Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. ApokedakCommercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak
Lead Opinion
OPINION
On remand, the Commission found that Apokedak and George Wilson were partners during 1970 and 1971 and that partnership assets were used to purchase the vessel and gear licenses for those years. However, Wilson, and not Apokedak, was named as the gear licensee. The Commission concluded that the term “holders of gear licenses” used in
From this action the Commission has petitioned this court for review. We have granted review and we now rеverse the decision of the superior court.
In our view, the term “holders of gear licenses” can only be reasonably construed to refer' to individual named licensees. As of the enactment of the Limited Entry Act in 1973, of which
At the inception of the limited entry system, the legislature intended that “the commission would issue entry permits at the present level of fishing effort ...” (emphasis added) 1973 House Journal 503, quoted in, Rutter v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,
Apokedak argues that a literal construction of
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska’s fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the commercial fisheries in the public interest and without unjust discrimination.
However, this position is largely foreclosed by our prior decision in this case.
[I]f special circumstances exist such that an appliсant’s income dependence is not realistically reflected by his income dependence percentage for the years 1971 and 1972, the commission may award an applicant up to a maximum of 10 points based on a special showing of income dependence; ...
The Commission concluded that this regulation applied only to those who had held gear licenses in the specified years. This conclusion was in accordance with
However, Templeton is distinguishable from the present case in that it concerned administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to the Limited Entry Act rather than the Act itself. This court reviews administrative regulations to ascertain whether they are consistent with the purposes of the statutory provisions conferring rule making authority on the agency in question. Kelly v. Zamarello,
For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE the decision of the superior court.
Notes
. The Commission’s opinion states in part:
George Wilson was a licensed gear operator. John Apоkedak was not. Without John Apokedak onboard the fishing vessel, George Wilson could legally continue fishing. Without George Wilson onboard, John Apokedak could not legally continue fishing. Prior to April 15 of any year, John Apokedak could have obtained a gear license. After April 15, John Apokedak could not have achieved the status of gear operator without effecting a license transfer at the request of a gear licensee and for reasons specifically allowed inAS 16.05.670(a) . No such attempted transfer has been alleged. John Apоkedak, lending institutions, processors, venture capitalists, and potentially many others may have been owners or lessees of gear or partners in a commercial fishing operation, but they were not legally licensed gear operators.
AS 16.43.260 authorizes the commission to accept applications only from persons who have commercially harvested fish as holders of gear licenses issued under the above-discussed statutes. We find that those statutes authorize the operation of gear only by the named licensee. We find that thе statutes, by their clear language, grant a personal and individual privilege, and that the operation of gear in the absence of the named licensee was illegal. The Limited Entry Act has attached an additional right or privilege to the benefits previously granted by the issuance of a gear license: the eligibility to apply for an entry permit. We find that the eligibility to apply for an entry permit is restricted underAS 16.43.260(a) , to precisely the same degree that the operation of gear was historically limited; that is, to the individual in whose name the license was issued. Neither the gear license statute nor the eligibility provision of the Limited Entry Act reach the partner or any other associate of the named licensee.
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The provisions ofAS 16.43.260(a) should be interpreted to mean what the common reading would lead a reasonable person to conclude. The facts are that gear licenses have been in existence since before Statehood. They were, without known exception, issued one to the person. Without the benefits of gear licensure an individual was legally precluded from operating a unit of commеrcial fishing gear. After April 15 an individual could not attain the status of gear license holder in a salmon net fishery without having an existing license voluntarily transferred to him. The Legislature was surely aware of the prevalence of partnership arrangements extant in the industry, and did not provide specifically for their existence.
(Emphasis in original.)
. The court’s decision and order states in part:
Although [State v. Templeton,598 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1979) ] differs in minor factual ways from [this case,] the distinctions are not substantively significant. Both Templeton and Apokedak were equal partners and owners and operators of gear, and both received different treatment than their рartners because of the Commission’s literal interpretation of the term “gear license holder.” In neither case did the evidence show significant differences between the functions performed in the fishery by the partner named on the gear license and the partner not so named.
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Given the Supreme Court's decision and reasoning in Templeton, the question is whether that case can be distinguished from this in any way which would disqualify Apokedak’s application. There is no way to do so which would not involve unfairly discriminating against Apokedak.AS 16.43.260 must be interpreted to allow him the same status as his partner.
Apokedak v. Comm’l Fisheries Entry Comm’n, No. 3AN-77-5710 C.A. (Alaska Super., March 31, 1982).
. Further, a statutory preamble such as that contained in
. We rejected a somewhat similar argument in Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,
In large part, Rose’s disagreement with the Commission's interpretation of what consti*489 tutes “special circumstances” merely restates the equal protection argument addressed previously. It would, indeed, be anomalous to hold that the Commission’s regulatory response to the 1972 administrative closure did not deprive first-year gear holders of equal protection of the law, yet at the same time hold that the Commission must award discretionary "special circumstances” points to these very same parties out of concern for the disproportionate impact of the regulations.
.
Following the establishment of the maximum number of units of gear for a particular fishery underAS 16.43.240 , the commission shall adopt regulations establishing qualifications for ranking applicants for entry permits according to the degree of hardship which they would suffer by exclusion from the fishery. The regulations shall define priority classifications of similarly situated applicants based upon a reasonable balance of the following hardship standards:
(1) degree of economic dependence upon the fishery, including but not limited to percentage of income derived from the fishery, reliance on alternative occupations, availability of alternative occupations, investment in vessels and gear;
(2) extent of past participation in the fishery, including but not limited to the number of years participation in the fishery and the consistency of participation during each year.
. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant,
Dissenting Opinion
Senior Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conсlusion that Apokedak is not a gear license holder within the meaning of
Both the Commission and the superior court found that John Apokedak and his brother-in-law, George Wilson, were full partners during 1970 and 1971. The two men contributed equally to the purchase of their vessel, their gear and the gear license itself. They shared expenses and profits from the fishing business, and participated jointly in management decisions. They intended to act, and did act, as partners because neither man could meet the expense and risk of operating the business by himself. Nevertheless, the Commission decided that Apokedak is not eligible to apply for a limited entry permit because George Wilson’s name appeared on the gear license. The superior court reversed, and held that it was necessary to interpret the term “holders of gear licenses” to include Apokedak in order to avoid the unjust discrimination that is prohibited by the enabling statute. I would affirm the decision of the superior court.
Our task is to reconcile two sections of the Limited Entry Act.
The presumption is that the lawmaker has a definite purpose in every enactment and has adapted and formulated the subsidiary provisions in harmony with that purpose; that these are needful to accomplish it; and that, if that is the intended effect, they will, at least, conduce to effectuate it. That evident purpose of a statute is an implied limitation on the sense of general terms, and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. This intention or the prevailing perception of it affords the key to the sense and scope of minor provisions. From this assumption proceeds the general rule that the cardinal purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious.
2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 57 (4th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted). We must construe the term “holders of gear licenses” in a manner that avoids unjust discrimination.
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak,
The majority maintains that our holding in Apokedak I forecloses the argument that denying Apokedak the right to apply for a limited entry permit unjustly discriminates against him. According to the majority, “We held [in Apokedak 7] that the requirement that applicants for entry permits be past gear licensees bore ‘a fair and .substantial relationship to the purpose of preventing unjust discrimination in allocating entry permits ....’”
In a partnership, however, the partners hold all the assets of the venture as tenants in partnership.
The Commission uses a point system to rank applicants on the basis of past participation in the fishery and the hardship that would result from exclusion. Apokedak claims to have at least twenty-six points, a claim that the Commission apparently dоes not contest. Only seventeen points are required for a drift gill net permit in the Bristol Bay fishery. On the substantive basis of past participation and hardship, Apokedak is qualified to apply for an entry permit. As a full partner with a named gear license holder, he should be deemed a gear license holder for purposes of his application in order to avoid unjust discrimination.
Apokedak is an owner and operator of a vessel and gear, and is therefore a member of the class that the legislature and this court determined had the most to lоse from the advent of a limited entry program and stood most in need of protection. Apoke-dak I,
The regulation that was at issue in Tem-pleton is part of Article Six of the regulations on limited entry. Article Six outlines a “Priority Classification Point System,” and includes specific regulations on weighing an applicant’s past participation in, and economic dependence on, the fishery.
We held, however, that a literal application would undermine the legislative purpose of avoiding unjust discrimination:
While a gear license may be a good general indicator of ownеrship and operation of gear for the purpose of weighing relative hardship, to foreclose automatically consideration of special circumstances under20 AAC 05.630(b)(2) in the absence of a gear license would result, in many cases, such as the one at bar, in unjust discrimination. The Commission was properly concerned with the problem of proliferation of gear operating in the fisheries. Unfortunately, allocating one permit between two partners solely on the fortuitous circumstances of which one held the gear licensе in two given years does not realistically weigh the relative hardship which each partner would suffer by denial of a permit. In this case, the construction of the statutes and the regulations that the Commission suggests works at cross-purposes with the Legislature’s stated intent to avoid “unjust discrimination.”AS 16.43.010(a) .
Templeton,
The same interpretation of legislative intent supports the conclusion that Apoke-dak’s application should not be summarily rejected, and that he should be allowed an opportunity to' demonstrate eligibility for an entry permit under the substantive criteria set forth in the regulations. The majority admits that “
[T]he commission will rank an applicant based on the factor of investment in vessels, gear and set net sites if the applicant, on the qualification date, was the owner .... In cases where a vessel, gear or set net site was owned jointly or in a corporate capacity, an applicant’s points will be determined by multiplying his percentage of ownership interest times the total number of points possible.
Obviously, the Commission contemplated a pro rata division of the ownership interest for the purpose of allocating points between partners. As either a beneficial owner
The majority attempts to distinguish Templeton on the ground that in that case we were interpreting an administrative regulation and in the present case we are reviewing a statute. Although this observation is accurate, it is of no substantive significance. In Templeton, we based the standard of review to be applied to the Commission’s decision on the fact that the Commission had attempted to interpret the legislativе intent of the Limited Entry Act. We stated that the trial court “was in just as good a position to make that judgment as the Commission. Similarly, since a question of statutory interpretation is involved, this court will independently evaluate the trial court’s interpretation.”
I would affirm the decision of the superi- or court that in order to avoid unjust discrimination, Apokedak must be deemed a gear license holder and be allowed to apply for a limited entry permit.
.
Nature of right in specific partnership property. (a) A partner is co-owner with his partners оf specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.
(b) The incidents of this tenancy are such that
(1) a partner, subject to the provisions of this chapter and to any agreement between the partners has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes, but he has no right to possess the property for any other purpose without the consent of his partners;
(2) a partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of the rights of all the pаrtners in the same property;
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(4) on the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in the property vests in his legal representative; the surviving partner or partners, or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership property except for a partnership purpose; ...
. The regulation at issue is as follows:
(b) Economic Dependence. Up to a maximum of 20 points will be awarded an applicant for economic dependence on a fishery based on the following schedule:
(1) income dependence percentage based on harvesting the fishery resource while participating as a gear license holder in the fishery applied for as shown for each fishery in (c)(2) of this section. (Maximum of 10 points possible.)
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(2) if special circumstances exist such that an applicant's income dependence is not realistically reflected by his income dependence percentage for the years 1971 and 1972, the commissiоn may award an applicant up to a maximum of 10 points based on a special showing of income dependence; ...
. In Templeton, we noted:
In [this] case and in other decisions the Commission has interpreted the Limited Entry Act as authorizing issuance of a permit only to an individual, natural person, and not to partners, a partnership, or a corporation; the Commission believes that the law of partnership independently makes persons who were formerly partners equal beneficial owners of licenses. Templeton has not challenged this interpretation before us or below. We therefore do not review that question.