99 Ala. 493 | Ala. | 1892
This case is in' all material respects precisely like the case of the Commercial Bank of Selma v. Hurt, ante, p. 130, decided on a former day of this term — opinion by Walker, J. In that opinion all the facts material to a consideration of this case are presented and commented on.
The claim of the Commercial Bank in the present suit is the same as that asserted by it in its suit against Hurt. In this case the asserted claim to the cotton in controversy is by virtue of the identical indorsement of cotton receipts by the H. C. .Keeble Company, which was relied on in that case. The alleged transfer was indorsed on the back of the note which the H. -C. Keeble Company gave the Commercial Bank of Selma; and is in the following words: “We hereby transfer two hundred and ninety-eight bales of cotton, marked, numbered and stored as shown in the warehouse receipts, which are,herewith transferred and delivered as collateral for the within note, which cotton has been advanced upon by us to its full value; and we hereby authorize the Commercial Bank of Selma to take actual possession of the same at any time they may desire, and to sell the same without notice, at public or private sale, applying the proceeds to the credit of this note.” Signed, “H. C. Keeble Co.”
Accompanying the indorsement the Keeble ‘ Company delivered to the bank warehouse receipts for the cotton
The claim of the Commercial Bank is rested mainly on section 1178 of the Code of 1886, which reads as follows : “The receipt of a warehouseman, on which the words ‘not negotiable’ are not plainly written or stamped, may be transferred by the indorsement thereof, and any person to whom the same is transferred, must be deemed and taken to be the owner of the property therein specified, so far as to give validity to any pledge, lien, or transfer made or created by such person.” This section of the Code of 1886 was doubtless taken from section 6 of the act “To prevent the issue of false receipts,” (fee., approved February 28,1881. Sess. Acts, 1880-81, p. 133. The rendering of the statute in the Code of 1886 is not a literal copy of the original statute. Possibly it was the intention to embody the same idea. As expressed in the Code, it may admit of question whether its language is broad enough to place the first indorsee of a warehouse receipt on the high ground claimed for him in this suit. Literally, that statute creates the presumption of ownership in the first indorsee so far only as to give validity to any pledge, lien or transfer made or created “by such person.” This language, if interpreted by grammatical rules, only authorizes the person to whom the warehouse receipt is indorsed to pledge or transfer it; and only upholds the binding efficacy of such pledge or transfer, when made by the indorsee. Thus interpreted, the Commercial Bank can claim no benefit or advantage under that statute, because the pledge or transfer was not made by an indorsee of the warehouse receipts. Possibly the original statute, as enacted by the legislature, is susceptible of a broader interpretation. We need not, however, decide this question. We prefer to place our decision on a different principle.
It will be remembered that in the indorsement on the note, by which the Keeble Company transferred to the Commercial Bank all the title or interest the latter can or does assert to the cotton, is the following language:
There is no error in the record.
Affirmed.