85 Md. 132 | Md. | 1897
delivered the opinion of the Court.
William McCarty executed a mortgage on certain leasehold property in the city of Baltimore to the Commercial Building and Loan Association of Richmond, Virginia. The mortgagee is a body politic and corporate under the laws of Virginia. By due proceedings the mortgaged property was sold, and in regular course exceptions were filed to the ratification of the sale. The second exception maintains that according to the Act of 1894, chapter 629, the mortgage is null and void. As this exception goes to the root of the whole matter, it is best to consider it before giving our attention to other subordinate questions which have been argued at the bar. The specific objection is urged against this mortgage that it exacts interest at a greater rate than six per cent, per annum; and it is said that it is embraced within the Act of 1894, chapter 629. If these objections are well founded they are fatal to the mortgagee’s case; because the Act in question makes the usurious contracts and securities therein mentioned absolutely null and void. It cannot be denied that a verbal and literal interpretation of the language of the Act will sustain the objection which has been urged. The appellant, however, argues that the purpose and meaning of the Act, the object which it was intended to accomplish, the evils designed to be remedied, and the great mischiefs which would be caused by including within its provisions such mortgages as the one now in litigation; all show that the construction set forth in the objection must be erroneous. A diligent examination of the Act is required for the decision of this question, which is involved in considerable difficulty.
When a written instrument of any character whatsoever is brought before a Court for adjudication, the first inquiry must be directed to its meaning. Until this is ascertained every step in the proceeding must be futile and useless. A great number of rules have been evolved by the wisdom and experience of successive ages for ascertaining the mean
The title indicates that it is an additional section to the laws relating to “Building or Homestead Associations.” But there is no reference whatever to these associations except in the last two lines. Of this matter we shall speak hereafter. In the body of the Act it is stated: “ And that no corporation incorporated under the laws of this State, for any purpose whatsoever, nor any foreign corporation doing business in the State, shall offer to procure or act as agent for any person or persons in procuring or making any loan of money or other valuable thing on the security of any chattels, nor shall make any loan of money or of any other valuable thing on the security of any chattels or otherwise, except in its own proper corporate name and for its own behalf or benefitand that no such corporation shall charge more than six per cent, interest on any loan; and that every security taken by any such corporation for a loan shall express plainly the period of time for which it is made and the entire interest agreed to be paid for the term of its continuance, and that any contract or security made in violation of the statute shall be absolutely null and void; and that no person shall, under a specified penalty, assume to deal or act as a corporation, or in any corporate name, or in any other than their own proper names in any of the matters prohibited by the statute; and that every security taken by such persons in any other than their own proper names shall be absolutely null and void. And finally, it is provided that the Act shall not apply to homestead and building and loan associations incorporated under the laws of this State. It is shown on the face of the Act that it is directed against certain conduct by corporations, and against persons who
This is an appropriate time to notice a misapprehension
The fourth exception alleges that according to the terms .of Article IX, section 6 of the by-laws, the association had no right to enforce a sale at the time it was made. This section refers exclusively to loans made to borrowers ; that is, to cases where there is an obligation to repay the sum with interest as a debt, and not to advances made on redeemed shares. In the case of the Mattress Company, 82 Maryland, 513 and 514, we endeavored to show the difference existing between the two transactions. The present mortgage shows unequivocally that there was no loan of money ; that the money advanced was not to be repaid by the mortgagor; that the money was advanced in redemption of the stock, and that the monthly payments were to be continued until the whole amount of money advanced should be liquidated by the maturity of the stock; and that no obligation was incurred by the mortgagor, ex
The learned Court below declared the mortgage null and void and set the sale aside. It has been seen that we are not able to agree in this opinion. We will reverse the order and ratify the sale with costs in both Courts.
Reversed and sale ratified.