44 So. 673 | Ala. | 1907
This was an action for libel, consisting of the publication in the Age-Herald, a newspaper ■published in Birmingham, Ala., of the articles shown in tbe record. The demurrers filed to the complaints, orig
It is contended on the part of the appellant: First. That this act is unconstitutional, because the subject is not clearly expressed in the title, in accordance with section 45 of the present Constitution. See section 2, art. 4, Const. 1875. The title of the act is “An act to amend section 1441 of the Code, regulating actions of slander and libel.’-' The only change made in the section as it stood in the Code is the substitution, for the words “by publishing an apology in a newspaper when the charge had been thus promulgated,” of the following, to-wit: “Before any suit for libel shall be brought for the publication of an article in a newspaper in this state, the aggrieved party shall, at least five days before beginning suit, serve notice in writing on the publisher or publishers of said newspaper, at their principal office of publication if within the state, specifying the statements in the said article which he or they allege to be false or defamatory, and if it shall appear on the trial of said action that said article was published in good faith, that its falsity was due to mistake or misapprehension, and that a full correction or retraction of any false statement therein was published in the next regular issue of said newspaper, or in case of daily newspapers within five days after service of said notice aforesaid in as conspicuous a place and type in said newspaper as was the article1 complained of, then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages.” TTider the previous decisions of this court, this was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional re
Appellant next insists that the act in question is unconstitutional, because it denies to the person the protection guaranteed to him by section 13 of the Bill of Rights, that “every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law,” and he argues that the term “actual damages” cannot include those presumed and unproved damages of which the law allows a recovery, although in point of fact they may not have been actually sustained. The law presumes certain damages, not on the idea that they have been actually sustained, but because they are the natural and probable consequences of the libel, and the law presumes that they are actually sustained, such as the injury to a man’s reputation, which, while it may not be an “actual pecuniary” loss, is nevertheless an actual loss. — Newell on Defamation, Slander, and Libel, p. 838, § 1. Actual damages include all damages, except that class of damages known as “vindictive, punitive, or exemplary damages.” Actual damages is the synonym of compensatory damages. Damages are said to be compensatory “when they are such as measure the actual loss,” while punitive or vindictive damages exceed the loss or injury actually sustained, “and are given as a kind of punishment to the defendant with a view of preventing similar wrongs in the future.” — 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 542; Newell on Defamation, Slander, and Libel, p. 842; 5 Ency. Pl. & Pr. p. 728.
Appellant insists that there is no field of operation for this statute, unless the term “actual damages” is taken in a more restricted sense than is given to it in the books, because, even without the statute, there could not be a recovery for vindictive damages in the- case described. Yet we cannot suppose that the lawmakers used the term in any other sense than that which the law had given it; and the reason given only suggests another reason for sustaining the statute, because it does not in any way abridge the rights of the parties, but is only a regulation of practice, by which suits may be avoided,' or, if entered upon, the issues shortened.
The appellant next insists that, even allowing the constitutionality of the act, yet it is not necessary to allege a compliance with it in the complaint, as the case could go on, and actual damages be recovered. It is true that the Supreme Court of North Carolina seems to have taken, this view of the interpretation of a similar statute (as does also the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Clementson v. Minn. Tribune, 45 Minn. 303, 47 N. W. 781) ; Osborn v. Leach, supra; but it will be observed that in that case the question-came up, not on a demurrer to the complaint, as in this case, but on a motion to nonsuit the plaintiff and the court said that was improper, “because good faith, honest mistake, and reasonable ground of belief were affirmative defenses which the court could not adjudge.” In the case now under consideration, as stated, the demurrers Avere sustained to the complaint, and the plaintiff declined to amend or plead further. But, hoAvever that may be, Ave knoAV of no way of ascertaining what the Legislature meant, except by the words Avhich Avere used in the enactment,
It is unnecessary to discuss other matters alluded to in argument.
We are unable to agree to the conclusion that the notice mentioned in the act has any field of operation or effect where only actual damages are sought to be recovered. The sole purpose to be effected by the giving of the notice to the publisher is to afford him an opportunity to exempt himself from liability for exemplary damages; and, if the aggrieved party waives, as, of course, lie may do, any claim to that class of damages, the notice is robbed of the only reason for its existence1 or requirement. If the whole act and the obvious legislative purpose are given consideration, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers intended the notice1 to be potential to inhibit the institution of an action against a publisher for libel, notwithstanding the aggrieved party relinquishes or renounces any claim of the character to be, in the event, affected by the notice provided. In this act it must be that, when the purpose for which the notice is required is entirely removed, the
Reversed and remanded.