The Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (“PERL”), together with several individual state and federal taxpayers, brings this case against the Secretary of the United States Department of Education, the Commissioner of Education for the State of New York, the Chancellor of New York City schools and the Board of Education of the City of New York (the “Board of Education” or the “Board”), alleging that public funds are being used in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and of Article XI of the New York State Constitution.
The program at issue provides federally-funded remedial instruction and ,support services to educationally disadvantaged elementary and secondary school students in New York City. The present version of this program was devised in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Aguilar v. Felton,
Both sides have moved for summary judgment on undisputed material facts. For the reasons stated below, the defendants’ and defendant-intervenors’ motions are granted and plaintiffs’ motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 1 Legislation and Services
Since 1965, Congress has enacted a series of laws (referred to here as “Chapter 1”) that provides federal funding for remedial educational and support services for certain elementary and secondary school students residing in low-income areas. 1 Chapter 1 services are financed by the federal government and provided by local educational agencies (“LEAs,” such as defendant Board of Education) to low income, low achieving children. 20 U.S.C. § 2722. To be eligible for educational assistance, a child must be both economically and educationally disadvantaged. A child is economically disadvantaged if she resides in an area that has a high concentration of low-income families, and she is educationally disadvantaged if she is progressing at a level below normal for her - age. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724. New York City’s plan implementing Chapter 1 provides supplemental remedial instruction in math, reading and English as a Second Language (“ESL”). (Declaration of Marga.ret O. Weiss, ¶ 14.)
The program is intended to reach eligible students regardless of whether the students attend public or private schools. 2 The LEAs must “make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and television, computer equipment and materials, other technology, and mobile educational services and equipment),” in which private school children can . participate. Title 20 U.S.C. § 2727(a). This section further requires that “[ejxpenditures for educational services and arrangements pursuant to this *849 section for educationally deprived children in private schools [be] equal (taking into account the number of children to be served and the special educational needs of such children) to the expenditures for children enrolled in the public schools of the local educational agency.” Section 2727 and its implementing regulations require that private school students receive services “comparable” to those provided to public school students. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 6.) 3
From the program’s commencement in 1965, defendant Board of Education, as a participating LEA, has used the earmarked funds to finance additional classes, counselors and instructors for all eligible children. Chapter 1 funds for the City of New York are administered through the Chancellor of the Board of Education. (Weiss Decl. ¶ 10.) Eligible students attending public schools have been, and continue to be, instructed in the schools that they regularly attend, by being pulled out of their regular classes to attend remedial instruction sessions. Currently, additional methods of combining remedial and regular class instruction are being pursued in public schools, such as the “push-in” or “pull-aside” methods, by which a remedial education teacher gives individualized instruction during a regular class session. (Declaration of Michelle I. Nowosad, ¶¶ 19-27; Declaration of Samuel Corsi, ¶¶ 3-4.) Prior to 1985, private school students generally received Chapter 1 services in separate classrooms in their schools. 4
B. Legal Challenges To Public Teaching In Private Schools
In 1976, the National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty brought ah action in the Southern District of New York to enjoin the Chapter 1 program insofar as it provided services in non-public religious schools. A three-judge court held that New York’s Chapter 1 program did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Nat’l Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Harris,
In 1978, another action was filed in this district by six federal taxpayers
5
challenging the City’s Chapter 1 program.
Felton v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 78-CV-1750 (E.D.N.Y.). After the parties stipulated to adopt the factual record of
Harris,
Judge Neaher granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Establishment Clause precludes the funding of any program that sends publicly-paid teachers into religious schools.
Felton v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Felton
case and rendered a decision on July 1, 1985.
Aguilar v. Felton,
In
Grand Rapids,
the “shared-time” program at issue involved public school teachers, paid by state funds, teaching certain “secular” subjects in religious schools. The subjects ranged from remedial courses to “enrichment” courses such as home economics,
*850
arts and crafts and languages. The classes were offered in the non-public schools, of which 40 out of 41 were “pervasively sectarian.” Because the Establishment Clause proscribes “ ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,’ ”
Grand Rapids,
In
Aguilar,
the Court concentrated not on the impermissible promotion of religion, but on the excessive entanglement that was required to prevent any such impermissible effect.
Aguilar,
Thus, Aguilar and Grand Rapids effectively precluded any publicly-funded teaching on the premises of religious schools. In the wake of those decisions, the Board of Education was forced to abandon its program of *851 providing Chapter 1 classes in private religious schools. 6
C. The Alternative Plan
After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Aguilar,
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments, which provided more money to local authorities to supply Chapter 1 services to private school students in compliance with
Aguilar. Pulido v. Cavazos,
In the wake of
Aguilar,
the U.S. Department of Education promulgated a series of guidelines for implementing Chapter 1 programs for private school children. These guidelines prohibited in-school instruction by public school teachers, but authorized off-premises mobile instructional units and computer instruction where possible. (Declaration of Thomas W. Fagan, Exh. B-D). The guidelines further instructed LEAs to deduct any additional costs of providing Chapter 1 services to private school children from the LEA’s total Chapter 1 allocation,
i.e.,
prior to apportionment per . student. This method, known as “off the top” cost allocation, was intended to fulfill the requirement of 20 U.S.C. § 2727(a) and (b)(1) that Chapter 1 services be provided on an equitable basis to all school children, whether attending public or private schools.
See Barnes v. Cavazos,
The New York State Department of Education also issued guidelines on the matter. (Weiss Deck, Exh. B). These guidelines endorsed the options of offering classes at religiously neutral sites (defined as “locations not under the control of any religious authority or organization”) in mobile units (if not located on the premises of a sectarian organization) and on public school premises.
The Board of Education of the City of New York devised and implemented a new plan (the “Alternative Plan”) to provide Chapter 1 services to religious school students consistent with Aguilar. The educational content of the Alternative Plan is identical to the plan invalidated in Aguilar — instruction to eligible students in remedial math, remedial reading and ESL — and makes use of four delivery options. First, religious school students are bused or otherwise escorted to a “matching” public school (one with available space and located no more than ten minutes away) for instruction. Because of the logistical difficulties involved in arranging for integrated classes (see Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 39-63), these classes are composed entirely of students from the private school. Second, classes are held in mobile instructional units (“MIUs”)— vehicles outfitted as classrooms and parked on a public street near the private schools during the school day. 7 Third, classes are held in sites leased by the Board (“Leased Sites”), which are off-premises but near the private schools. Finally, computer-assisted instruction (“CAI”) is provided (preferably in *852 addition to off-premises, face-to-face instruction) through computer terminals located in a designated room in the religious school or through laptop computers sent home with religious school students. (Weiss Decl, ¶¶ 101,114,117,121.) 8
The mix of these delivery methods changed somewhat from 1986 to 1991. 9 Because of overcrowding in the public schools, and because of other concerns related to transporting students from private to public schools during the day, this method was used less frequently, and CAI and MIU instruction were used more frequently. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 44, 48; see also ¶¶ 39-63.)
Each option carries a different price tag. 10 The first — classes held in public schools — is the least expensive. The School Board pays nothing to use public school classrooms for Chapter 1 purposes. Since students are transported from private schools to public schools by buses already provided to the School Board during the school day, the cost of taking religious school children to and from these Chapter 1 locations is for the most part aggregated with general busing costs for the School District. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 41,171.) The same is true for transportation to and from Leased Sites, but, unlike classrooms in public schools, the Board must pay to use the space in leased buddings. During the 1990-91 school year, the Board paid a total of $280,402 to lease these sites. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 190.) Non-instruetional costs associated with CAI amounted to $226,711 in that same school year. (Weiss Decl, ¶ 197.) The provision of MIUs is significantly more expensive than any other delivery method, since each MIU is leased by the Board at a cost of $106,934 per year (including driver, garage, insurance, maintenance and repairs). In the 1990-91 school year, the Board spent a total of $11,126,541 to lease MIUs. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 66,184.)
D. The Current Constitutional Challenge
Plaintiffs PERL and taxpayers Florence Flast, Helen Henkin, Hazel Smith, Denise Krouser and Christina Walker, attack the constitutionality of the Alternative Plan. They allege that it violates the United States and New York State Constitutions by imper-missibly supporting religion and/or entangling government and religion. According to plaintiffs, each of the four delivery options in the Alternative Plan is constitutionally flawed. Plaintiffs also challenge the practice of taking additional costs for delivery of Chapter 1 services to religious school students “off the top” of Chapter 1 funds, calling the practice an impermissible subsidy of religious institutions.
Plaintiffs attack the first delivery option— providing instruction to religious school students in public schools — because the religious school students are kept separate from the public school ones.
11
Citing articles documenting community protests surrounding various segregated class programs, plaintiffs suggest that separate classes of religious and public school students, even if both these classes are held within the public school braiding, violates the Constitution in that it creates the very community divisiveness and “political entanglement” that the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. Furthermore, argue plaintiffs, the Second Circuit in
Parents’ Ass’n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones,
Second, plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the Board’s use of MIUs because of the relatively greater cost this method entails and because, plaintiffs contend, MIUs are “physically and educationally” associated with the religious school and thus create the same constitutional problems addressed in Aguilar and Grand Rapids. Plaintiffs make much of the fact that an MIU is not equipped with restroom, lunchroom or infirmary facilities, and that some surplus equipment used by Chapter 1 instructors is stored in the religious school the MIU services, since there is not enough room for long-term storage in the MIU itself. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 75-76.) The plaintiffs also contend that there is not much difference between going from class room to classroom inside the religious school, as in Aguilar, and going from a classroom inside the religious school, out the door, and immediately into a mobile classroom parked at the curb. Plaintiffs claim that MIUs amount to mere annexes of the religious schools. Because the MIU is clearly labeled as property of the City of New York (Weiss Deck, ¶ 178 and Exh. D), plaintiffs allege that, like the supervisory system struck down in Aguilar, the clear association of MIUs with the state creates excessive entanglement between church and state.
Third, plaintiffs allege that the Leased Sites are not neutral and that classes held at these sites therefore violate the Establishment Clause for the reasons set forth in Aguilar and Grand Rapids. The majority of the sites leased by the Board are indeed owned by a religious organization, often the same Catholic parish that funds the particular private school. Defendants have supplied affidavits stating that all religious symbols have been removed from every Leased Site and that each site is clearly labeled as and used only for a Chapter 1 classroom. 12 Plaintiffs contend that mere religious ownership creates a sectarian environment in Leased Sites, rendering them non-neutral. Plaintiffs also argue that paying religious institutions a fee under lease agreements constitutes a direct state subsidy to religion.
Fourth, plaintiffs challenge CAI as advancing religion and improperly entangling church and state. According to plaintiffs, Aguilar and Grand Rapids suggest that entanglement is inherent in the provision of publicly funded instruction inside a religious school building regardless of whether a teacher is physically present or instructs from another location via computer. There are no teachers present in the religious school who instruct in conjunction with CAI; instead, instruction occurs through computer terminals located in the schools and linked by modem or dedicated phone line to the Board of Education central office. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 100, 102.) There is, however, a Board-employed technician who is present in the room where CAI terminals are located. Although the technician is directed to limit his assistance to turning the terminals on and off and keeping order among the students (Weiss Decl., ¶ 104-105), plaintiffs contend that the presence of such a public employee is impermissible. Plaintiffs allege the system of CAI thus violates the Establishment Clause just as instruction in private schools by physically present teachers would. Plaintiffs further contend that CAI effectively subsidizes the religious function of sectarian schools by taking over their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the use of additional funds to pay the “compliance costs” of providing Chapter 1 services to religious school students violates both the Establishment Clause — by effectively subsidizing religious schools — and the mandate of Chapter 1 itself — by failing to treat public and private school children equitably. Part of this dispute centers on the proper interpretation of the requirement of 20 U.S.C. § 2727 and Department of Education regulations mandating that services be provided equitably and equally among private and public school children. Plaintiffs contend *854 that equal treatment, required by Chapter 1, is not provided when the state spends more per pupil for religious school students. Defendants rejoin that the equitable treatment provision mandates the current system of taking extra costs of delivery of services “off the top,” since otherwise, religious school students would receive less money per child for instructional purposes.
DISCUSSION
A. The “Effects” Cases
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
13
This prohibition reflects, among other things, the desire of the early settlers of this country to worship freely and to be free from laws which compelled public support of government-favored churches.
See Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing,
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Everson,
In the context of state supported primary education coexisting with religious schools, this requirement of neutrality presents a uniquely difficult problem in balancing private school benefits on the wall between church and state. On the one hand, services provided to all schoolchildren necessarily cause, at least to some degree, a benefit to accrue to religious schools, and, therefore, to the religion itself. Very strictly speaking, any such benefit flowing from the government to religion has some “effect of advancing religion.” On the other hand, denying children the access to general benefits because of their attendance at church-sponsored schools may effectively punish religious exercise and thus have the effect of inhibiting religion. In its effort to reconcile the mandate of governmental neutrality with the reality that every government act or omission in this context will have some “effect,” the Supreme Court has held that the preclusion of an impermissible effect should not be applied so rigidly as to disallow indirect benefits to religious institutions flowing from the provision of religious-neutral, general governmental services.
See Everson,
1. Permissible Benefits to Schoolchildren
In
Everson,
the Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing for reimbursement to parents of all schoolchildren for the costs associated with busing their children to school.
Twenty-two years after
Everson
the Court upheld the constitutionality of another generally-provided governmental service that ben-efitted religious schools, perhaps more directly than did the statute in
Everson.
In
Board of Education of Central School District v. Allen,
Reading these early “effects” eases together, the First Amendment permits state provision of goods and services if the provision is done neutrally,
i.e.,
to all schoolchildren, and if the goods and services provided cannot be converted to assist in religious indoctrination. On the other hand, laws that provided goods and services that could aid in religious instruction have been struck down by the Supreme Court as having an impermissible effect.
People of the State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
2. Subsidies of Religious Schools’ Functions
In a slightly different approach to the question of improper effect, the Court has invalidated statutes which provided public funds to pay the costs of running a private school as impermissibly subsidizing the religious function of such an institution. In
Sloan v. Lemon,
In
Meek v. Pittenger,
the Court invalidated a statute providing services to religious schools not only because such services could be converted to religious uses, but also because the statute involved “massive aid” to the pervasively sectarian schools that was “neither indirect or incidental.”
B. The Entanglement Cases
1. Aid Directly to Religious Organizations
In
Walz v. Tax Comm’n,
While the distinction between a direct money subsidy and a financial benefit via a tax exemption is elusive, it was not the main concern in
Walz,
which focused more on the entanglement of church and state.
16
Walz
attempted to balance entanglement concerns with the neutral effect requirement and concluded that rigid adherence to a neutrality standard is not required where excessive entanglement would result.
Id.
at 669,
2. The “Lemon Test” and Supervision as Entanglement '
In
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
The Court in
Leman
acknowledged that it is “a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier” which divides church from state.
Id.
at 614,
[t]he State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion ... [a] comprehensive discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal *858 beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.
Id.
at 619,
Whereas entanglement was avoided in
Walz,
in
Lemon,
the benefit created it.
Id.
at 621,
3. Political Conflict as Entanglement
In finding that the challenged statutes improperly entangled government and religion,
Lemon
referred not only to the need for supervision inherent in the statutes, but also to a “broader base of entanglement” created by statutes that are politically divisive.
Id.
at 622,
C. Chapter 1 Services And The Establishment Clause
1. Grand Rapids and Aguilar in Context
In
Grand Rapids,
the Court first found that the challenged services provided by the state,-
i.e.,
teachers of secular subjects in private schools, were mutable in their instructional character and thus could be used for religious indoctrination.
Id.
at 386-388,
Second, as in
Meek, Sloan
and
Nyquist,
the Court in
Grand Rapids
found an impermissible effect arising from public assumption of financial responsibilities of the religious schools, to wit, the teaching of secular subjects.
Finally,
Grand Rapids
announced that a “symbolic union” between church and state could constitute an impermissible effect to invalidate a statute. The Court stated that “[gjovernment promotes religion as effectively [as when financing indoctrination] when it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any — or all— religious dominations.”
Id.
at 389,
As
Grand Rapids
proceeded from the reasoning in
Meek,
so
Aguilar
built on the analysis in
Lemon.
Like the statutes invalidated in
Lemon,
the Chapter 1 program challenged in
Aguilar
provided services to private schools that could be converted to religious instructional uses.
Aguilar,
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
The Court distinguished Meek and Grand Rapids in two ways: first, the programs in those eases were considered subsidies only because the public program relieved the religious schools of costs that they otherwise would have borne, whereas the religious school in Zobrest would not have provided a sign language interpreter in the absence of the state program; and second, an interpreter, unlike a teacher, does not instruct the students at public expense, but merely acts as a transmitter for the privately funded instruction. 19
*860 2. The Comparability Requirement
In revising Chapter 1 programs in reaction to the
Aguilar
decision, state educational agencies were further influenced and constrained by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wheeler v. Barrera,
3. The Courts of Appeals’ Treatment of Post-Aguilar Cases
The Supreme Court’s holding that comparable services could be achieved in non-identical programs for private and public school students, together with Aguilar’s bar of state funded on-site instruction, caused various state departments of education and LEAs to revise their Chapter 1 programs in the hope of complying with both the First Amendment and the statute’s equal treatment goal. Four courts of appeals have heard challenges to these amended Chapter 1 programs, and all four have upheld the off-premises instructional programs as complying with the Constitution.
In
Pulido v. Cavazos,
Pulido
also declined, to find that the Missouri Chapter 1 program created any entanglement. First, the court rejected the argument that the program entangled church and state by creating political conflict, noting that
*861
“‘political divisiveness alone’ cannot invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.”
Pulido,
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also upheld the constitutionality of
post-Aguilar
Chapter 1 programs.
Barnes v. Cavazos,
In 1995, the Ninth Circuit approved an alternative Chapter 1 delivery system for private schoolchildren designed in the wake of
Aguilar.
In
Walker v. San Francisco Unified School District,
4. “Off The Top” Funding and the First Amendment
Each of the four circuit courts to consider the constitutionality of a
post-Aguilar
Chapter 1 program also concluded that the various funding mechanisms used, such as special appropriations and taking certain expenses “off the top,” did not violate the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs in
Pulido
contended that an “off the top” allocation creates political divisiveness that entangles the government and religion, amounts to public support of private school expenses, and further violates the Chapter 1 requirement of “equal” expenditures for public and private school students.
The Sixth Circuit in
Barnes
applied a “grossly disproportionate test” in assessing the disparity between the cost of Chapter 1 services for private school children and for their public school counterparts.
The Seventh Circuit in
Alexander
and the Ninth Circuit in
Walker
also found that “off the top” allocations for the extra costs incurred in making comparable services available to private school children after
Aguilar
did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Seventh Circuit applied the
Lemon
test and concluded that the purpose of this practice was secular and that its effect was to neutrally provide remedial educational assistance to all eligible schoolchildren.
In
Walker,
the Ninth Circuit followed the prior decisions in the Eighth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits, holding that the “off the top” method of financing mobile construction units was motivated by a secular purpose — the quest for comparable services — and was not so disproportionate as to be “merely a ruse to confer a benefit to the parochial school children.”
D. The Alternative Plan’s Purpose And Primary Effect
In determining whether the Alternative Plan violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, I apply the three-step inquiry set forth in
Lemon. Lemon
requires that a law have a secular purpose, no effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and no entangling propensities in order for it to pass constitutional muster.
In this case, plaintiffs have not adequately supported any contention they may have that the Alternative Plan is motivated by an improper purpose.
21
Indeed, it seems clear from the affidavits of the officials who have developed and implemented the Plan that its purpose, like that of the Chapter 1 program itself, is simply to assist in the
*863
education of disadvantaged children. In
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
Since the Alternative Plan has a secular purpose, I must next determine its primary effect. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has extensively examined the interaction between benefits to private schools and the requirements of the Establishment Clause. In order to uphold the Alternative Plan, there must be no effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. It is improper for a state to promote religious indoctrination or even to appear to do so. There are several ways in which a statute might have such improper effect. I will treat each potential impermissible effect separately.
1. The Danger Of State-Funded Indoctrination
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases have affirmed and reaffirmed the proposition that there is nothing
per se
unconstitutional about the neutral provision of a benefit to religious schools. I find, as did the court in
Walker,
that “Chapter 1 services
are
a generally available benefit: they are provided to all educationally deprived children without regard to religion.”
Walker,
Remedial instruction in public schools is not subject to being used for religious indoctrination, even if the classes taught are composed solely of students of one religion.
Wolman,
The teachers instructing in MIUs are not under the control or supervision of a religious school. Furthermore; the MIUs are not religious environments. They are labeled as property of the state. They contain no religious symbols of any kind. They are not located on the premises of religious schools. They are mobile and cannot be considered annexes to religious schools. They are not under the control of religious schools. The mere fact that Chapter 1 personnel assigned to an MIU might enter a sectarian school in between classes to use the restroom or lunchroom facilities does not convert the secular environment of the MIU into a religious atmosphere.
The case of Leased Sites is less clear, but the result is the same. Although a classroom may be leased by a state agency, it might still constitute a religious environment in certain circumstances. In
Grand Rapids,
the Court found that teachers instructing in a room leased inside a school that was owned and operated by a religious group and inhabited by religious teachers and administrators, whose professed goal was religious indoctrination, were subject to the kind of environmental pressures that could render their teaching in aid of religion.
The provision of computers inside the religious schools is likewise permissible. The fact that computers may be located inside a religious school does not taint their immutable instructional capacity. Like books, immutable secular goods can enter and be used for instruction in a sectarian school, since they are not subject to being used for religious indoctrination.
See Allen,
2. Symbolic Union — The Appearance Of State Support
The Supreme Court has held that a statute or state practice can have the effect of aiding religion when it creates the appearance of joint government-religion action or authority. For example, in
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,
the Court found that allowing a religion to exert governmental power by exercising its discretion over which applicants could obtain liquor licenses created impermissible joint state-church power.
On this subject, plaintiffs first suggest that the Alternative Plan created, in essence, á veto power for the religious schools, which amounts to an improper delegation of government authority to a religion. Plaintiffs assert that the private schools exercised this power to expand the use of MIUs and to limit the use of public school classrooms as Chapter 1 delivery sites. This argument was rejected in
Walker,
Plaintiffs next cite to
P.S. 16 v. Quinones,
The Second Circuit found that the special treatment of the religious school students, including the provision of Yiddish-speaking female teachers when requested, conferred upon the Hasidic students a benefit not available to other students. The court also held that this treatment, together with the “enforced physical separation” of Hasidic girls from public school students, created “at least the appearance that the City was endorsing the tenets of the Hasidic religious sect.” Id. at 1238. Citing Grand Rapids, the court stated that a statute could have the impermissible effect of advancing religion merely by giving the appearance of government endorsement of religion. Id. at 1246-41. It is especially important, the court noted, to guard against creating this type of “symbolic link” in the minds of “children of tender years.” Id. at 1240. The court took care to distinguish the special nature of the separation involved in that case — Yiddish-speaking teachers, physical separation and segregation by gender according to religious beliefs— with other types of separate classes for private schoolchildren that did not involve the appearance of state endorsement of religion. Id. at 1241-42.
A similar analysis of the “symbolic link” created by a state practice was undertaken by the court in
Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District,
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that conducting classes composed only of private school students creates the same type of “symbolic link” as the challenged practices in P.S. 16 and Bollenbach. However, there are significant differences between a program which happens to result in separate classes and one which deliberately sets up classes to accommodate the religious preferences of the private school students. This distinction was recognized by the Second Circuit in P.S. 16, 803 F.2d at. 1241. Here, there is no indication that the logistically-motivated separate classes echo any religious tenets of the students involved. Although schoolchildren from schools for one gender necessarily attend Chapter 1 classes composed of students only of that gender under the Plan, there is no effort made to ensure that Chapter 1 *866 personnel interacting with such students are of the same gender or otherwise meet special criteria that would perhaps be important from a religious point of view. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 134.) Some all-girls classes, for example, are attended to by male public employees. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 154-155.) There is also no construction of physical barriers to create a separate space in public schools in which private students are instructed. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 38.) Since, unlike in P.S. 16, the Alternative Plan does not cater to the religious beliefs of students, the mere fact that private school students do not receive Chapter 1 instruction together with public school students cannot be characterized as endorsing religious beliefs or creating an impermissible “symbolic link” between church and state.
Plaintiffs contend that the fact that MIUs and computers used in CAI are provided by and belong to (or are leased by) the government creates the impression that the state is engaged in a joint enterprise with religious schools. I find, however, that the opposite is true. As the Court pointed out in
Bowen v. Kendrick,
3. Direct Aid To A Pervasively Sectarian Enterprise
A statute will create an impermissible effect if it directly subsidizes a pervasively sectarian enterprise.
See Meek,
Chapter 1 explicitly provides that federally funded remedial classes established under its authority must not supplant classes already provided by local schools and educational agencies. The Alternative Plan does not replace any programs for educationally disadvantaged schoolchildren. Unlike the program in Grand Rapids, the Alternative Plan provides only for special education classes for a small, identified segment of the student population. There is no danger that Chapter 1 classes could expand within this framework to take over the secular teaching function of religious schools. In addition, affidavits from religious school administrators affirm that Chapter 1 creates educational options for disadvantaged children that otherwise were not and would not be provided by the private schools. It is clear, therefore, that, unlike the programs in Meek and Grand Rapids, and like the program upheld in Zobrest, the Alternative Plan does not substitute state aid for religious school educational responsibilities.
The Court in
Meek,
*867
Clause.
Zobrest,
at 12,
Plaintiffs’ New York Constitutional challenges of the Chapter 1 program fail for the same reasons. The benefit of the remedial education accrues not to the religious schools but to eligible, educationally deprived students. The Alternative Plan, therefore, does not “support or maintain” any religious schools in violation of the New York Constitution.
Finally, the mere payment of money to a religious institution as part of a commercial lease does not create an improper effect under the First Amendment. There is no effect of advancing religion by the government contracting with a sectarian organization unless there is some special benefit granted to the organization by virtue of the contract. There is no evidence in this case that the leasing at fair market rentals of sites owned by various sectarian groups created a special benefit for the religious organization.
4. Non-Neutral Treatment Or Effect Of The Funding Scheme
Plaintiffs contend that even if the Alternative Plan otherwise lacks the effect of advancing religion, the funding system supporting it is impermissible. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the federally endorsed and state-mandated approach of special appropriations, or taking monies “off the top” to fund the costs of complying with Aguilar, unconstitutionally transfers more money per capita to religious school students and thereby advances religion. Thus, plaintiffs contend that the funding scheme behind the Alternative Plan should be struck down as either non-neutral in its treatment of religious school students or non-neutral in its effect of providing a relatively greater benefit on such students.
As noted above, some circuits have applied a “grossly disproportionate” test to determine whether a disparity in costs and/or benefits is unconstitutional. In
Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt,
the First Circuit held that when a statute results in an unequal provision of benefits, the benefit received by religious school children cannot be grossly disproportionate.
Both Barnes and Walker dealt with Chapter 1 plans which, like the one at issue here, provided that the cost of making the plan comport with the constraints of Aguilar were taken “off the top.” In applying the grossly disproportionate test, both courts compared the “off the top” expenses to the total Chapter 1 allocation, and both concluded that the percentage of Chapter 1 funds used to bring the plans into compliance with Aguilar was not grossly disproportionate.
Plaintiffs argue that, rather than comparing the compliance costs to overall Chapter 1 funds, the grossly disproportionate test requires a comparison between cost per religious school student and cost per public school student. The eost-per-student comparison was used in
Jamestown,
The Bames/Walker method of assessing gross disproportionality here would counsel in favor of upholding the Alternative Plan. The costs of complying with First Amendment constraints, even if calculated inclusively as plaintiffs suggest, remains well below ten percent of the total Chapter 1 expenses. Such a disparity does not create a constitutional difficulty. 24
However, some circuits have refused to apply the grossly disproportionate test to determine the constitutionality of Chapter 1 funding schemes. In
Pulido
and
Alexander,
the courts rejected it, reasoning that a statistical analysis should not be the determining factor between disparities that are and are not permitted under the Constitution. Instead, these cases concluded that if services were neutrally and generally provided, then any resulting disparity in costs, or even benefits, would be irrelevant.
Pulido,
Since the Chapter 1 program at issue here provides a general benefit — remedial educational services — to all children neutrally, under the Pulido and Alexander approach, any disparity in the costs of delivering this benefit to one child as opposed to another is constitutionally immaterial. Although I agree with the Pullido/Alexander approach, the Alternative Plan at issue here satisfies the “grossly disproportionate” test in any event. 25
E. The Plan’s Potential For Excessive Entanglement
Although excessive church-state entanglement may invalidate a statute, the law does not require “total separation.”
Lemon,
1. The Need For Supervision In A Religious Environment
The Supreme Court has consistently found parochial schools to be “religious environments.”
See, e.g., Lemon,
2. Administrative Entanglement
The implementation of a successful Chapter 1 program necessarily involves at least some minimal degree of contact and coordination between public officials and the administration of the parochial school. The Aguilar decision found that the administrative contacts involved in providing services inside private schools created excessive church-state entanglement. The Court has *869 stated, however, that it is neither possible nor required that the state be barred from all contact with religious organizations. The question is one of degree.
Jamestown
held that administrative contacts alone could not cause an otherwise constitutional statute to be struck down.
3. Political Divisiveness
Although
Lemon v. Kurtzman
identified a “broader base” of entanglement that could result from a statute’s inspiration of political conflict along religious lines,
Lemon,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. Defendants’ and defendant-inter-venors’ motions for summary judgment are granted.
So Ordered.
Notes
. The first such program was created by Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 2701. Title I was recodified by Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-35, which, in turn, was superseded by the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-382. Both parties agree that the basic provisions of these laws have remained the same since 1965. The one notable addition in the latest set of amendments is 20 U.S.C. § 2727(d), which allows for extra funding to be used to conform Chapter 1 programs to the constraints of Aguilar. Section 2727(d) and other relevant provisions are discussed below.
. In 1993-94, approximately 22,000 of the roughly 259,000 students served by the Chapter 1 program attended private schools. Virtually all of these schools are affiliated with religious organizations. Approximately 86% are Catholic schools, 8% are "Hebrew day schools,” and the remaining 6% of the schools are affiliated with Greek’ Orthodox, Lutheran, Episcopalian, Ukrainian Orthodox and other denominations. (Plf.Exh. 1).
. Recent amendments express this requirement as mandating that services be provided “equitably” to eligible public and private school students. (Weiss Decl. ¶ 7; 20 U.S.C. 2727(a); (b)(2).)
. Early experiments with after-school Chapter 1 programs for schoolchildren proved unsuccessful, since both students and teachers were tired at the end of the day and thus, both attendance and attention lagged. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 18; Plf. Exh. 3, ¶¶ 17-18.)
.See Flast v. Cohen,
. However, in the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Aguilar,
the landscape of Establishment Clause decisions has significantly changed. The life expectancy of
Aguilar
itself is, to put it mildly, subject to question. Indeed, three justices of the Supreme Court have declared that
Aguilar
"should be overruled at the earliest opportunity."
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,
. Photographs of MIUs appear at Weiss Deck, Exh. D.
. CAI terminals and laptops are electronically and physically configured so as to prevent them from being used for any purpose other than Chapter 1 instruction. (Weiss Decl, ¶ 107-113, 118-120).
. The parties in this case stipulated that discovery would be limited to the dates up to and including the 1990-91 school year.
. A 6.5% general administrative charge is added to total Chapter 1 costs. This charge is taken "off the top" of funds allocated for Chapter 1 purposes. (Weiss Deck, ¶¶ 202-204.) The total administrative charge in 1990-91 was $20,910,-171. (Weiss Deck, ¶ 205.)
.Although plaintiffs allege that separation of religious school students is “for religious reasons” (Plf.Mem. at 12), this allegation is unsupported, and defendants have supplied affidavits stating that this separation is not improperly motivated, but instead reflects legitimate secular concerns. (Weiss Deck, ¶¶ 53-63, 155; see also Nowosad Deck, ¶¶ 20, 28-34.)
. Defendants state that all potential leased sites were inspected and that over 140 potential sites were, in fact, rejected by the Board because they were not religiously neutral. (Weiss Decl., ¶¶ 86-88.)
. The First Amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mur-dock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
. The Court noted that the real benefit of loaning textbooks accrued not to the parochial school, but to its students, since ownership of the books remained with the state. Although both
Everson
and
Allen
contained dicta to the effect that the benefits are permissible if provided to students rather than to religious institutions, an interpretation of these cases as holding that the constitutionality of a statute hinged on such a distinction was called into doubt by the Court's decision in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York,
. A different legal analysis has been used to determine the effect of grants to religious colleges. The Supreme Court has determined that religious colleges are not “pervasively sectarian enterprises" and that aid to such colleges, even if constituting a subsidy (taking over a cost for which the school is responsible), does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.
See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works,
. In
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
. The defendants note that five members of the current Supreme Court have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
Lemon
test, especially as applied in
Aguilar
and
Grand Rapids.
For exam-pie, in
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
. Lynch was not a case about support for private schools, but rather addressed, and upheld, the inclusion of a nativity scene in a city's Christmastime public display.
. Justices Blackmun and Souter disagreed with the Court’s characterization of an interpreter, holding that interpreting services could be converted to assisting in religious indoctrination even easier than a slide projector or a map, the public provision of which was struck down by the Court in,
inter alia, Wolman,
. Plaintiffs in
Walker
also argued that the “off the top” allocation method effectively gives the private schools veto power over proposed Chapter 1 programs, which they use to control the type of Chapter 1 delivery systems to be used.
. Plaintiffs generally allege that the purpose of the Alternative Plan is to subsidize the religious schools so as to ensure their continued existence. Not only does Chapter 1 fail to effect a subsidy to sectarian enterprises, see discussion infra, but the plaintiffs have failed to support their allegation of improper purpose with any facts.
. Plaintiffs also argue that the government has effectively created separate educational facilities for students of different religions, violating the Equal Protection Clause in the same way that the , segregated schools did in
Brown
v.
Bd. of Educ.,
. I will not determine whether the instructional services provided according to the Alternative Plan to private schoolchildren are "equitable” or "comparable” to public school students because in this case plaintiffs have no standing to assert a violation of 20 U.S.C. § 2727.
. In addition, defendants note, the extra compliance costs have often not been taken “off the top,” as the Board is permitted to do, but have been financed by other appropriations or covered by unspent portions of previous Chapter 1 funds.
. Plaintiffs challenge the New York funding laws which provide for "off the top” funding in addition to the practice encouraged by federal regulations. The reasoning upholding the feder-regulations is applicable to the state rules as well, and neither system creates a constitutional difficulty here.
