97 Pa. 293 | Pa. | 1881
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court, March 21st 1881.
This was a writ of quo w'arranto, issued at the relation of the attorney-general, requiring the defendants to show by what authority they hold and exercise the office of associate judges of Fayette county.
It appears, by the suggestion filed, that Fayette county has a population of forty thousand inhabitants; that by the Act of 9th April 1874, Pamph. L. 54, it was designated as the Fourteenth Judicial District, “ to which the county of Greene is herebj' attached that the associate judges of Fayette county, in office at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, remained in office until the expiration of their respective terms; that the defendants were elected after such expiration, and have continued in office since
We are met at the threshold of the case by a denial of our jurisdiction. Sect. 3 of art. V. of the Constitution declares the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend over the state, and the judges thereof shall have original jurisdiction in cases * * of “ quo warranto, as to all officers of the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the state.” It is objected that the jurisdiction of a judge of the Common Pleas'does not extend over the state, but is confined to. his judicial district, from which it is argued that he is not “an officer of the Commonwealth” whose right to hold his office can be inquired into by this court upon a writ of quo warranto. If this position be sound, there would be no remedy in such cases, as neither the Constitution nor any Act of Assembly confers such jurisdiction upon the Courts of Common Pleas, and a person who had intruded himself into the office of president or associate judge of such court could hold the office so usurped indefinitely. We are not driven to this unfortunate position, as we regard the question of our jurisdiction as free from difficulty. That judges of the Common Pleas are state officers is not denied: Leib v. Commonwealth, 9 Watts 200. While their jurisdiction for many purposes-is confined to their respective judicial districts, it is equally true that for some purposes it extends over the state. Witnesses may be subpoenaed in any portion of the state, and their attendance compelled by attachment in any county of the state by the Court of Common Pleas of such county. In many instances, original process may issue from such courts to other counties throughout the state. The 3d section of the Act of 13th June 1836, Pamph. L. 572, the Act of 4th March 1862, Id. 79, and the Act of 24th April 1857, Id. 318, are cited as illustrations. Many similar acts might be referred to were it necessary. We need not pursue this branch of the case further. It is too plain for argument. We are of opinion that a judge of the Court of Common Pleas is an officer whose jurisdiction extends over the state, within the meaning of the 3d section of the 5th article of the Constitution. It follows, that this court has jurisdiction to inquire, upon quo warranto, by what right the defendants hold the offices which they respectively claim.
We pass now to the main question in the case. Its solution must depend chiefly upon the construction which should be placed upon the 5th section of the 5th article (Judiciary) of the Constitution. The language of said section is as follows i “ Whenever a county shall contain forty thousand inhabitants, it shall constitute a separate judicial district, and shall select .one judge, learned in the law, and the General Assembly shall provide for additional judges as the business of the said districts may require. Counties. containing a population less than is sufficient to constitute separate
The Act of 1874, to which reference has been made, was passed to give effect to this constitutional provision, and designates the different judicial districts throughout the state.
It is clearly the right of Fayette county, having a population of forty thousand inhabitants, to be a separate judicial district. Hence it was entirely proper for the legislature to designate it as the fourteenth district.
Counties having forty thousand inhabitants are entitled to three privileges under the 5th article. They are: 1. The right to be a separate judicial district; 2. The right to have a resident law judge; and 3. The right not to have associate judges. As these rights rest upon the fundamental law, it is not in the power of the legislature to take them away. The designation in the Act of 1874 of Fayette county as the fourteenth judicial district is the equivalent of declaring it a separate district. To hold otherwise would convict the legislature of a wilful violation of the Constitution.
It was urged, however, that by attaching Greene county to Fayette, under the provision of the 5th article, Fayette lost its distinctive character as a separate district, and that Greene became a part of the district. This proposition cannot be' sustained without writing something into the Constitution that is not there. It does not say that counties with forty thousand inhabitants shall be separate judicial districts, excepting where a county with a less population is attached thereto. There is nothing in the language of the Constitution to indicate that Fayette county loses any of its rights as a separate district by having Greene attached.
The word “ attached” in the 5th article, and in the Act of 1874, mus‘t be understood according to its popular meaning. It vras well said in Monongahela Navigation Company v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 114, that constitutions are for the million, not for the mere inspection of lawyers, and are expressed in terms that are most familiar to them, that they may discern their rights and duties. What would the citizen of average intelligence understand by the word attach ? Precisely what the lexicographers define it to mean, o tie or fasten, to hind; as to fasten one substance to another by a string or glue.” — Webster. Surely he would never dream that when one thing is attached to another, the thing attached became a part of the thing to which it is attached. You may attach a chain to a watch, but it does not thereby become a watch, nor any part thereof. Nor does a small county attached to a separate judi
The Constitution having in language too clear to be misunderstood defined the rights of Eayette county as a separate district, I will consider for a moment the rights and position of Greene as am attached county. Among them are, 1st. The right to have associate judges resident in the county; and, 2d. The right to have the president judge of Eayette to preside in her courts, and to attend to all such business as requires his action. For such purposes Greene is in the same position as if she were one of the counties of a single district.
In such case, however, it might fall to her lot, to have a resident president judge, which can never be the case while attached to Fayette. If there'is anything clear in the Constitution, it is that the mere attachment of Greene to Fayette does not change any of the rights of the latter county.
I grant that the position of an attached county is anomalous. It was probably intended to be so. It would have been very easy for the framers of the Constitution to have provided in that instrument that such a county should be a part of the judicial district to which it should be attached. But they carefully refrained from doing so, and, we must presume, for sufficient reasons. Its position, at most, is temporary. It may become a separate district by increase of population, or may be made a part of a single district; and I have no doubt this guarded language was used in the Constitution to prevent what has just occurred here, viz., an attempt on the part of associate judges to hold their offices in separate districts where, by reason of there being a resident law judge, they are not needed. It is impossible to read the Constitution, or the debates of the convention which framed it, without coming to the conclusion it was intended to abolish the office of associate judge in all counties where a president judge is obliged to reside — that is, in all “ counties forming separate districtsand in attaching a county to a separate district the separate character of the district is presumed, so far as it concerns the office of associate judges not learned in the law. Further than this it is not necessary for us to go. It may be that in some sense and for some purposes Greene county may be a portion of the Fourteenth District. It is certainly a portion of the territory over which the judge of Fayette is required to preside, and in this sense the words “ district” and “ territory” may perhaps be considered as convertible terms. But it cannot be regarded as a part of the district in the sense of taking from Fayette county any of its rights as a separate district; it is
We have seen that Greene as an attached county has all the rights necessary for the holding of her courts and the proper administration of the law. It is said, however, that the construction we have placed upon the Constitution denies to her people the right to vote for president judge: this does not necessarily follow. The 15th section of the 5th article provides, “All judges learned in the law, except the judges of the Supreme Court, shall bo elected by the qualified electors of the respective districts over which they are to preside. Speaking for myself, it may possibly be that, in favor of the right of suffrage and for election purposes, the word “ districts” in this section may be construed to mean territory, so that in the case of an election for president judge of the Fourteenth District, the voters of the entire territory over which he is to preside may vote at such election. This, however, is a mere suggestion, not even an opinion of my own. No such question is before us, nor can it be decided in this proceeding. Any attempt to do so would embarass us in the future when such a case is brought before us, if it should be.
Even if there be a casus omissus in the Constitution in this respect, it would be no reason why we should deprive Fayette county of rights clearly given by the fundamental law. We can neither amend the Constitution or make the law. If any remedy is needed, we leave it to the legislative department of the government where it properly belongs.
This evil, if it exists, is not serious nor of a permanent character. It has often happened in the past that in the erection of new judicial districts, or by transferring a county from one district to another, the courts of a county have been presided over for years by a judge who was not voted for by its electors. And such instances may occur in the future under apportionments under the new constitution. Such slight imperfection in the working of that instrument in isolated cases is no good reason for interfering with a general system which, as a whole, is commendable and may be found useful.
And now, March 21st 1881, after hearing and upon due consideration, judgment is entered for the Commonwealth ; and it is further ordered and adjudged by the court that the said David W. C. Dumhauld and Griffith Roberts be and they are hereby respectively ousted from the office of associate judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette county, and from the franchises, fees and emoluments thereof, and that they pay the costs of this proceeding.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, delivered the following opinion, in which Gordon and Green, JJ., concurred:
Less than three months ago, after argument and ample time for consideration, we decided this case in favor of the defendants. Now, after a re-argument on the part of the plaintiff only, and without any substantial reasons not presented on the former argument, the judgment then entered. is to be reversed. In this I cannot concur. Nothing less than clear error in the former judgment justifies the present judgment. This reversal is mainly based on that portion of article V., sect. 5, of the Constitution of 1874, which declares “ whenever a county shall contain forty thousand inhabitants it shall constitute a separate judicial district. * * * Counties containing a population less than is sufficient, to constitute separate districts shall be formed into convenient single districts, or, if necessary, may be attached to contiguous districts, as the General Assembly may provide. The office of associate judge not learned in the law is abolished in counties forming separate districts.”
As the clause relating to forty thousand inhabitants does not execute itself, but requires legislative action to give it effect (Com. ex rel. Chase v. Harding, 6 Norris 343), and other parts of the Constitution relate to the same general subject-matter, no one should be interpreted by itself alone, but all should be made to harmonize so as to give due effect to the whole Constitution. It must be so interpreted as to carry out the great principles on which our government is based.
Section 15 of the same article declares “ all judges required to be learned in the law, except judges of the Supreme Court, shall be elected by the qualified electors of the respective districts over which they are to preside.” It is conceded that one president judge presides in the counties of Fayette and Greene. It follows that he is the president judge in each county, and the writs issued in each are tested in his name. Thus, in fact, the two counties constitute the district in which he presides. Then, in the language of the Constitution, he “shall be elected by the qualified electors” of that district.
Section 19 requires that judges, “ during their continuance in office, shall reside within the districts for which they shall be respectively elected.”
Section 26 declares “ all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation.”
The right of every male citizen ox the Commonwealth, twenty-one years of age, to vote at all elections, under limited qualifications, is expressly declared in art. VIII., sect. 1. This right of suffrage thus distinctly affirmed to exist in the great body of the people cannot be taken from them as long as the present Constitution stands, and it is not to be held subordinate to mere matters of
It is claimed, however, that the Constitution declares a county or counties having a population insufficient to form a separate district may be attached to contiguous districts, and as Greene is attached to Fayette, the latter still remains a separate district. It is true the Constitution does permit a county to bo attached to a contiguous district, yet there it stops. It does not profess to declare its legal status, nor the status of the citizens of the county thus attached. It certainly is not a forced presumption to say, that, when the people adopted the Constitution, they understood, whenever a county was “attached” to an existing district, it became a part of the district.
The very idea of territorial attachment is, that the two thus united become parts of one whole. It is but another word for annexation. Unless otherwise provided by the terms of annexation, it becomes an integral part of the enlarged territory.
The denial of associate judges to the county of Fayette is a distinct affirmation that in one county, in which the president judge presides, he constitutes the whole court. He may there hold a court of oyer and terminer, and perform all the duties and exercise all the powe. a that he and associate judges not learned in the law jointly might do. In the county of Greene, where he also presides, it is admitted he has no such power. This is manifestly contrary to the whole spirit of the Constitution and the Act of Assembly creating the district. The idea that the presiding judge has so much less power in one county in his district than in another, finds no warrant in the Constitution. It is conceded that this ground is wholly untenable, where the legislature has in clear and express terms declared that two counties shall form a district.
It is therefore contended that the legislature may make this discrimination, and make the clause applicable to courts of the same grade of unequal operation, but this would seem to come in direct
This is not the case of a transfer of one county to a previously existing judicial district, for which the Constitution intended to provide. It is the formation of a new district by one and the same Act of Assembly, and in one line thereof.
After judges were made elective in Pennsylvania, a question as to the power of the legislature to transfer a county to another district, and thereby impose on the people thereof a judge in whose election they had no voice, was somewhat mooted. To remove this doubt, and to bridge over the time intervening prior to the next election, this power to attach was expressly given. It cannot be that there was any intention to permanently take from the people of any one county substantial rights and powers enjoyed by the people .of any other county. It is clearly wrong to say the people of Fayette county have a right to be deprived of associate judges. On the contrary, they have the right to enjoy all the conveniences resulting from having such judges. They expressed such desire by electing these judges. The governor duly commissioned them. It cannot be presumed that he did so contrary to the advice of the then attorney-general. Thus the action of the people of Fayette county had the sanction of the executive department.
Notwithstanding the words of the Constitution, that a county containing a population of forty thousand shall constitute a separate district, yet an act of the legislature is necessary to make it a district, and to set its machinery in motion. It is giving to that clause an undue effect when it is thus made to defeat other parts of the Constitution relating to the same subject-matter, and thus thwart the clear intent of the legislature in uniting the two counties under one president judge. To reach any other conclusion is to assume it intended to violate a cardinal right of the people declared in the Constitution. The other view makes the act harmonize with the different parts of the Constitution,, so as to give a reasonable and practical effect to all of them.