Comenout v. BurdmanComenout v. Burdman
Lead Opinion
— This appeal arises from a writ of prohibition brought by the petitioners (appellants), Dollietta and Kenneth Comenout, against the respondents, Milton Burdman, as Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, and Judge Warner Poyhonen, Judge Pro Tern of the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County. The case deals with the issue of whether the State of Washington has jurisdiction to deprive the petitioners of their parental rights over their children where the petitioners are Quinault Indians residing on the Quinault Indian Reservation.
The facts in the instant case are as follows. The petitioners, Quinault Indians residing on the Quinault Indian Reservation, are the parents of Annabella Comenout, born May 22, 1967, and Sonja Comenout, born May 15, 1970. In March of 1969, Annabella Comenout was taken from the custody of her parents by the state Department of Social and Health Services and, in March of 1971, at a hearing before the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, the petitioners were temporarily deprived of the custody of both their children for a period of 6 months. Both children have been placed in foster care by the state Department of Social and Health Services.
On August 6, 1973, a hearing was held before Judge Warner Poyhonen, Judge Pro Tern of the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, on a petition for permanent deprivation of the parental rights of the petitioners over their
The petitioners’ contention in this case, that the State of Washington has no jurisdiction over Quinault Indians and the Quinault Indian Reservation, must be considered in light of various constitutional provisions, statutory enactments, and events leading up to this controversy. In 1889, the United States Congress adopted an act allowing the territories of Washington, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota to become members of our union of states. Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 1, 25 Stat. 676. The enabling act provided as a prerequisite to admission to the Union that each state seeking admission should hold a constitutional convention and provide, among other things:
[B]y ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said States:
Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; . . .
(Italics ours.) 25 Stat. 676, 677.
In compliance with the enabling act language, article 26
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of this state:
Second. That the people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries of this state, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States . . .
(Italics ours.)
The Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, was passed by Congress, consenting to the assumption of jurisdiction over Indians by the states. The relevant sections of this act provided on page 590:
Sec. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.
Sec. 7. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.[1 ]
On April 22, 1958, a body purporting to be the “Quinault Indian Tribal Council” adopted a resolution expressing the desire that the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the State of Washington be extended to include the Quinault Indian Tribe and Reservation. Pursuant to
The criminal and civil jurisdiction of the State of Washington shall apply to the Quinault Indian people, their reservation, territory, lands and country, and all persons being and residing therein.
After the proclamation was issued, however, certain mem
In 1963, the legislature of the State of Washington enacted Laws of 1963, ch. 36, p. 346, which substantially amended
The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this state in accordance with the consent of the United States given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public Law 280, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, unless the provisions of
(1) Compulsory school attendance;
(2) Public assistance;
(3) Domestic relations;
(4) Mental illness;
(5) Juvenile delinquency;
(6) Adoption proceedings;
(7) Dependent children; and
(8) Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads and highways: Provided further, That Indian tribes that petitioned for, were granted and became subject to state jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter oh or before March 13, 1963 shall remain subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws of 1963 had not been enacted.
(Italics ours.) It is under subsection (7) of the above statute covering “Dependent children” that the State of Washington and its Department of Social and Health Services assert jurisdiction over the petitioners in this case. Subsequent to the 1963 amendments of
The petitioners’ first argument in this case is that the State of Washington, by failing to amend article 26 of its state constitution, has not validly assumed jurisdiction over the Quinault Indian Tribe pursuant to the Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. We disagree. This argument was extensively considered by this court in Ton
The petitioners next contend that even if state jurisdiction has been validly assumed under the Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, the State of Washington now has no jurisdiction over the Quinault Indians in this case since the proclamation by Governor Evans in 1968 declared the 1958 proclamation by former Governor Rosellini to be null and void, and retroceded all of the State of Washington’s jurisdiction over the Quinault Indians to the federal government. The petitioners argue that even though the 1968 proclamation by Governor Evans did not retrocede to the United States any jurisdiction exercised by the State of Washington over the Quinault Reservation under Laws of 1963, ch. 36 (which includes
That Indian tribes that petitioned for, were granted and became subject to state jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter on or before March 13, 1963 shall remain subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws of 1963 had not been enacted.
After examining the language of
Subsequent to the passage of Laws of 1957, ch. 240, this court considered two cases, State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court,
The Adams case involved a review by certiorari of an order of the Juvenile Court for Okanogan County declaring certain minors to be “dependent children” whose parents were Colville Indians residing on the Colville Indian Res
After our determination in Adams and Colwash that the State had no jurisdiction in dependency matters over Indian tribes which had not submitted a resolution pursuant to the proclamation procedure outlined in
We therefore hold that the provisions of
The writ of prohibition is therefore denied.
Hale, C.J., and Finley, Rosellini, Hamilton, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur.
Notes
Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, has been repealed by the enactment of Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No.
HCW 37.12.020 was repealed in 1963 and superseded by the enactment of Laws of 1963, ch. 36, § 5 (now codified as
The language of
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — My views are the same as expressed in my dissent in Tonasket v. State,
Stafford, J., concurs with Utter, J.