitled even to the benefits of any exemption law.
It is argued that the exemption of wages from attachment was not intended merely to confer a personal privilege upon laborers but was enacted for the proteсtion of their employers as well
(Little v. Balliette,
We are therefore of opinion that a judgment or decree based upon an order for support of wife or children may be enforced by a writ of execution attaching in the hands of the employer the wages or salary of the defaulting husband.
The order quashing the Avrit and dissolving the attachment is reversed with a procedendo.
Notes
Re-enacted in the Penal Code of 1939, P. L. 872, section 733.
That the exemption of wages from attachment has not, howevеr, heen considered sacrosanct and of greater importance than all other considerаtions of public policy is shown by the fact that by the Act of May 8, 1876, P. L. 139, the proprietors of hotels and boarding hоuses were given the right to attach wages owed to them for board not exceeding a period of fоur weeks, and by the Act of June 7, 1907, P. h. 429, the right to attach wages and salaries was granted in the case of a cоnviction of fornication and bastardy and sentence thereunder to pay to the mother of the child any sum or sums for its support.
