5 Minn. 254 | Minn. | 1861
By the Oourt.
I have had great difficulty in satisfying my own mind as to the proper disposition of this case, resulting from the conflict of authorities as to what constitutes an estoppel inpais, and the application of the principle to the various reported cases. Scarcely any branch of the law has given rise to more discussion, and resulted in so great a difference of opinion among jurists, in the definition and application of the principle to the various cases presented in the Courts for adjudication. Many of the cases where the principle has been invoked, seem to have been decided by the
I think it is manifest that many of tbe cases cited by tbe Respondent, are not applicable as authority, to sustain bis position, that tbe Plaintiff is estopped from asserting bis legal rights, by bis acts and declarations in tbe premises. In Jackson vs. Van Carleur, 11 Johns 123, tbe parties were held concluded by a line agreed upon between them. But tbe Court say that “whether Bleecker’s line is correct or not, cannot now be made a question between these parties; for they undertook to run and establish a line for themselves, which is tbe line run by Shephard in bis survey about nineteen years ago. After suoh a lapse of time and the repeated acquiescence on tbe part of tbe lessors, it would be unjust and inexpedient to disturb that line, admitting that it bad been incorrectly settled at first.” This decision is placed upon tbe express ground of lapse of time and repeated acquiescence in tbe boundary line as agreed upon, and not upon tbe simple fact, that such division bad been made. The case of Jackson vs. Cole, 16 John, 255, presents an entirely different state of facts from those in tbe case at bar, and was not decided on tbe ground that the acts or declarations of tbe parties bad estop-ped them from asserting their legal rights, although tbe Court in its opinion says, that, “we are ..also, of opinion, that tbe acts of tbe parties in this case, if it was necessary to have re
In the case_of Jackson vs. Ogden, 7 John, 238, it was held, as appears by the syllabus, that, “after various mesne conveyances, during a lapse of near eighteen years, the parties should be bound by their actual location under their deeds, according to the metes and bounds given in the original survey, without reference to the map and patents.” An examination of that case will clearly show the distinction between it, and the one.at bar, and the language of Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion of the Court, shows that the case was not decided on the mere ground that the parties had agreed upon a dividing line, but as he says, “they located according to the facts addressed to the^senses, and without having recourse to the Secretary’s office; and when the question of location was thus rendered ambiguous or uncertain, by the contradiction between the map and survey, (and both were referred to in the patent and early deeds) a practical location and construction given by the parties, and acquiesced in through a series of transfers, and for a great number of years, until the lands had become cultivated and had grown into value, cannot but operate with great, if not with decisive force.” And in this case it will be observed that the Court were divided in opinion.
In Rockwell vs. Adams, 6 Wend. 467, Savage Ch. J., lays down the rule of law as applicable to the case, as follows:
Adams vs. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285, was a case of trespass, involving the question, of whether a party was concluded from asserting his legal claim to ownership of land, by recognition of an erroneous line, and it was held, that “ where
The case of Jackson vs. McConnell, 19 Wend. 175 only
Nor do I think tbe cases cited in equity sustain tbe Respondent’s position more fully than those abové referred to. In Wendell vs. Van Rensselaer, 1 John. Chan. 344, it was held, that “ a person looking on and suffering another, knowingly, to purchase and expend money on land, without disclosing or making known bis claim to tbe land,,will not be permitted af-terwards, to assert bis legal title against such innocent purchaser.” This of course, would be actual fraud, which no Court of equity would permit, but is by no means analagous to tbe case at bar. In Storrs vs. Baker, 6 John. Chan. 169, it was held tbat “ a person having tbe legal title, who acquiesces in the sale of tbe land by another, claiming or having color of title to it, is estopped from afterwards asserting bis title against a purchaser; especially, if be has advised and encouraged tbe parties to such sale to deal with each other.” An examination of this case will show a totally different state of facts from tbat existing in tbe case at bar, and tbat tbe Defendant bad no equities on which to rest bis case. Barker, tbe Defendant, had advised and encouraged tbe Plaintiff to make bis purchase, and afterwards sought to assert bis legal title, not on tbe ground of any mistake of fact, but solely tbat be had mistaken tbe law of the land, or rather, such was tbe plea offered to excuse himself from the consequences of bis acts. Very properly such plea was disregarded by tbe Court, and tbe equities 5of tbe purchaser were preferred to his.
The case of Town vs. Needham, 3 Paige 545, is also cited
The cases above cited show to some extent, the manner in which Courts have applied the doctrine of estoppel in pais, to cases in which the location and boundaries of lands have come in question. The doctrine has been largely discussed in other cases, some of which it may be proper to notice. Dezell vs. Odell, 3 Hill. 215 is a leading case on the subject, and is often referred to in the books. Bronson J. defines an es-toppel inp ais, as follows: “ Before the party is concluded, it must appear, 1. That he has made an admission which is clearly inconsistent with the evidence he proposes to give, or the title or claim which he proposes to set up. 2. That the other party has acted upon the admission. 3. That he will be injured by allowing the truth of the admission to be disproved.” Take this definition as it stands, without modification or limitation, and it would conclude the plaintiff in the case at bar. But I do not think the opinion goes to the same extent. For immediately after he adds, that “ the doctrine was well stated by my brother Nelson, in the Welland Canal Company vs. Hathaway, (8 Wen. 483.) His words are: “as a general rule, a party will be concluded from denying his own acts or admissions, which were expressly designed to influence the conduct of another, and did so influence it, and when such denial will operate to the injury of the latter.” That these two definitions are essentially different, and that a case which
The case of Kingsley vs. Vernon, 4 Sand. 361, although professing to have been decided in accordance with the rule, is, I think, at variance with it. In that case the endorser of a bill, after the receipt of notice of protest, on going to take up the bill, was informed by the holder that it had been paid, and, by such information, the endorser was prevented from collecting it of the drawer, who subsequently became insolvent, (the acceptor being insolvent at the time) it was held, that the endorser was discharged from liability, although
The cases in equity do not go farther than those at law in applying the doctrine of estoppel in pads. In 1 Story's Equity Jur.p. 429, after stating the principle, he says, See. 386: “ In order, however, to justify the application of this cogent moral principle, it is indispensable that the party so standing by and concealing his rights should be _ fully apprised of them, and should by his conduct or gross negligence, encourage or influence the purchase, for if he is wholly ignorant of his rights, or the purchaser knows them, or, if his acts, or silence, or negligence do not mislead, or in-any manner affect the transaction, there can be no just inference of actual or constructive fraud on his part. Por a right can be lost or forfeited only by such conduct as would make it fraudulent and against conscience to assert it.” In the next section he states that “ there are indeed, cases, where even ignorance of title will not excuse a party.” Several cases are cited in illustration of the proposition, to some of which I have not had access, butin regard to those which 1 have examined, the facts are very materially different from those found in the present case. Indeed the author himself states in Seetion 391, what limitation he places upon the proposition, when he says that “ in all this class of cases, the doctrine proceeds upon the ground of constructive fraud, or of gross negligence, which in effect implies fraud. And, therefore, where the circumstances of the
In Adams’ Equity gage 314, the rule is laid down in these terms : “ In order to the ¡introduction of this equity it is essential that there be intentional deceit in the Defendant, or at all events, that degree of gross negligence which amounts to evidence of an intent to deceive. If, therefore, the party standing by be ignorant of his right, or if he has been merely careless and negligent; as where a mortgagee or trustee, by not taking the title deeds, or by subsequently parting with them, has enabled the mortgagor or cestui que trust to commit a fraud, the mere circumstance of his having done so will not warrant relief against him.”
The case of Brewer vs. Boston and Worcester Rail Road Corporation, 5 Met. 478, fully sustains the position of the Appellant, and the case of the Boston and Worcester Rail Road Corporation vs. Sparhawk id. 469, is nearly to the same effect. In the case of Parker vs. Barker, 2 Met. 423, the declaration of the demandant, that “ he would relinquish' his claims on the demanded premises,” upon which a party had acted, was held not to estop him from asserting his claim, although the Court assign as the reason, that it was a parol promise to relinquish title to real estate, and was therefore inoperative and void by the statute of frauds. And it has also been held in 20 Conn. 98, 568, that “ an admission will not take effect as an absolute estoppel, unless it be made with fullu knowledge of the right to be estopped, and with the design or effect of creating an impression that it does not exist or tvill not be enforced.”
There arepiumerous other cases cited in the books showing the application of the principle, but it is unnecessary to examine them at greater length. I think the true rule to be deduced from the authorities is, that the party sought to be estopped, must have been guilty of constructive fraud, or gross neglect, in regard to the subject matter claimed as an estoppel, inprder to conclude him from asserting-the fact as it really exists. Or, to state it in another form, there must have been an express design that the act or statement should influ
We are then brought to enquire what is the effect of the application of this principle upon the rights of the parties to this action. As between the Plaintiff and the grantor of the Defendant, I suppose there can- be no pretence that the Plaintiff would be estopped from asserting his legal claim to the premises, by reason of the agreement between him and Parker. The land claimed by Plaintiff in this action, is a strip between six and seven feet in width extending across one end of lot 3, the principal value of which it would appear, consists of a spring situated upon it. This spring had been walled up by Parker, previous to the agreement between him and Plaintiff, and it does not appear that Parker expended one dollar upon the land claimed by Plaintiff, or that his position with reference to the premises in dispute or his own property, was in any respect changed, or that he would have been in any way prejudiced by permitting the Plaintiff to assert his legal rights. If any estoppel exists therefore against the Plaintiff, it must arise by virtue of the purchase from Parker by Defendant, and the representations made by Plaintiff to Defendant previous to such purchase. It may be remarked that no survey was had of the lot at the time of the agreement between Parker and Plaintiff, respecting the division line, nor any attempt made to ascertain the true line, save that “ Parker pointed out -to the said Plaintiff a certain stake as the point of intersection of the north line of said lot three and Pleasant street,” from which the number of feet was measured off called for by Plaintiff’s deed from Story. The error into which Plaintiff was led therefore, was occasioned by the erroneous- statement of the grantor of the Defendant, respecting the line of Pleasant street, a circumstance not wholly unimportant in one aspect of the case.
There is no pretence in the case that the Plaintiff was actuated'by any wrong or fraudulent motive whatever, in making to the Defendant the statement he did with respect to the division line between him and Parker. Did he make such statement with the express design, or any design of influenc
This, so far as the case shows, was all that transpired between the Plaintiff and Defendant with reference to the division line, previous to the purchase by the latter of the premises. 1 think no one would conclude from the above that the Plaintiff designed to influence the Defendant in any manner whatever with reference to the purchase. To him it was doubtless a matter of entire indifference whether Pai’ker or Defendant owned the premises. He certainly had nothing to gain in either case, although, by reason of the Defendant’s purchase he has been made to suffer in consequence of ah honest though mistaken statement as to the division line
If the principle of an'estoppel in pais is not properly applicable to this case, on the ground above stated, is it any more applicable on the only remaining’' one, of such gross neglect on the part of the Plaintiff in informing himself of his rights, that he should not be entitled to assert them in a court of justice ? This position I think even less tenable than the former. The Plaintiff had acquired title to his lot less than five months previous to the purchase by Defendant, and it would appear was not then in personal occupation of it. I cannot think he was bound to be at the expense of an actual survey, immediately upon acquiring title, in order that he might be certain of making no errors in his statements in regard to the boundaries, or that he should be mulcted in damages for such errors for lack of exact knowledge as to the extent of his lot. It is true he was not bound to give the information he did, or to make any statements in reference to the matter, but it is equally true that the Defendant was not obliged to seek it of him. The sources of obtaining correct information on the subject were equally open to both, and the Defendant could have ascertained the exact size of the lot he proposed purchasing at the same expense, and as readily as could the Plaintiff. The deeds were on record, and a survey could be made in accordance therewith. Clearly, no greater negligence can be attributed to the Plaintiff than the Defendant ; and if the latter chose to rely on such knowledge as the former possessed, rather than resort to the legitimate business method of ascertaining the true location of his premises, he
There is another fact which, though of itself perhaps not of great weight, yet, taken in connection with all the circumstances of the case, materially tends to impair the equities on which the Defendant relies. The answer alleges no sum in which the Defendant will be damnified or injured if the claim of the Plaintiff is sustained, nor is there any allegation of the’ value of the premises in dispute or of the improvements thereon, nor has the finding of the Court cured the defect in this respect. The allegation of the answer in this behalf is, “ that the existence of said spring upon the said parcel so purchased by Defendant, was a material -inducement to said purchase, and that the same entered into the estimate and consideration price paid for said premises by Defendant to the amount of at least $500.” This allegation I think not well pleaded to show either the value of the premises in dispute or the amount of injury to the Defendant, if the Plaintiff sustains his action. The real question is, what was the actual value of the spring or premises — not, what value was put upon them by Defendant. To form an issue upon the opinion of a party as to the value of an article, would be rather novel pleading, and, it being simply an operation of the mind, would be an issue somewhat difficult for the party holding the negative to prove.
The Court finds simply (upon this point) that by reason of this spring the premises were greatly enhanced in value. The expression “ of great value,” as used in law, is a compara-ative term, of no definite signification, and may mean one dollar or one thousand, or more or less. Where no bad faith is imputed, I apprehend a Court of Chancery would not interfere to oust a party of his legal rights, where the amount in controversy is comparatively unimportant,- nor unless his
In fine, tbe legal title of tbe Plaintiff to tbe premises (if be can assert it) is unquestioned of record, be stands unchallenged m foro conscientm, and we cannot think tbe acts or statements of the Plaintiff, as disclosed by tbe case, have been such as to preclude him from claiming a right to property acquired by tbe highest title known to tbe law. Tbe estoppel we have been considering is spoken of in tbe books as an equitable estoppel, but tbe term would be a misnomer, if tbe doctrine is to be applied to such a case as tbe record here discloses.
Tbe judgment below is reversed, and a new trial ordered.