COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. GABRIEL J. MARTINEZ, Appellee; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. ADAM MACKENZIE GRACE, Appellee; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. WAYNE PATRICK SHOWER, Appellee
Nos. 30 MAP 2015, 32 MAP 2015, 34 MAP 2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
September 28, 2016
SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.
[J-29A-2016, J-29B-2016, J-29C-2016]
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 1522 MDA 2013 dated April 14, 2014 Affirming the Order of the York County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-67-CR 0000227-2011, dated July 31, 2013.
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 1422 MDA 2013 dated April 15, 2014 Affirming the Order of the York County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No.CP-67-CR 0006313-2005, dated July 19, 2013.
ARGUED: March 8, 2016
OPINION
In the three consolidated appeals presently before this Court, all of which originated in the Court of Common Pleas of York County before the same judge, the Superior Court applied its en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), and concluded that Appellees are entitled to specific performance of their plea agreements, i.e., Appellees’ sexual offender registration requirements are governed by Megan‘s Law,1 which was in effect when Appellees entered their plea agreements, and not by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),2 which superseded Megan‘s Law. We granted allowance of appeal to examine Hainesworth and its applicability to Appellees’ cases. Consistent with the Superior Court‘s decision in Hainesworth, we hold that Appellees are entitled to the benefit of the bargains struck with the Commonwealth when the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreements. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
A. Appellee Wayne Patrick Shower (Shower)
The Commonwealth charged Shower with aggravated indecent assault,
B. Appellee Gabriel J. Martinez (Martinez)
The Commonwealth charged Martinez with one count each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
Megan‘s law was in effect when the trial court accepted the plea agreement, and pursuant to Megan‘s Law, a conviction for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse obligated the offender to register for life as a sexual offender.
C. Appellee Adam MacKenzie Grace (Grace)
The Commonwealth charged Grace with one count each of unlawful contact with a minor,
Megan‘s law was in effect when the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreement. Neither of Grace‘s convictions required him to register as a sexual offender under Megan‘s Law.4 However, had Grace been convicted of unlawful contact with a minor, Megan‘s Law would have mandated that he register as a sexual offender for ten years.
II. SORNA
After the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreements and sentenced Appellees, the General Assembly passed SORNA as Act 111 of 2011, signed
Regarding its applicability to convicted criminals, SORNA provides, in pertinent part:
The following individuals shall register with the Pennsylvania State Police as provided in sections 9799.15 (relating to period of registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) and 9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and Pennsylvania State Police) and otherwise comply with the provisions of this subchapter:
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(2) An individual who, on or after the effective date of this section, is, as a result of a conviction for a sexually violent offense, an inmate in a State or county correctional institution of this Commonwealth, including a community corrections center or a community contract facility, is being supervised by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole or county probation or parole, is subject to a sentence of intermediate punishment or has supervision transferred pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Supervision in accordance with section 9799.19(g).
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(3) An individual who:
(i) was required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police pursuant to this subchapter prior to December 20, 2012, and who had not fulfilled the individual‘s period of registration as of December 20, 2012[.]
Shower and Martinez were convicted of indecent assault under
Grace was convicted of indecent assault for violating
A. Shower
On March 12, 2013, Shower filed in the trial court a Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement or for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Therein, Shower explained that he entered his plea with an understanding and agreement that he would be required to register as a sexual offender for only ten years under Megan‘s Law. Because SORNA now would obligate him to register as a sexual offender for life, Shower asked the trial court to enforce specifically the parties’ plea agreement and to order that he has to register as a sexual offender only for ten years as contemplated by the agreement and his accepted guilty plea.
In support of this request, Shower alluded to contract law principles and averred that the application of SORNA‘s increased registration requirements to him violates the parties’ plea agreement. Shower also took the position that the application of SORNA to him violates the Due Process and Contract Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.6
On May 31, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Shower‘s petition. The only evidence offered at that hearing was Shower‘s testimony. He testified that, when he entered into the plea agreement, he understood that part of the agreement required him to register as a sexual offender for only ten years. N.T., 5/31/2013, at 4-5. Shower further stated that the main reason that he entered into the agreement with the Commonwealth was to avoid the lifetime registration requirement Megan‘s Law attached to an aggravated-indecent-assault conviction, i.e., the charge that the Commonwealth withdrew as part of the plea agreement. N.T., 5/31/2013, at 5-6.
The day after Shower filed his petition, Martinez filed a nearly identical petition in the trial court. Like Shower, SORNA would obligate Martinez to register as a sexual offender for life, not for the ten years that Megan‘s Law‘s required when the trial court accepted his plea agreement. The trial court held a hearing regarding Martinez‘s petition on June 21, 2013. No evidence was offered at the hearing, as the Commonwealth was willing to stipulate to the facts as stated in Martinez‘s petition, N.T., 6/21/2013, at 13-14, which were nearly identical to the facts alleged in Shower‘s petition.
C. Grace
On the same day as the hearing on Martinez‘s petition, Grace filed a petition in the trial court. Grace‘s petition was substantially similar to the petitions filed by Shower and Martinez. When the trial court accepted Grace‘s plea agreement, he was not required to register as a sexual offender. SORNA now would mandate him to register as a sexual offender for 25 years. For the same reasons cited in the petitions filed by Shower and Martinez, Grace asked the trial court to issue an order instructing the Commonwealth to perform specifically the plea agreement, which for Shower would mean that he is not required to register as a sexual offender.
IV. Trial Court Orders and Opinions
On July 19, 2013, the trial court entered separate orders granting the petitions of Shower and Martinez. In the two opinions in support of those orders, the court concluded that the application of SORNA to persons such as Shower and Martinez violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of both the United States and Pennsylvania
Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth filed identical court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements in the cases concerning Shower and Martinez. Germane to this matter, the Commonwealth did not present an issue in their 1925(b) statements explicitly challenging the trial court‘s contract law analysis; however, the Commonwealth did assert that the trial court erred by holding that the application of SORNA to Shower and Martinez violated the Contract Clauses of the state and federal constitutions, seemingly confusing contract law and Contract Clause analyses, as the trial court did not find that the Contract Clauses of either constitution were violated.8
Finally, with regard to Grace, the trial court entered an order granting his petition and adopting the initial opinion it authored in Martinez‘s case. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal and, subsequently, a court-ordered
The Superior Court consolidated the Commonwealth‘s appeals regarding Martinez and Grace.9 Commonwealth v. Martinez et al., 102 A.3d 530 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum) (Martinez/Grace Appeal). The court considered
V. Hainesworth
The Commonwealth charged Hainesworth with three counts of statutory sexual assault,
On February 27, 2009, Hainesworth and the Commonwealth entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Hainesworth pled guilty to three counts of statutory sexual assault, three counts of indecent assault, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 445. Thus, as part of the agreement, the Commonwealth withdrew all of the aggravated-indecent-assault charges that would have triggered registration under Megan‘s Law. Id. at 446. However, if applicable to Hainesworth, SORNA would alter his sexual offender registration status.
More specifically, Hainesworth pled guilty to, inter alia, violating
In anticipation of the effective date of SORNA‘s new registration requirements, Hainesworth filed a motion on December 13, 2012, seeking termination of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition; however, the court‘s order further stated that Hainesworth was not subject to SORNA‘s registration requirements. In this regard, the court posited that the application of SORNA to Hainesworth would violate due process, fundamental fairness, and the parties’ negotiated plea agreement. Id. at 446-47. The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, which heard the matter en banc.
The Hainesworth court began its analysis by highlighting the very different manners in which the parties characterized the issue before the court. Id. at 447. Hainesworth framed the issue similarly to how the trial court viewed it, i.e., whether the parties’ plea agreement included a term that Hainesworth does not have to register as a sexual offender, and if so, whether he is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. On the other hand, the Commonwealth believed the issue involved a question of statutory application of SORNA, which could not be avoided. Consistently, the Commonwealth argued that the Superior Court had previously upheld changes to the registration requirements of Megan‘s Law applicable to registrants who are under correctional supervision, noting that registration requirements are non-punitive collateral
Thereafter, the Hainesworth court concluded that the record unambiguously demonstrated that Hainesworth, the Commonwealth, and the guilty plea court understood that a sexual registration requirement was not included as a term of Hainesworth‘s plea agreement. Id. at 447-48. According to the court, the plea agreement appeared to have been precisely structured so that Hainesworth would not be subjected to a registration requirement. Id. at 448. In this regard, the court found significant that the plea agreement completely eliminated only the aggravated-indecent-assault counts, the sole counts Hainesworth faced that would have triggered a Megan‘s Law registration requirement. Id.
The Hainesworth court next concluded that the trial court did not err by ordering specific performance of the terms of the parties’ plea agreement. The court did so by first rejecting the Commonwealth‘s contention that, because registration under SORNA is a non-punitive collateral consequence of Hainesworth‘s conviction, Hainesworth is subject to SORNA‘s reporting requirements. Instead, the court determined that the dispositive question is whether sexual offender registration was a term of the parties’ agreement.10 Id. at 448-49 The court further highlighted that, while a plea agreement arises in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and, therefore, must be analyzed under principles of contract law. Id. at 449.
The Hainesworth court found further support for its position in the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Hainesworth court quoted Santobello for the proposition that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. The Hainesworth court opined that this proposition of law is reflected in the law of this Commonwealth, which holds that, when a trial court accepts a plea agreement, the convicted criminal has forfeited the right to a trial by jury and, therefore, must be afforded the benefit of all of the promises made by the district attorney.
Additionally, the Hainesworth court analogized the circumstances of Hainesworth‘s case with the situation presented to this Court in Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976). In Zuber, the trial court accepted a plea agreement which contained a sentence that was both advantageous to Zuber and, as it turns out, incapable of fulfillment under the law. Yet, this Court held that Zuber was entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain -- a prison sentence commensurate with the term contemplated by all of the parties to the plea proceedings, Zuber, 353 A.2d at 446 -- despite the unenforceable nature of the sentence.12 Premised upon these conclusions and supporting logic, the Hainesworth court found no error in the trial court‘s decision to order specific performance of the agreement between the Commonwealth and Hainesworth. For these reasons, the en banc panel unanimously affirmed the trial court‘s order. We now turn our attention back to the Superior Court‘s decisions regarding the Commonwealth‘s appeals sub judice.
VI. Superior Court‘s Memorandum Opinions
The Commonwealth presented the same four issues in the Martinez/Grace Appeal as it did in the Shower Appeal. The Superior Court disposed of both appeals
Regarding Shower, the Superior Court concluded that the record, specifically the transcript of Shower‘s guilty plea colloquy, clearly demonstrated the nature of the parties’ agreement. Shower Appeal at 6-7. During that colloquy, the parties discussed that: the Commonwealth would be withdrawing the charge of aggravated indecent assault (which would have required Shower to register as a sexual offender for life under Megan‘s Law); Shower would be pleading guilty to indecent assault; and, under Megan‘s Law, an indecent-assault conviction required the criminal to register as a sexual offender for ten years. Id. (citing to the notes of testimony from Shower‘s guilty plea colloquy). The Superior Court pointed out that subjecting Shower to SORNA‘s lifetime-registration requirement for a Subsection 3126(a)(7) indecent assault conviction would have placed Shower in the same position that he was in when he began the plea
As to Martinez, the Superior Court observed that, at the hearing regarding Martinez‘s petition to enforce his plea agreement, the Commonwealth stipulated to the facts as set forth in the petition. Martinez/Grace Appeal at 10. Because the petition alleged, inter alia, that Martinez entered into the plea agreement with the agreement that he was required to register as a sexual offender for only ten years, id. (quoting Martinez‘s Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement or for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 3/13/2013, at ¶1), the Superior Court concluded that a term of the parties’ plea agreement was that Martinez would have to register as a sexual offender only for ten years.
Concerning Grace, the Superior Court highlighted the parties’ stipulation of facts, wherein they specified, inter alia, that the plea agreement was based upon Grace not having to plead to charges that would require him to register as a sexual offender. Martinez/Grace Appeal at 10-11 (quoting Stipulation of Facts, 7/30/2013, at ¶4).14 Based upon this stipulation, the Superior Court determined that the parties’ plea agreement did not require Grace to register as a sexual offender.
The Superior Court rejected the Commonwealth‘s various attempts to distinguish Appellees’ cases from Hainesworth and held that, because Appellees’ plea agreements contained conditions regarding their sexual offender registration status, Hainesworth
VII. The Parties’ Arguments to this Court
The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal in all three cases. This Court granted the petitions and consolidated the matters in order to evaluate Hainesworth and its application to Appellees’ cases. The issues in these cases implicate questions of law. As with all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 2007).
In its briefs to this Court,15 the Commonwealth continues to invoke the constitutional Contract Clauses and to refer to a violation of those clauses. However, as noted previously, neither the trial court nor the Superior Court disposed of Appellees’ cases by way of a Contract Clause constitutional analysis. Rather, the trial and intermediate courts clearly applied general contract law in deciding that Appellees should receive the benefit of their bargains.
Appellees have identified this weakness in the Commonwealth‘s briefs. Indeed, Appellees dedicate significant portions of their briefs arguing that this Court should dismiss the appeals, primarily on the basis that the Commonwealth seeks review of a claim that was not the basis of the ruling below[.] Martinez/Grace Brief at 18
At the inception of these cases, Appellees, in their various petitions, injected the issue of whether principles of contract law require specific performance of the parties’ plea agreements. In addition to finding that the application of SORNA to Appellees constitutes an ex post facto violation, the trial court determined that principles of contract law mandate that Appellees receive the benefit of their bargains. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court‘s orders solely on the basis of contract law principles. Moreover, throughout this litigation, the parties have provided adequate argument on these non-constitutional principles, including the Commonwealth in its briefs to this Court. Consequently, we now will consider the cases solely under common law contract principles.16
Ultimately, the Commonwealth asks this Court to reject Hainesworth and remand Appellees’ cases for further consideration. At the core of its argument is the Commonwealth‘s belief that SORNA‘s registration requirements, like Megan‘s Law‘s registration requirements, constitute collateral consequences of Appellees’ convictions.17 According to the Commonwealth, when it enters into a plea agreement
Stated succinctly, Appellees primarily contend that Hainesworth was correctly decided and that the Superior Court properly applied Hainesworth in concluding that they are entitled to the benefit of their bargains -- Martinez and Shower have to register as a sexual offender for ten years, and Grace does not have to register as a sexual offender. As to the Commonwealth‘s belief regarding the alleged collateral nature of SORNA‘s registration requirements, Appellees take the position that the Hainesworth court properly rejected the claim that a promise of non-registration should not be enforced because registration is ‘collateral’ to the sentence. Martinez/Grace Brief at 39; Shower‘s Brief at 26. Indeed, Appellees echo the Hainesworth court‘s determination that, for purposes of a contractual analysis of the parties’ plea agreement, the dispositive question regarding a convicted criminal‘s sexual offender registration status is whether sexual offender registration was a term of the parties’ agreement, and if it
VIII. Discussion
As an initial matter, the Hainesworth court accurately described the critical role that plea agreements play in the criminal justice system. In fact, courts have long recognized that plea negotiations and agreements are essential components of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (explaining that [t]he disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of justice). In this Commonwealth, we look upon the practice of plea bargaining with favor. Zuber, 353 A.2d at 443.
We acknowledge that the analogy of a plea agreement as a contract is not a perfect one. For instance, unlike a typical contract, a plea agreement does not become binding on the parties upon their consent to terms; rather, a plea agreement is not valid and binding until it is evaluated and accepted by a third party, i.e., a trial court. See
Nonetheless, as the Hainesworth court recognized, plea agreements clearly are contractual in nature. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (stating that, [a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts). For all intents and purposes, the parties agree on this point. See Commonwealth‘s Martinez/Grace Brief at 13 (A guilty plea is a contract.); Commonwealth‘s Shower Brief at 13 (same); Martinez/Grace Brief at 30 (Specific
By way of example and pertinent to Appellees’ cases, in Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1993), Spence argued that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce an oral plea agreement allegedly reached by the Commonwealth and Spence prior to his trial. Spence, 627 A.2d at 1184. In rejecting this argument, this Court acknowledged that, after a plea agreement has been entered and accepted by a trial court, the Commonwealth must abide by the terms of the plea agreement. The Court, however, clarified that, prior to the entry of a guilty plea, the defendant has no right to specific performance of an agreement. Id. Stated in the affirmative, after parties enter into a plea agreement and the trial court accepts it, the convicted criminal can seek specific performance of the agreement. Specific performance is a traditional contract remedy that is available when monetary damages are inadequate. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (8th ed. 2004) (defining specific performance as, inter alia, a court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate . . .).
In this vein, the Santobello Court instructed that, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. Consistent with Santobello, this Court has held that, when a trial court has accepted a plea agreement entered into by the Commonwealth and a defendant, the prosecutor is duty bound to fulfill the promises made in exchange for the
IX. Conclusion
When a question arises as to whether a convicted criminal is entitled to specific performance of a term of his plea agreement, the focus is not on the nature of the term, e.g., whether the term addressed is a collateral consequence of the defendant‘s conviction.19 Rather, quite simply, the convicted criminal is entitled to the benefit of his
With regard to Appellees’ cases, the Superior Court accurately reported that the Commonwealth stipulated to the facts as set forth in Martinez‘s petition. Martinez/Grace Appeal at 10; N.T., 6/21/2013, at 13-14. In the petition, Martinez alleged, inter alia, that he entered into the plea agreement pursuant to an understanding and agreement that [he] was required to register as a sexual offender for only ten years. Martinez‘s Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement or for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 3/13/2013, at ¶1. By stipulating to this fact, the Commonwealth confirmed that the parties’ plea agreement contained a term requiring Martinez to register as a sexual offender for ten years. Thus, Martinez is entitled to the benefit of that bargain.
Concerning Grace, he and the Commonwealth entered into a stipulation of facts. Those facts included: The plea agreement [Grace‘s counsel] negotiated with the Commonwealth was based on Mr. Grace not having to plea to charges which would require registration under Megan‘s Law in effect at the time of the plea. Stipulation of Facts, 7/30/2014, at ¶4. By stipulating to this fact, the Commonwealth admitted that the parties’ plea agreement contained a term which contemplated that Grace would not have to register as a sexual offender. Consequently, Grace is entitled to the benefit of his bargain.
Regarding Shower‘s case, in concluding that the record demonstrated the nature of the parties’ plea agreement, the Superior Court accurately recounted the discussion that took place at Shower‘s plea colloquy. Shower Appeal at 6-7. That discussion included Shower‘s counsel stating that Shower would be subject to ten years of
For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the Superior Court.
Former Justice Eakin and Justice Donohue did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justices Todd, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.