COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CARLOS PEREZ
No. 9 EAP 2020
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT
DECIDED: April 29, 2021
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ. [J-108-2020]. Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 10/07/2019 at No. 1392 EDA 2017 affirming the Order entered on 4/5/2017 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, at No. MC-51-CR-0005268-2017. ARGUED: December 1, 2020.
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
DECIDED: April 29, 2021
We granted discretionary review to determine whether the Superior Court employed the proper standard for evidentiary sufficiency in evaluating the Commonwealth‘s prima facie presentation at a preliminary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513-15 (Pa. 2005) (Commonwealth need not prove defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at pre-trial stage; it must put forth sufficient evidence to establish prima facie case of guilt, i.e., probable cause to warrant belief the accused committed the offense); Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003) (when determining whether prima facie case has been established, evidence must be read in light most favorable to Commonwealth, giving effect to all inferences reasonably drawn from evidence to support a verdict of guilty). We hold the Superior Court failed to review the evidence in the proper light, and accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Appellee was arrested and charged with first-degree murder for the stabbing death of the victim during a physical altercation inside a Philadelphia nightclub (the Bleu Martini) during the early morning hours of August 20, 2016. At a first preliminary hearing conducted on March 22, 2017,1 Hector Martinez, a friend of the victim, testified he and the victim arrived at the Bleu Martini just before closing, but were permitted to enter after paying a fee to a “bouncer.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/22/17 at 5. Martinez testified he saw appellee wearing a gray shirt sitting at a table approximately four feet from where the victim was dancing with a female in a group. Martinez testified he saw appellee stand up and approach the group, the only “males” in the area were appellee and the victim, and he saw two “bouncers” walk toward them. Id. at 8, 9, 25. Martinez testified he then saw the victim walk outside, holding his neck. Martinez followed the victim outside, and saw “blood [] gushing out of his neck.” Id. at 10. Martinez became enraged, “turned back to go inside of the [c]lub[,]” saw appellee “coming outside, he had the blood on his shirt[;] ...It was full of blood.” Id. at 10, 11. Martinez testified he asked appellee, “What did you do to my friend?” and when appellee “pretended he didn‘t know what I was saying[,]” Martinez “punched [appellee] in the face and [appellee] went [back] inside the club.” Id. at 10-11, 20. Martinez testified he assumed appellee was the victim‘s attacker. Id. at 11. On cross-examination, Martinez testified although he saw blood on appellee‘s shirt, he did not actually see the victim get stabbed. Id. at 34.
Following the testimony of Martinez, the Commonwealth introduced a DNA lab report showing that blood samples taken from the front and back of appellee‘s gray shirt “originated from the same source” and “matche[d]” the victim‘s DNA, and appellee himself
A second preliminary hearing was conducted before a different jurist of the common pleas court on April 5, 2017.4 At the outset, the court stated it had “read the notes of testimony” from the first preliminary hearing, and noted, “the issue[ ] [here] is not whether or not a crime was committed, I think there is an agreement there was a crime committed, but the identity of the perpetrator is the issue in question.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/5/17 at 9, 15-16. The Commonwealth then called as its first witness Marquis McNair, a “bouncer” who worked security at the Bleu Martini. Id. at 19. McNair testified
McNair then began clearing patrons out of the club, and after the premises had been cleared, McNair noticed appellee standing inside a “little doorway” separating the “first bar” from the “second bar.” Id. at 38. At this point, appellee was only wearing a tank-top, and McNair, knowing the “rules [of] the club is [one] must have a shirt on[,]” asked him, “[W]here‘s your shirt?” Id. at 37, 39. Appellee answered he left it in the
On cross examination, McNair testified that while the “pushing” incidents in the Bleu Martini involved only the victim and appellee, both individuals were part of larger groups concentrated in a small two-booth area of the club. Both those groups consisted of people who were “black, white, Spanish, male [and] female.” Id. at 53-54. McNair could not give a definitive answer as to the number of people around appellee and the victim, or the specific number of people in each group, but testified the total number of people occupying the small two-booth area in which the incident took place was not “more than 15” and not “less than 5.” Id. at 55. McNair testified he never saw a weapon and did not hear or see any glass being broken. Id. at 63. McNair agreed the “blood came shooting out of [the victim],” and the blood “could have hit whoever was near him.” Id. at 71-72. McNair additionally testified that the other “bouncer” who helped separate appellee and the victim had gotten blood on his suit. McNair disagreed with defense
The Commonwealth then presented the testimony of Philadelphia Police Officer Charles Stone, who responded to the Bleu Martini with his partner after being “flagged down by a citizen” reporting a fight there. Id. at 85. The officers received a call while en route reporting a “male stabbed across from the Bleu Martini [] parking lot.” Id. When the officers arrived, they saw the victim lying on the ground, bleeding heavily from the neck and unable to speak. Id. at 85-86. Emergency medical personnel arrived and transported the victim to a hospital, where he later died. Id. at 86. Officer Stone testified an “employee[ ] from the Bleu Martini . . . said he had a male inside who was involved in the fight.” Id. Once inside, the officer “was pointed in the direction of [appellee] ... [who] was sitting [in a] bоoth[,]” ostensibly because he was “involved in the fight[,]” and also because “[h]e owed money on the tab.” Id. at 87-88, 92, 104. The officer asked appellee whether he was “involved in the fight.” Id. at 90. Appellee replied “no.” Id. Officer Stone asked appellee a few more questions regarding what happened, and appellee “then stated . . . he had been hit, but he wasn‘t in the fight.” Id. Officer Stone then asked appellee “where his shirt was[.]” Id. Appellee retrieved his shirt which was now “tucked behind the seat” in which he had been sitting, and the shirt “had blood on it.” Id. at 91. Officer Stone asked appellee “how did blood get on [the shirt]?” Id. at 92. Appellee replied “when he was fighting . . . he got hit and that‘s how the blood got on there.” Id. The Commonwealth marked for identification a statement Officer Stone had given in the case, and the officer confirmed it accurately recorded a report he submitted stating that, “[a]t
Following the parties’ arguments, the preliminary hearing court found the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to “establish at a prima facie level that this defendant was the person who inflicted the injuries that resulted in the death of the victim in this case.” Id. at 115. Thus, the court dismissed the charges for lack of evidence, and the Commonwealth appealed.
A divided en banc panel of the Superior Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Perez, 220 A.3d 1069 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc). The panel majority observed, ““[a] prima facie case consists of evidence, read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that sufficiently establishes both the commission of a crime and that the accused is probably the perpetrator of that crime.“” Id. at 1075, quoting Commonwealth v. Ouch, 199 A.3d 918, 923 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis supplied by Perez court). The panel majority then noted, “[a]t the prima facie level, ”inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth‘s case.“” Id., quoting Ouch, 199 A.3d at 923 (emphasis supplied by Perez court). The panel additionally observed, ““[e]videntiary inferences, like criminal presumptions, are constitutionally infirm unless the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.“” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991).8
The panel first addressed the suggested inference that appellee perpetrated the killing based on the testimony provided by McNair. The panel noted although McNair testified appelleе made a “furtive arm movement” during the second altercation, which happened around the same time as the stabbing, McNair still was able to physically separate appellee and the victim before hearing a female shout “they cut him,” from a surrounding group of “between ten and thirty people.” Id. at 1077. McNair never saw a weapon and did not see appellee stab the victim, no weapon was ever found, and there was no other evidence to support an inference appellee possessed or used a weapon, such as security video, or “clarifying testimony” from the woman “whose cries brought [the victim‘s] injury to McNair‘s attention.” Id. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and “[a]ccepting McNair‘s testimony as true,” the panel concluded, “we are nonetheless unable to find it more likely than not that [thе victim‘s] wound resulted from [appellee‘s] use of a deadly weapon[.]” Id., citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10-11 (Pa. 1978) (pre-trial inference of defendant‘s identity as killer was improper in absence of evidence establishing defendant‘s actions at time of killing, motive to kill, or murder weapon used).
The panel next rejected the suggested inference of appellee‘s consciousness of guilt arising from evidence that appellee made efforts to conceal his role in the crime,
Judge Olson would have concluded the “Commonwealth met its burden of establishing a prima facie case of murder against [appellee].” Id. at 1079-80 (Olson, J., concurring and dissenting). In Judge Olson‘s view, “the record . . . when viewed in the proper light . . . [shows] there is probable cause to believe that [appellee] was the person who committed [the crime].” Id. at 1080. Judge Olson pointed out several inconsistencies in the panel majority‘s recitation of the facts and the inferences to be reasonably drawn
Judge Olson listed the relevant facts the Commonwealth established in this matter as follows: “[appellee] and [the victim] were engaged in two pushing matches, the second of which was more aggressive; [appellee] and [the victim] were the only two individuals involved in these altercations; [appellee] made a motion toward [the victim‘s] neck seconds before a female yelled that [the victim] had been cut; [appellee] exited from the club but returned only after being punched by Martinez; [appellee] hid his shirt which contained a significant amount of [the victim‘s] blood; [appellee] denied being in a fight.” Id. at 1085. In sum, Judge Olson opined that, viewing the above evidence and all
II.
We granted the Commonwealth‘s petition for allowance of appeal raising the following question: “Did the Superior Court misapply the standard for the evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth‘s prima facie case, as set forth [in Karetny and Huggins], effectively ruling that inferences may be drawn from the evidence in favor of defendant[s] at the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal proceeding and raising the burden of proof borne by the Commonwealth?” Commonwealth v. Perez, 226 A.3d 561 (Pa. 2020) (table) (per curiam).
The Commonwealth‘s bedrock contention is the lower courts deviated from the well-settled and long-accepted “standards by which a court must evaluate a prima facie case[,]” which if permitted to stand, will “increase[ ] the Commonwealth‘s burdеn of proof at the preliminary hearing stage of litigation.” Commonwealth‘s Brief at 29. “Instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth‘s favor, as required at the preliminary hearing stage by this Court‘s decisions in [Karetny, supra and Huggins, supra], the Superior Court majority and the pretrial courts did just the opposite.” Id. at 16. The Commonwealth argues that contrary to the conclusions of the lower courts, the evidence it presented, when viewed in the proper light, “unquestionably exceeded the threshold of proving that [appellee] was probably the perpetrator of the victim‘s murder.” Id. at 18 (emphasis supplied by the Commonwealth).
The Commonwealth next claims the Superior Court “disregarded other evidence” favorable to the Commonwealth, namely, that appellee tried to flee the scene and hide evidence which raised a reasonable inference of his consciousness of guilt. Id. at 26. According to the Commonwealth, the Superior Court‘s characterization of appellee‘s actions as cooperating with Bleu Martini security and the police represents “an improper pre-trial acceptance of defense-favored inferences.” Id. at 27. The Commonwealth maintains that viewing the facts presented at the preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, “as this Court‘s well-settled precedent requires,” leads to the eminently reasonable inference that appellee attempted to conceal evidence and lie to the police, which are both probative of his guilt. Id. at 27, citing Commonwealth v. Dollman, 541 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. 1988). Moreover, the Commonwealth suggests the Superior Court‘s reliance on Prado, supra, is entirely inapt as that case is factually inapposite. Id. at 28-29. The Commonwealth states the defendant in Prado was seen simply walking from an alley where a fatal shooting took place, and there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting nor any other evidence whatsoever of the accused‘s involvement, except an attempt to show motive based on an altercation the accused had with the victim one year earlier. Id.
Lastly, the Commonwealth observes a preliminary hearing is not a trial, but is designed to protect an individual‘s right against an unlawful arrest and detention. Id. at 29, citing McBride, 595 A.2d at 591. The Commonwealth asserts, “[t]he majority‘s decision would essentially require the Commonwealth to prove a defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the pre-trial stage. Requiring such exacting proof before a
Appellee agrees a crime occurred and that the central issue in question is the identity of the perpetrator. Appellee‘s Brief at 7. Appellee first argues that he was not even questioned “about the incident for over six months. The Commonwealth‘s desperation to repeatedly charge [appellee] in order to put an innocent man on trial is because the case is stone cold.” Id. at 7-8. Appellee argues there was no direct eyewitness testimony identifying him as “[t]he stabber.” Id. at 9. Appellee insists the unidentified female‘s exclamation that ”they cut him[,]” was insufficient to prove apрellee stabbed the victim because “”[t]hey’ could be anyone present[,]” and observes ”[t]he stabber could have been any of the men and women who were all dancing, drinking, and moving around the very small [c]lub.” Id. (emphasis in original). Appellee next importunes the Commonwealth “would have this Court incorrectly assume that it had to have been a man who stabbed the victim and that the only male in the crowd nearby the victim was [appellee]. In that no one actually saw who stabbed the victim, whose [sic] to say that it was not a woman?” Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, appellee is adamant there was ”no evidence whatsoever that [appellee] ‘provoked’ either of the two pushing matches[.]” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). Appellee muses that “even if [appellee] and the [d]ecedent were, for the sake of argument, both involved in these pushing matches, that does not establish that it was [appellee] who stabbed the [d]ecedent[,] as “[t]here is no еvidence that anyone saw [appellee] with any type of weapon in his hand.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
Appellee goes on in this fashion to argue McNair never testified he saw appellee‘s “hands on or even near” the victim‘s neck, and insists the evidence showed that while there was a lot of blood on the floor, and some on a bouncer‘s suit, “[t]here was only a
Next, without citation to relevant authority, appellee contends a trial court‘s “decision to quash a criminal information or indictment is within [the court‘s] sound discretion . . . and will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 17-18.10 Appellee emphasizes the Commonwealth‘s evidence was reviewed by two separate common pleas court judges who found the evidence insufficient. The same evidence was reviewed by the Superior Court en banc, where a majority of the judges also concluded the evidence was insufficient. Appellee contends, “[w]hile hypothetically perhaрs one jurist may misapply or misunderstand the prima facie standard, the odds are almost nill [sic] that multiple jurists, viewing that exact same
Appellee finally asserts the inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence must be reasonable, id. at 20, citing McBride, and observes ““where the Commonwealth‘s case relies solely upon a tenuous inference to establish a material element of the charge, it has failed to meet its burden of showing that the crime charged was committed.“” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 997 (Pa. 1983) (emphasis omitted). Appellee argues evidentiary inferences are infirm unless the inferred fact is ““more likely than not” to flow from the proved fact upon which it depends. Id., quoting McBride, 595 A.2d at 591-92. Appellee asserts the more-likely-than-not test must be viewed as a minimum standard; anything less would rise to no higher than suspicion or conjecture, which clearly are not evidence. Id. at 21, citing Wojdak, 466 A.2d at 966 and Commonwealth v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2016). Appellee thus contends there is no proper inference from the evidence to show he is more likely than not the perpetrator. Appellee cites two non-precedential opinions to support his argument that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case and concludes the present case is similarly infirm. Id. at 22-24, citing Commonwealth v. Laboy, 1950 EDA 2012, slip op. at 7-8 (Pa. Super., May 16, 2013) (unpublished memorandum) and Commonwealth v. Fuentes, No. 3927 of 2008, 2009 Pa. Dist. & Cty. LEXIS 376 (Lehigh County, June 2, 2009).
III.
We have previously observed the “question of the evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth‘s prima facie case is one of law.” Huggins, 836 A.2d at 865; see Karetny,
Pennsylvania law provides:
The basic principles of law with respect to the purpose of a preliminary hearing are well established. The preliminary hearing is not a trial. The principal function of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual‘s right against an unlawful arrest and detention. . . . At this hearing the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it.
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
“[A] prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense. Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the jury.” Karetny, 880 A.2d at 514 (citations omitted). “A judge at a preliminary hearing is not required, nor is he authorized to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused; his sole function is to determine whether probable cause exists to require an accused to stand trial on the charges contained in the complaint.” McBride, 595 A.2d at 592, citing Prado, supra. An offense on which the Commonwealth has met its burden will be “held over” for trial, Commonwealth v. Weigle, 997 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 2010); at the trial, of course, the Commonwealth‘s burden is to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McBride, 595 A.2d at 591. The weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing stage, and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the person
“[I]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth‘s case.” Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866 (quotation marks omitted). “The use of inferences is a process of reasoning by which a fact or propositiоn sought to be established is deduced as the logical consequence from the existence of other facts that have been established.” Wojdak, 466 A.2d at 996. The “more-likely-than-not” test, must be applied to assess the reasonableness of inferences relied upon in establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability. Id. The more-likely-than-not test is the minimum standard — anything less rises no higher than suspicion or conjecture. Id.
IV.
The parties and the courts below all agree the victim was unlawfully killed by a stab wound to the neck. Thus, the Commonwealth properly established the statutory elements of the crime of murder at the prima facie level. See
We proceed to the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to show appellee was probably the рerpetrator. As we have already noted, this is a legal question, and as such, our appellate courts owe no deference to the preliminary hearing court‘s
The first two established facts the Commonwealth relied upon at the preliminary hearing to raise a reasonable inference that appellee was the perpetrator were (1) that appellee and the victim engaged in two shoving matches immediately before anyone noticed the victim‘s ultimately fatal neck wound, and (2) during the second, more aggressive skirmish, appellee made a motion with his arm toward the victim‘s neck. The Superior Court panel majority stated it read this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accepted it as true, but it nevertheless determined no reasonable inference of appellee‘s personal culpability arose therefrom. It is clear that in reaching this conclusion the Superior Court did not hew to the appropriate standard.
Although the Superior Court recognized the victim was killed by a wound that was noticed by eyewitnesses seconds after the second skirmish, it ultimately concluded these facts did not raise a reasonable inference that appellee was the killer. The majority thus failed to view this particular evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and instead improperly viewed it in the light most favorable to appellee. See Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866 (preliminary hearing evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to Commonwealth; inferences reasonably drawn from evidence that would support guilty verdict must be given effect). Specifically, it appears the Superior Court majority, without expressly saying so, determined the eyewitness evidence did not raise the suggested inference that appellee stabbed the victim, but instead raised an equal, or perhaps more
First, the evidence regarding the timing of the fatal thrust, even given McNair‘s testimony that he did not see the victim get stabbed, was that he saw blood gush from the victim‘s neck within two seconds of separating the men while he was directly in front of the victim and looking at him. A reasonable inference from this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is not that someone else stabbed the victim, but that appellee stabbed the victim. Second, the panel‘s statement there were between ten and thirty people “facing off against one another,” Perez, 220 A.3d at 1077, clearly arises from the panel‘s failure to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as its witness McNair testified there were five to fifteen people total among the twо groups in the vicinity of the altercation. Importantly, there was zero evidence the groups were engaged in hostilities or a face-off against one another at the time the second confrontation between appellee and the victim occurred. It is thus clear the Superior Court majority failed to apply the proper standard. See Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866 (“[i]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support
The remaining facts upon which the Commonwealth relied to support its suggested reasonable inference that appellee was the perpetrator were: 1) he attempted to leave the Bleu Martini after the stabbing; 2) he twice tried to conceal his bloody shirt; and, 3) he lied to police regarding the bloоd on his shirt and his involvement in the incident. We reject the Superior Court‘s position these facts were not adequately established by the record, and we further reject its legal conclusion they were not sufficient to show appellee‘s “guilty conscience” and give rise to the reasonable inference appellee was the perpetrator of the crime.
The record evidence was clear appellee did, in fact, leave the Bleu Martini shortly after the stabbing. The evidence was just as clear appellee went back inside the Bleu Martini only after encountering the victim‘s friend, Martinez, who punched appellee in the face. Although the Superior Court recited these facts, the court interpreted them to mean appellee “stayed at Bleu Martini‘s premises[,]” which somehow undermines a consciousness of guilt. Perez, 220 A.3d at 1078. Thus, when the Superior Court concluded this demonstrated appellee‘s “cooperat[ion],” id., rather than his flight from the scene, the court failed to view the evidence in the proper light. See Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866 (preliminary hearing evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to Commonwealth; inferences reasonably drawn from evidence that would support guilty verdict must be given effect). Additionally, the panel determined the evidence showed that after appellee came back inside the Bleu Martini, “[t]he security staff detained [him] because of the $600 he owed on his tab, not because they thought he was involved in
Additionally, the parties and the courts below all acknowledge appellee discarded his bloody shirt in the trash after he returned to the Bleu Martini. The panel did not view this fact as supporting a reasonable inference that appellee attempted to destroy or conceal evidence, because appellee eventually told McNair where the shirt was and retrieved it at McNair‘s direction. Perez, 220 A.3d at 1078. Thus, the panel actually disregarded the fact appellee initially threw his shirt with appellee‘s blood on it in the trash. And, the panel apparently ignored evidence that, although appellee had the shirt draped over his shoulder when McNair first seаted him in a booth after all other patrons had left the club, the shirt was no longer draped on his shoulder when Officer Stone interviewed appellee a short time later. When Officer Stone asked appellee where the shirt was, appellee retrieved it from where it was tucked behind him in the booth. This preliminary hearing evidence, when viewed in the proper light, reasonably gives rise to an inference that appellee twice attempted to discard or conceal his bloody shirt. The Superior Court‘s alternate view — that these facts instead demonstrate appellee‘s compliant behavior — arises from a reading of the evidence in a light most favorable to appellee, not the Commonwealth. See Karetny, supra; Huggins, supra.
Finally, and perhaps most telling, the preliminary hearing evidence showed appellee denied he had beеn involved in a fight when directly asked that question by Officer Stone. After producing the bloody shirt at the officer‘s direction and further
V.
We conclude the Supеrior Court failed to apply the correct standards to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. Specifically, the court did not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the court also failed to give effect to all reasonable inferences from that evidence that would support a guilty verdict. See Karetny, supra; Huggins, supra. We therefore reverse the decision of the Superior Court and order appellee be held for trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice Baer, and Justices Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion in which Justice Todd joins.
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY