Coma v. City of New YorkComa v. City of New York
A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129 [1985]). “A jury’s finding that a party was at fault but that such fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause” (Stewart v Marte, 91 AD3d 754, 755 [2012], quoting Garrett v Manaser, 8 AD3d 616, 617 [2004]; see DeSalvo v Kreynin, 95 AD3d 819 [2012]). “[W]here there is a reasonable view of the evidence under which it is not logically impossible to reconcile a finding of negligence but no proximate cause, it will
Further, the Supreme Court properly permitted the defendant’s attorney to cross-examine the injured plaintiff, subject to connection, about a prior accident in which she sustained injuries to her back and neck. Although the injured plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder in the accident at issue in this case, the defendant adduced testimony from its expert witness indicating that the existence of a prior neck injury would be medically relevant because the fifth cervical root controls sensation in the shoulder. Under these circumstances, evidence regarding the injuries the injured plaintiff suffered in her prior accident was relevant, and the cross-examination was properly permitted (see Ocampo v Pagan, 68 AD3d 1077, 1079 [2009]; Bowers v Johnson, 26 AD2d 552 [1966]).
The plaintiffs’ contention that they were deprived of a fair trial by certain of the defendant’s attorney’s summation comments is largely unpreserved for review, since their attorney objected to only one of the comments now alleged to have been improper (see Turuseta v Wyassup-Laurel Glen Corp., 91 AD3d 632, 634 [2012]). Although we agree that the comment to which an objection was lodged was improper, it did not deprive the plaintiffs of a fair trial (see Jun Suk Seo v Walsh, 82 AD3d 710 [2011]; Toure v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 127 AD2d 759 [1987]). Rivera, J.P., Eng, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.