Davis, J.

(after stating the cáse.) Section 707, subsection 21, of The Code, confers upon the County Commissioners authority to provide for the maintenance of the poor. Section 3540 does not differ materially from section 707, subsection 21, and the Commissioners have authority “ to institute proceedings against any person coming into the county who is likely to become chargeable thereto, and to cause the removal of such person to the county where he was last legally settled, and to recover, by action, from the said county all charges and expenses whatever incurred for the maintenance or removal of such poor person.”

Section 3545 provides more in detail the manner in which paupers shall be “ removed to their settlements,” and “ if such poor person be sick or disabled, and cannot be removed without danger of life, the Board of Commissioners shall provide for his maintenance and cure at the charge of the county, and after his recovery shall cause him to be removed and pay the charges of his removal, and the county wherein he was last legally settled shall repay all charges occasioned by his sickness, maintenance, cure and removal,” &c.

*524 It thus provides that the Board of Commissioners of the -county to which such poor person belongs shall receive and provide for him, under a penalty for refusal to -do so, and makes them liable, if they “ shall refuse to pay the charges and expenses” mentioned in the section.

Section 3544 provides, among other things, that “ every person who shall have resided continuously in any county for one year shall be deemed legally settled in that county.” We have been favored with an interesting argument upon questions of domicile, citizenship and residence, and many authorities have been cited by counsel, but the law applicable to pauper '• settlements” is regulated by statute, and is in no way governed by the law of domicile or citizenship.

There is no change of domicile by removal of residence without an accompanying intent, and one does not lose his domicile by change of residence simply — there must be an intent to abandon the old and acquire the new — and no length of time is necessary to constitute the change, nor will any length of residence affect the change if the intent be wanting.

It is manifestly the purpose of the .law in regard to pauper settlements to charge each county with the support of its own poor, and the liability of the county in relation thereto is controlled, not by domicile, but by settlement. State v. Elam, Phil., 460.

In Neal v. Commissioners of Burke, 85 N. C., 420, Hoke C. Secrest, a citizen of Union County, in passing through Burke County, was charged with the murder of his wife. He after-wards became insane,- and was sent, by an order of the Judge, to the asylum. His settlement was notin Burke, and it was held that the cost of sending him to the asylum, being no part of the costs of the prosecution, the county of Burke was not chargeable therewith. The county of his settleemnt was liable for that charge. The case does not state *525 bow long it was from the time of arrest to the time when he was sent to the asylum, but the facts apparent show that it was much more than one year, and while one year’s residence will create a new settlement, it is manifest that a confinement for one year under legal process does not constitute such a residence as is contemplated by the statute. A legal settlement is a right which a pauper may “ acquire,” so as to entitle him to be supported as a pauper, by a residence of twelve months. It is clear that Rosanna Meadows was notin a condition to lose or acquire anj*- rights. Being insane, she could do no act by which she could lose or gain a settlement. As an unfortunate person, she was entitled to support, and how and at whose expense this should be, is regulated by the statute, and this must be by the county where she was “ last legally settledN In what county was she “ last legally settled ” ? Do the facts alleged in the complaint, if admitted, sufficiently show that it was in the county of Buncombe ?

The facts stated are not as concise or as definite as they might have been, but they are stated with sufficient clearness to leave no doubt as to what “the cause of action ” is or as to the relief demanded. Undoubtedly they are sufficiently stated to enable the defendant to answer intelligently and make any defence that it may have to the plaintiff’s demand. Nance v. Railroad, 94 N C., 619.

Every fact necessary to constitute a claim against the county of Buncombe for the money expended in the maintenance of Rosanna Meadows is substantially stated; and the first ground of demurrer cannot be sustained.

Though it appears from the complaint that Rosanna Meadows was continuously in Burke County from August 3d, 1880, to July, 1886, it also appears that during that time she was cared for in the almshouse of that county, and the facts in relation thereto are clearly stated, and as we have *526 seen, do not constitute such a residence as is contemplated by the statute in section 3544; and the second ground of demurrer cannot be sustained.

It is sufficient, if the complaint states facts constituting a cause of action, and it is not necessary to set out in the complaint any public statute or law; and the third ground of demurrer cannot be sustained.

The Court below erred in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer. Error.