110 Ga. 824 | Ga. | 1900
The Mayor and Council of the City of Cedar-town filed their petition praying that the writ of mandamus might issue to require the county commissioners of Polk county to repair, and', if necessary, rebuild a bridge which had been constructed under the direction of the county authorities. The petition set forth, in substance, the folio-wing: In 1889 the county commissioners ordered that a named person should proceed as early as practicable to purchase material to build a bridge across a named stream. In pursuance of this order the bridge was built at the county’s expense, and was kept in repair by the county authorities for a number of years. At this time the road of which the bridge formed a part was not within the corporate limits of the City of Oedartown. After the building of the bridge the limits of the city were extended so as to embrace within the same the bridge in question. On September 19, 1898, the county commissioners passed the following order: “Ordered that the authorities of Polk County relinquish all jurisdiction or control of all the bridges or causeways inside the incorporate limits of Oedartown and Rockmart, and will not be responsible for any damages to the public caused by any bridges or causeways inside of said incorporate limits. ” In 1899, the bridge being out of repair, the city authorities requested the county authorities to repair the same, and notified
Tbe moment that tbe charter of tbe City of Cedartown was •so amended as to embrace within the limits of that corporation that portion of tbe public road of which tbe bridge in question formed a part, tbe jurisdiction of tbe county over this part of tbe highway ceased, and the same became subject to tbe control .and jurisdiction of tbe municipal authorities. See Almand v. St. Ry. Co., 108 Ga. 417, and authorities there cited. Consequently, tbe duty of tbe municipal authorities to keep in repair the bridge in question arose as soon as it became a part of one of tbe streets of the city, and tbe county was no longer under any ■duty in respect thereof. Such being tbe case, no order or proceeding of any character was necessary in order to relieve tbe county authorities of tbe obligation to keep tbe bridge in repair. Especially would tbe county authorities no longer be under any obligation to keep tbe bridge in repair, when it affirmatively appears that since the same has become a park of one of tbe streets of the city they have never undertaken to repair the bridge, but on the other hand, by order duly passed, have expressly relinquished all jurisdiction and control over it. Even if tbe law in regard to tbe abolition of a public road is applicable to bridges,
The judge erred in making the mandamus absolute.
Judgment reversed.