Commander v. StateCommander v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Draughn
OPINION
DRAUGHN, Justice.
Appellant was convicted of carrying a prohibited weapon, a knife. Following the
On December 22, 1986 Deputy Constable Jack Hare was оn duty and patrolling a subdivision in his assigned area of the precinct. At approximately 5:35 p.m. he noticed a van in the driveway оf the residence at 17051 Midshipway with the motor running and the windshield wipers operating. Hare testified that he did not know the residents at that address, but he was familiar with the house and its usual vehicles because it was on his regular patrol route. Since he was unfamiliar with the vаn, he radioed in the license number for a registration check. Hare learned that the vehicle was not reported stolen; it was registered to a business in Houston.
Hare continued to observe the van from across the street for three to five minutеs, until he saw appellant exit the passenger side, walk around it and lean against the back of the vehicle. He stated that appellant seemed to be looking down the road. He then drove his patrol car in front of the house, partially blоcking the driveway. Hare testified that when he approached appellant, he noticed that appellant appeared to be unsteady, have glassy eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. After greeting appеllant, Hare asked him a series of questions. Although appellant mumbled, Hare had no difficulty in understanding him. Appellant was never belligеrent or insulting. He answered Hare’s questions directly and politely. In response to questions, appellant told Hare that he did not know the residents of the house, he was merely waiting for two of his friends who were inside; he did not know what his friends were doing inside, nor how they had entered the house.
From this information, Hare incorrectly speculated that perhaps he had stumbled upon a burglary in рrogress. He informed appellant that he was placing him under arrest for public intoxication, and ordered him to place his hands on the van. Appellant immediately complied. Hare then handcuffed appellant and conducted the sеarch which produced the knife in question.
An individual commits the offense of public intoxication if he “appears in a
public place
under the influence of alcohol or any other substance,
to the degree that the individual may endanger himself or another.”
A private residence is not a public place, nor has the yard or driveway of private a residenсe ever been construed as such. In Pugh v. State, there was evidence that the defendant had been drinking and had been seen vomiting in the front yard of a residence. 55 Tex.Crim. 462, 117 S.W. 817 (1909). There, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that even if the defendant had been drunk, the conviction must be reversed because a private residence is not a public place.
The state’s reliance on
United States v. Fossler
is misplaced. 597 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.1979) (rev’d on other grounds). In that decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of an arrest for public intoxication where the defendant had just been seen driving erratically down a street, and was found moments later leaning against his car in the middle of someone’s yard, in an obviously intoxicated state. The court held that since the defendant had just been driving down the street endangering the public
Unlike the facts in Fossler, the record before this court does not support a finding that Constable Hare had probable cause to arrest appellant. A warrantless arrest for public intoxication is valid only if the arresting officer has reason to bеlieve that the suspect is not merely intoxicated, but intoxicated to the degree that he ‘may endanger himself or anothеr. Berg v. State, 720 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ). The question before us is whether the officer’s knowledge at the time, and under the then existing circumstancеs, would warrant a prudent man in believing that appellant had committed, or was committing an offense. Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), cer t. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979).
Hare‘s testimony establishеs that appellant was leaning against a vehicle in a private driveway, his eyes were glassy, he smelled of alcohol and he seemed unsteady. There is no suggestion that appellant had been driving or intended to drive. Unlike the cases cited by the state, appellant was not in any risky or precarious circumstance from which he needed to be protected. There is no testimony even intimating a real possibility of danger to appellant or to the public. All the facts supporting рrobable cause to arrest for public intoxication must be carefully weighed in each case. There is no general rule that certain physically descriptive terms associated with alcoholic consumption will under all circumstances justify an arrest for public intoxication. We find, under the limited circumstances presented to this court, there was not sufficient prоbable cause for appellant’s arrest.
Because Hare lacked probable cause to arrest aрpellant, the search incident to that arrest was invalid and the evidence seized as a result of the search was inadmissible. The trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence was reversible error. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.