COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. and Transportation Insurance Company v. Ernest R. LAFON, Jr. and Center For Rehabilitative Medicine
Record No. 2327-95-3
Court of Appeals of Virginia
April 9, 1996
468 S.E.2d 698
Rather, DCSE made a jurisdictional argument before the circuit court, arguing that the circuit court could not hear the case because father posted no appeal bond. Under these facts, examined in conjunction with “equitable considerations,” we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction over this case, even after it failed to correct the J & DR court‘s failure to set an appeal bond. See Burks, 214 Va. at 323, 200 S.E.2d at 522;
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‘s order.
Affirmed.
Richard A. Hobson, on brief, Richmond, for appellants.
J.D. Morefield and Ginger Jonas Largen, Morefield, Kendrick, Hess & Largen, on brief, Abingdon, for appellee Ernest R. Lafon, Jr.
Clifford L. Harrison, Stone, Harrison, Turk & Showalter, on brief, Radford, for appellee Center for Rehabilitative Medicine.
Present: BENTON, COLEMAN and WILLIS, JJ.
COLEMAN, Judge.
Combustion Engineering, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter collectively referred to as “employer“) contend that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in (1) exercising its jurisdiction over an application filed by the Center for Rehabilitative Medicine (“the Center“), and (2) finding that the three-year statute of limitations contained in
Background
On October 23, 1987, Ernest R. Lafon, Jr. sustained a compensable injury to his thumb while operating a grinder for employer. On March 29, 1990, pursuant to a memorandum of agreement, the commission entered an award in Lafon‘s favor, providing for compensation at the rate of $344 per week during incapacity and payment of medical benefits. On August 31, 1993, the commission approved a settlement entered into by the parties. Pursuant to the approved settlement, Lafon received a lump sum payment and payment of causally related medical treatment provided from the date of his accident through the date of entry of the order approving the settlement. Lafon also received medical benefits for one year following entry of the settlement order.
On November 18, 1994, the Center filed an application requesting that the commission order employer to pay $11,085.14 in medical expenses incurred by Lafon from August 22,
I. Jurisdiction
“All questions arising under [the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act“)] ... shall be determined by the Commission....”
The commission found that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the Center‘s application concerned employer‘s duty to pay medical expenses related to Lafon‘s compensable injury. Employer argues that the commission‘s decision is contrary to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Bogle. We disagree.
In Bogle, the Supreme Court ruled that the commission did not have jurisdiction to consider the reimbursement claim of a private health insurance carrier after the employer had reimbursed the employee for his out-of-pocket payment for his medical expenses. Bogle, 250 Va. at 434, 463 S.E.2d at 468-69. The Court ruled that the commission lacked jurisdiction to consider a claim by the employee‘s insurer against the employer for reimbursement of the insurer‘s expenses because “no right of the [employee] was ‘at stake.‘” Id. Once the employer reimbursed the employee, the litigants were left to common law remedies in resolving the issue whether the employer had to reimburse the employee‘s private health insurance carrier. Id.
In this case, unlike Bogle, the employee‘s rights were at stake. If Lafon‘s reasonable and necessary medical bills were not paid by the employer, he would be personally liable for them. Lafon had the right, pursuant to the Act, the commission‘s award, and the settlement order, to have his causally related medical expenses paid by employer. Lafon joined the Center‘s application as a party and sought to require employer to abide by its duty to pay his causally related medical expenses. Moreover, employer does not challenge the commission‘s ruling that the medical expenses incurred by Lafon at the Center were necessary, reasonable, and causally related to his compensable injury by accident.
The commission did not have before it a request for reimbursement by a private health insurance company. Rather, the commission had before it a dispute among a medical care provider, an employee, and an employer concerning whether the employer was responsible for payment of Lafon‘s medical expenses. Such a dispute falls squarely within the commission‘s sole jurisdiction provided for under the Act.
II. Code § 8.01-246
Employer also argues that the three-year statute of limitations contained in
We agree with the commission that the application was grounded in the commission‘s award. The dispute did not involve a common law action founded upon an express or implied unwritten contract. The dispute concerned an employer‘s duty to pay causally related medical benefits awarded to Lafon by the commission. Under these circumstances, the commission correctly ruled that the three-year statute of limitations contained in
Affirmed.