*1 litigated who their puts waiver those abolition of relaxed litigants did disadvantage. These Albrecht at petition before counsel, under re- appellate but of prove not ineffectiveness Thus, it. I prove not have to concepts, they did laxed waiver prove the ineffec- opportunity appellant would afford counsel, for such and would remand appellate of tiveness hearing is penalty phase a new proved, If it is purposes. not, judgment if it sentence is appropriate; stand. reasons, analysis my learned I dissent
For these colleagues. A.2d 348 Pennsylvania, ex rel.
COMMONWEALTH Attorney, BALDWIN, District Mark C.
County Berks, Appellee v. FISHER, Craig Appellant. Wes Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of 25, 2002. Oct.
ORDER PER CURIAM: October, NOW, day the Order
AND this 25nd hereby affirmed. County of Berks Pleas Common ex rel. Baldwin dissenting files a statement. Justice SAYLOR dissenting. Justice SAYLOR property owner of a residential
Appellant is the rental (“Lessees”). Terry he leased to Guldin and Janelle Houck On rent, February paying February without their Les- *2 they Appellant moving sees informed were from the lease, expired April residence in breach of their following day, Appellant premises 2000. The entered and the remaining of personal property, transferred several items VCR, and a including temporary a television into a barn for storage facility while the was and for prepared cleaned future Appellant tenants.1 subsequently instituted a civil action against unpaid bills, Lessees to recover for utility rent and residence, repairs and to the and was ultimately awarded $2,815 plus pre-judgment interest.
In Appellant charged March of by with theft 3921(a), taking, § unlawful see 18 Pa.C.S. stemming from his having personal moved Lessees’ items from the proper- rental ty storage. into Appellant pled and, no charge contest upon plea, based such was sentenced to twenty-three months probation $3,910 and to pay ordered in restitution.2 There- after, in November of the District Attorney filed a quo warranto action in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County.3 sought The action a declaration that Appellant had crime,” been convicted of an “infamous requested his removal from his position Jury Commissioner on basis ineligible II, he was to hold office under Article Section 7 Pennsylvania Constitution. parties The filed cross- motions summary judgment trial .the court heard oral Matter, In deposition testimony, his Answer and New and in Appel- that, February lant maintained on moving he had seen a van property, premises at the and that when following he entered the day, appeared that Lessees had moved out but had left behind the personal eventually items that storage. he transferred into that, 2. The trial court Appellant observed intended to convert use, property to his own or whether his actions were instead a "misguided attempt help,” by at self is rendered irrelevant the convic- tion. Quo warranto by the proper right means which to test title or public office. See In re Bd. Township, Sch. Directors Carroll 156, 157-58, Pa. judgment ultimately summary court entered argument. The favor, removing Appellant in the Commonwealth’s office. This holding any him from future barring office and theft I do not believe that Because timely appeal followed. crime” an “infamous taking necessarily constitutes unlawful II, 7,1 would reverse. under Article Section states: II, Pennsylvania Constitution 7 of the Article convicted embezzlement No hereafter crime, shall be bribery, perjury or other moneys, holding any Assembly, capable of or eligible to the General profit or in this Commonwealth. office of trust Const, convicted of Appellant was not art. 7. Since embezzlement, issue is whether he bribery, crime.” an “infamous committed Shaver, 338, 1842 Serg. & WL In Watts of infamous (Pa.1842), category this Court delineated *3 offenses as:
treason, species of crimen felony, every falsi —such verdict, attaint of false subornation involve the description, like offences of the other administration public and affect the charge of falsehood justice.
Id., *4. 4918 at 1842WL pertained to original in its context
Although passage this testimony giving a disqualify person offenses that would of the within a broader discussion appeared in court—and that disabled a connoting crimes legal concept of subse- or a witness —it was serving juror person from for of infamous offenses adopted description quently See, II, Hughes, Petition e.g., of Article Section purposes 97-98, recently, More Pa. (2000), this A.2d 647 Baldwin v. classification, and the above continued: reiterated Court an depart from such established As no reason we see purposes that a crime is infamous we reaffirm principle, a underlying facts establish if its of Article offense, involving or a offense felony, a crimen like falsi affects the that charge of falsehood justice. without this definition consistently applied has Court
Our deem crime whereby we rule a mechanical employing one from disqualifies grounds that solely on the facts and analyzed the we have juror. Instead serving as crime and determined surrounding the circumstances forth in to those set was akin at issue the offense Shaver. omitted).'4 (footnote 497-98, A.2d at 652
Id. at Richard to both Shaver and trial court read Presently, the assumed to crimen are all deemed dictate that falsi when committed adversely affect the administration court reasoned public office. The an individual who holds integrity crimes “undermines of such commission jus office, public administration thereby affecting the court thus at 6. The trial op., slip op. Trial tice.” is infamous when offense concluded rule, incorrectly states by an This committed officeholder. that, to be however, requires as the Shaver classification itself must infamous, offense See, In re justice. e.g., administration of affect the (1991) 286 n. 252 n. Braig, 527 rule, infa that, bribery only is the Shaver (observing under distinction justice).5 Such purpose mous if its obstruct expansion, an were it not for might of little relevance remain considered crimen types. of offenses years, in recent *4 falsi. constitutionally infamous had defined The trial court in Richard specifically render which would crimes as those offenses Pa. at 751 A.2d serving juror. See 561 incapable of at 650. quoted above can be paragraph of Richard that the first
5. To the extent all constitutionally infamous crimes to include expand read to the list 1hey on the tend to have an effect whether or no1 crimen offenses falsi paragraph clarifies that no justice, the second public intended. broadening scope of constitutional such of the 420 law,
At common
crimen
referred to
crime render
falsi
ing
perpetrator
witness,
incompetent
such as
perjury,
subornation of
“and
affecting
other crimes
Dictionary
justice.”
the administration of
372
Black’s Law
(6th ed.1990).
aspect
One
of such
appears
offenses
to be the
perpetrator’s
regard
lack of
degree
for the truth even to the
willing
public
he
undermine the
administration of
Jones,
justice.
321, 323,
See Commonwealth v.
334 Pa.
5 A2d
(1939)
804, 805
(explaining
necessarily
that crimen
entails
falsi
falsehood,
an element of
“everything
includes
which has a
tendency to injuriously
affect the administration
(internal
the introduction of
quotation
falsehood and fraud”
omitted)).
logically
It
follows that
traditionally
entail,
minimum,
deemed
at a
an intent to de
falsi
Toto,
ceive. See
Virgin
Government
Islands v.
529 F.2d
(3d Cir.1976)
278, 281
(explaining that “[cfrirnen
de
falsi
involving,
to,
scribes crimes
or at
relating
communicative,
least
verbal, dishonesty”).
often
This aspect of traditional crimen
appear
would
primary purpose
consistent with a
classification as a test of
competency
prospective
of a
witness, where the court is
testimony
concerned
be
potentially worthy
States,
of belief.
Rosen v.
See
United
467, 471,
148, 150,
(1918).
U.S.
38 S.Ct.
421
which the
deceit,
by
or falsehood
“involving corrupt
those
impeded, such
may be
of
witnesses,
bribery of
perjury,
of
subornation
witnesses, barratry,
of
in
non-attendance
conspiracy
procuring
measures, and
by
weights
false
counterfeiting, cheating
crime”).
of a
an innocent
to accuse
conspiring
individuals convicted
rendering
common law rules
As the
were re-
as witnesses
incompetent
to serve
certain crimes
Richard,
The record
conflicting
contains
indications concerning
Appellant
felony
was convicted of a
or a misdemean-
or. Although
opinion
the trial
suggests
court’s
that he was
theft,8
convicted of misdemeanor level
Trial
op.,
see
slip
1-2,
at
op.
the criminal information
grading
reflects a
of third-
degree felony,
plea colloquy
and the
that Appellant
sheet
signed
an acknowledgment
possible
includes
aof
sentence
up
years
prison,
seven
which is consistent with felony
106(b).
gradation.
Since,
noted,
See 18 Pa.C.S.
I believe
that
grading
of Appellant’s offense as misdemeanor or
(lie
well,
Notably,
present
facts
matter are less
severe than
borough
those in Richard.
In that case a
councilman had
hours,
girlfriend
gunpoint
held his former
at
in a car
three
and was
restraint,
threats,
subsequently convicted of unlawful
terroristic
reck-
violations,
endangerment,
less
firearms
and other offenses. See Rich-
ard,
appellant
561 Pa. at
deprived
at 649. Thus the
had
liberty
placed
his victim of her
physical
and
her at serious risk of
harm.
We
nonetheless determined that he was not
barred
holding public
office. See id. at
COMPANY,Appellant Blanche Hoover, M. Husband, HOOVER and James E. her Loren Druist, Wayne Hursh,
J. Trucking Company, S. Marbec Marvin Trucking Company, K.B.S., Inc., SenseniG Marbec t/d/b/a *7 Appellees.
Supreme Pennsylvania.
Argued March
Decided Oct.