12 S.E. 92 | N.C. | 1890
The demurrer admits these allegations to be true. It is settled that upon such state of facts a mandamus could not issue. Muller v. Comrs.,
The plaintiffs rely upon sections 75 and 76, and chapter 25, Private Laws 1889, and contend that, inasmuch as the answer admits that at the election held in Maxton "license" to sell liquor carried the majority of votes, the county commissioners were deprived of any discretion in regard to the character of the applicant to sell liquor in that town, provided permission in writing had been granted to such applicant by the commissioners of the town. We do not think so. The sections referred to prohibit the county commissioners from granting license to retail liquor in said town without permission in writing from the commissioners of the town, and prohibit the town commissioners from *263 granting such permission, unless the town shall vote for "license," (337) and in that event all laws prohibiting the sale of liquors in said town are repealed.
The town of Maxton, having so voted, was like any other territory in which there was no prohibitory law, and the powers and duties of the country commissioners were the same in regard to it, except that before they could grant license to any person, however fit they might adjudge him to be, the permission of the town commissioners, in writing, must be first had. The effect of those sections is simply to require a concurrence of both boards to authorize a license to sell liquor in the corporate limits.S. v. Propst,
We do not see why the commissioners of Maxton were joined as parties plaintiff with the applicants for the license. Their presence seems to have been unnecessary, but in no wise prejudicial.
Per Curiam. Affirmed.
Cited: Hillsboro v. Smith,