COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BRENDAN PATRICK YOUNG; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DANIEL CASEY
No. 2088 MDA 2018; No. 2089 MDA 2018
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AUGUST 03, 2022
2022 PA Super 130
OPINION BY BOWES, J.
J-S54002-19; J-S54003-19; Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000784-2018, CP-14-CR-0001389-2017, CP-14-CR-0001540-2018; No(s): CP-14-CR-0000781-2018, CP-14-CR-0001377-2017, CP-14-CR-0001536-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and DUBOW, J.
FILED AUGUST 03, 2022
The instant appeals are before us on remand from our Supreme Court. We have been directed to consider whether the Commonwealth should be permitted pursuant to
We begin with a recap of the litigation among these parties. The Commonwealth filed six separate criminal informations, three for each Appellee, charging them with various offenses related to alleged hazing activities in 2016 and 2017, including the death of Timothy J. Piazza at the Beta Theta Pi fraternity at the Pennsylvania State University on February 2, 2017. Each Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion at all three docket numbers assigned to his respective cases. The motions included the contention that cell phone evidence must be suppressed because it was obtained pursuant to overbroad search warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellees also challenged the constitutionality of the since-repealed anti-hazing statute that formed the basis for some of the charges against them.1
The trial court, by a single opinion and order captioned with all six docket numbers for both Appellees, upheld the constitutionality of the anti-hazing law, but granted the motions to suppress the cell phone evidence. The trial court subsequently amended its order in accordance with
Both sides sought interlocutory appellate review. Specifically, the Commonwealth filed two notices of appeal, one for each Appellee listing the three docket numbers pertinent to him, from the suppression ruling pursuant to
Both sides were unsuccessful in their bids for interlocutory review based upon the mandate of our Supreme Court‘s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). In Walker, the
Our Supreme Court agreed that Rule 341‘s Official Note mandated the filing of separate notices of appeal at each docket number, but it reversed our quashal of the appeal in Walker because the Note‘s mandate contradicted “decades of case law from this Court and the intermediate appellate courts that, while disapproving of the practice of failing to file multiple appeals, seldom quashed appeals as a result.” Walker, supra at 977. However, the Court stated a bright-line rule that “in future cases Rule 341(a) will, in accordance with its Official Note, require that when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Walker Court further directed the amendment of the Official Note to Rule 341 and suggested amendment of Rule 341 itself, as well as the portion of Chapter 3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure (“Orders From Which Appeals May Be Taken“) governing interlocutory appeals, namely Rule 311 (“Interlocutory Appeals as of Right“), Rule 312 (“Interlocutory Appeals by Permission“), and Rule 313 (“Collateral Orders“), “to state explicitly the requirement that separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket.” Id.
This Court applied Walker‘s prospective ruling to Appellees’ joint petition to appeal by permission, resulting in its denial on August 28, 2019. The motions panel entertaining Appellees’ request observed that the Walker ruling applied equally to appeals taken pursuant to Rules 311, 312, and 341. See Commonwealth v. Casey, 218 A.3d 429, 431 (Pa.Super. 2019) (”Casey“). Since Walker controlled, we held that “[Appellees‘] failure to file a separate appeal petition for each docket number [wa]s fatal to their petition for permission to appeal” pursuant to Rule 312. Id. Our Supreme Court declined to review this Court‘s decision. See Commonwealth v. Casey, 10 MM 2020 (Pa. June 2, 2020).
The instant panel likewise determined that this Court was unable to address the substance of the Commonwealth‘s two appeals as of right in the case sub judice based upon Walker violations, and therefore quashed the appeals by non-precedential decisions filed on October 28, 2020 (2089 MDA 2019), and November 2, 2020 (2088 MDA 2019). Although the Commonwealth had requested leave “to amend the notice of appeal” to comply with Walker, see Response to Rule to Show Cause, 3/4/19, at 7, we failed to discern how the belated amendment of the single notice it filed could remedy its failure to timely file separate notices of appeal at the other two docket numbers. We therefore quashed the appeals.
Our Supreme Court opted to grant review of our quashal of the Commonwealth‘s appeals and partially overruled Walker by holding that failure to file separate notices of appeal at each docket number implicated by the appealed-from order did not necessarily require quashal. See Young, supra at 476. Rather, filing a single notice of appeal for all implicated docket numbers was a non-jurisdictional defect
matter to the lower court so that the omitted procedural step may be taken.” Id. at 457 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
On this point, the Young Court quoted with approval the concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc):
So long as a litigant timely perfects an appeal, Rule 902 allows an appellate court to take any appropriate action, including remand, to allow a party to correct any procedural misstep in a notice of appeal, excluding of course any defect relating to timeliness. A single notice of appeal referencing more than one docket number in violation of Walker presents a procedural misstep that easily can be remedied. A single appeal notice containing more than one court docket easily can be segregated into separate notices for each docket while the filing date of the original notice of appeal is preserved.
Young, supra at 476 (quoting Larkin, supra at 357 (Stabile, J. concurring)) (cleaned up). The High Court also cited its pre-Walker decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583 (Pa. 2014), in which it observed: “in the event of a defective notice of appeal, Rule 902 encourages, though it does not require, appellate courts to remand the matter to the lower court so that the procedural defect may be remedied;” and, indeed the Rule indicates a “preference for correcting procedurally defective, albeit timely, notices of appeal so that appellate courts may reach the merits of timely appeals.” Young, supra at 477 (quoting Williams, supra at 587-77) (cleaned up).
The Court went on to expound on the use of Rule 902 in the instant case, agreeing “with the Commonwealth that there would have been no prejudice to [Appellees] had the Superior Court granted its prompt and clear request for remand to correct the procedural defect once it was identified.” Id. (cleaned up). It was further convinced by the Commonwealth‘s contention “that nothing practical is achieved by the reflexive quashal of appeals for easily corrected, non-jurisdictional defects. Indeed, Rule 902 is designed specifically to eliminate such quashals as it eliminates the trap of failure to perfect an appeal by making timely notices of appeal self-perfecting.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Court concluded as follows:
[T]he relationship between Rules 341(a) and 902 is clear. Rule 341 requires that when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each docket; but, where a timely appeal is erroneously filed at only one docket, Rule 902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the error, where appropriate. Accordingly,
as there were two timely-filed notices of appeal in this case, one for each defendant, that listed additional docket numbers for each defendant, we reverse the Superior Court‘s order quashing the appeals and, pursuant to Rule 902, we remand to that court to reconsider the Commonwealth‘s request to remediate its error, so that the omitted procedural step may be taken.
Id. at 477-78 (cleaned up).
Justice Wecht, joined on this point by Justice Donohue, dissented to the Majority‘s decision to allow the Commonwealth to have a “do-over here” because “[i]t would be inequitable to afford the Commonwealth the grace that has been received by no other appellant whose appeals have been quashed for the same Walker violation, including [Appellees] themselves.” Id. at 484 (Wecht, J. concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 482 (Donohue, J. concurring and dissenting) (“I agree with the sentiment expressed by Justice Wecht that the application of the majority‘s holding to the Commonwealth in this appeal is abjectly unfair given that the defendants in this very case were held to the Walker standard, with the result that their earlier appeals were quashed.“). Justice Wecht continued:
The only ostensible difference between the Superior Court‘s order quashing the Commonwealth‘s appeal and its order quashing [Appellees‘] appeals is that, because of the former order, the Commonwealth may not be able to secure a conviction, raising the possibility that the Commonwealth‘s challenge to the trial court‘s suppression rulings will evade post-verdict appellate review. However, our laws and rules must apply soberly, and without contemplation of consequence. This Court should not distort law and rules in order to give the Commonwealth a break or to assist it in securing a conviction. If [Appellees] are required to suffer Walker‘s harsh mandate, it is only fair that we hold the Commonwealth to the same standard.
Id. at 485 (footnote omitted).
Back in this Court, we granted Appellees’ requests to establish a briefing schedule to inform our exercise of discretion in complying with our Supreme Court‘s directive to consider granting relief to the Commonwealth through Rule 902. The Commonwealth in its brief advances the points made by the Young majority, which the Commonwealth asserts “reaffirms the well-established principle that procedural rules should be applied to allow a decision on the merits where there is no prejudice and no substantial impediment to appellate review.” Commonwealth‘s supplemental brief at 7 (citing, inter alia, Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 683 A.2d 278, 282 (Pa. 1996) (“Certainly, our rules are not intended to be so rigidly applied as to result in manifest injustice where there has been substantial compliance and no prejudice.“)). It cites a string of this Court‘s post-Young decisions as demonstrating this policy favoring merits review despite Walker defects. Id. at 7-8 (citing, inter alia, Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 570 (Pa.Super. 2022) (allowing appellant to correct Walker defect rather than quashing).
The Commonwealth further highlights that appellate review of pretrial suppression rulings is of great importance to “preserve the rights of society” in seeing all pertinent evidence being admitted in the prosecutions sole opportunity to place a defendant in jeopardy. Id. at 8-9. It asserts that, by contrast, “the Supreme Court has already found that allowing merits review pursuant to Rule 902 will cause no prejudice,” and Appellees “cannot plausibly argue otherwise.” Id. at 8 (citing Young, supra at 477).
Mr. Casey further contends that the issue on which Appellees sought interlocutory review, namely the constitutionality of the applicable anti-hazing statute, is just as significant as the suppression issue that the Commonwealth is pursuing. See Casey‘s supplemental brief at 9. He argues that allowing the Commonwealth to correct its Walker violation when the same lenity is unavailable to him prejudices him in having to “expend extensive resources” defending in a “month-long trial” forty-five charges that were brought pursuant to “a statute that has escaped Constitutional scrutiny for 33 years.” Id. at 10. In sum, Appellees’ position is that if they must suffer the consequences of their procedural misstep and go to trial on charges they otherwise might not have had to defend, the Commonwealth should likewise endure the consequence of an evidentiarily-handicapped prosecution. Id.
The Commonwealth rejoins that Appellees’ unfairness argument is based upon “the false premise that the parties are equally situated,” while, in actuality, “[t]hey are not.” Commonwealth‘s supplemental reply brief at 1. In particular, the dismissal of the Commonwealth‘s interlocutory appeals as of right would be “final and permanent,” while Appellee‘s failure to obtain permissive interlocutory review does not impact their right to appellate review once the order becomes final if they are convicted of any of the charges under the then-applicable anti-hazing statute. Id. Furthermore, since the suppressed evidence is relevant to all of the charges against Appellees, the instant appeal challenging the suppression of the evidence impacts the entirety of the case, while Appellees’ appeal by permission, even if successful, would not have terminated the prosecution. Id. at 2. Finally, the Commonwealth observes that Appellees made the same unfairness arguments to our Supreme Court in Young only to have them rejected by five of the seven justices. Id. at 3.
With the parties’ arguments in mind, we next consider the objectives of the rules in question. It “is well-settled that procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and are not to be exalted to the status of substantive objectives.” In re Larsen, 812 A.2d 640, 650 (Pa.Spec.Trib. 2002). As this Court has observed, “the purpose of our procedural rules is to facilitate the administration of justice, and our courts should apply them with that purpose in mind.” Huntington Nat. Bank v. K-Cor, Inc., 107 A.3d 783, 786 (Pa.Super. 2014). Rule 902 exists in its current form to make it uncomplicated for an appellant to achieve the end of perfecting an appeal, and “represents a significant simplification of practice.”
Nonetheless, in Walker, our Supreme Court established a bright-line rule requiring quashal of appeals that did not comply with the Official Note of Rule 341. The Young decision did not eliminate the requirement of Walker and its progeny that separate notices of appeal be filed when a single order implicates multiple docket numbers whether the appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 341, Rule 311, or Rule 312. Rather, it held that Rule 902 is an available tool to avoid quashal for a Walker violation. Indeed, Rule 902 “creates a preference for correcting procedurally defective, albeit timely, notices of appeal so that appellate courts may reach the merits of timely appeals.” Williams, supra at 588 (quoted with approval in Young, supra at 477)).
We conclude that Appellees’ claims of unfair disparate treatment do not provide cause for us to disregard Rule 902‘s preference for allowing the correction of the Commonwealth‘s timely but defective notices of appeal. Indeed, we perceive no meaningful unfairness because we agree with the Commonwealth that the parties herein are not similarly situated. “Generally speaking, an appellate court‘s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders.” Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa. 2018) (citing
More significantly, an interlocutory appeal is the only avenue for the Commonwealth to secure appellate review of the trial court‘s evidentiary ruling. If the Commonwealth prevails at trial, it would not be an aggrieved party, but if the fact-finder acquits Appellees, their double jeopardy protections would prohibit a second trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90, 94 (Pa.Super. 1995) (“A factfinder‘s verdict of acquittal is, of course, insulated from further review.” (cleaned up)).
Appellees, on the other hand, may obtain review of their claim in a direct appeal as of right if a jury convicts them of violations of the applicable anti-hazing law, and have their convictions vacated if their argument prevails. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sabula, 46 A.3d 1287, 1293 (Pa.Super. 2012) (observing
Appellees’ additional arguments why it would be inappropriate to allow the Commonwealth to correct its procedural omissions do not present distinct allegations of prejudice, but merely reiterate the unfair disparate treatment contentions we have already rejected.3 See Casey‘s supplemental brief at 9-10 (contending that it would be prejudicial to have to defend the anti-hazing
law charges that Appellees sought to challenge in their dismissed appeal, not that there would be any prejudice in having the Commonwealth‘s suppression issue reviewed prior to trial).
Therefore, upon consideration of the purpose of procedural rules generally, the particular Rules of Appellate Procedure implicated in this case, and our Supreme Court‘s rulings thereupon, we conclude that the law of the Commonwealth post-Young is as follows: when there is a Walker defect in an appeal to which Rule 902 applies, the default position is that we deem it appropriate to allow the correction, and only stray from the Rule‘s preference for good cause. In the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to an appellee resulting from the lack of separate notices of appeal at each docket, bad faith by an appellant, or other circumstances that render clemency inappropriate, a party filing an appeal as of right will as a matter of course be permitted to correct a Walker violation pursuant to Rule 902.4
Applying this to the case sub judice, we find Appellees’ claims of unequal treatment to be insufficient cause for us to deny the Commonwealth the
opportunity to correct its failure to file separate notices of appeal at each of the six docket numbers. Thus, we remand these appeals to allow the Commonwealth, within ten days, to file separate notices of appeal at each of the six docket numbers at issue in these two appeals. Failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeals. Upon the trial court‘s certifications that the notices have been duly filed as part of supplemental records, we shall proceed to address the substance of the appeals.
Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained.
Judge Lazarus files a Concurring Opinion in which Judge Dubow joins.
Judge Bowes also files a Concurring Opinion.
Notes
An appeal permitted by law as of right from a lower court to an appellate court shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the lower court within the time allowed by Rule 903 (time for appeal). Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but it is subject to such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, remand of the matter to the lower court so that the omitted procedural step may be taken.