Com. v. Williams, T.Com. v. Williams, T.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS,
FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2020
Appellant, Timothy Williams, appeals from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County dismissing without relief his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“),
Appellant argues the PCRA hearing established that privately retained sentencing counsel‘s advisement to an insolvent Appellant to seek an alternate means of timely filing a post-sentence motion, while nevertheless remaining counsel of record, caused the trial court to nullify Appellant‘s timely pro se post-sentence motion as a product of hybrid representation.
After careful review of the record and controlling authority, we remand for reinstatement of Appellant‘s post-sentence rights.
On January 5, 2018, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm prohibited. On March 28, 2018, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of six to 13 years’ incarceration. With privately retained counsel still of record in the post-sentence phase, neither a counseled post-sentence motion nor a direct appeal was filed on Appellant‘s behalf.
Appellant, however, did file two timely pro se post-sentence letters with the court raising several challenges, but the trial court treated the filings as products of hybrid representation and forwarded them to counsel of record pursuant to
At the hearing, testimony addressed what role, if any, sentencing counsel had in Appellant‘s failure to file a timely post sentence motion accepted by the court. Counsel testified that Appellant and he discussed Appellant‘s post-sentence rights for the first time after sentencing, and he informed Appellant what his fee for preparing a post-sentence motion would be. N.T. 12/24/19, at 4-5. According to counsel, both Appellant and his wife, with whom he had spoken earlier, told him they were unable to pay the fee. N.T. at 6.
Counsel therefore advised Appellant he would not prepare a post-sentence motion and cautioned that it was up to Appellant to contact the Public Defender‘s Office immediately and file a post sentence motion before the filing period expired. N.T. at 6-7. See
On December 31, 2019, the trial court dismissed Appellant‘s PCRA petition, relying specifically on sentencing counsel‘s testimony that Appellant never requested that counsel file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal on his behalf. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 27, 2020. A concise statement order was issued on January 28, 2020, and counsel filed a timely
In Appellant‘s counseled brief, he raises several issues asserting the ineffective assistance of prior counsel and other trial errors. As a prefatory matter, however, we address his contention that the PCRA hearing established the dissolution of the attorney-client relationship at the outset of the post-sentence phase that should have prompted the PCRA court to take remedial action.
We recognize that Appellant filed timely pro se post-sentence motions at a time when counsel was still designated as counsel of record in his case. As noted, pro se filings submitted by counseled defendants are generally treated as legal nullities. Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010).
However, this Court has recognized that a counseled defendant may act on his own to protect important rights where counsel remains technically attached to the case but is no longer serving the client‘s interest. See Williams, supra. Thus, where counsel has effectively discontinued working on a defendant‘s behalf, this Court has concluded that a pro se filing does not offend considerations of hybrid representation. See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73 (Pa. Super. 2015).
At the PCRA hearing, privately retained sentencing counsel confirmed that Appellant was effectively unrepresented when he filed the pro se post-sentence motions in question. Specifically, counsel‘s undisputed testimony stated: (1) counsel informed Appellant he required payment prior to preparing a post-sentence motion; (2) both Appellant and his wife indicated
Under these circumstances, we find principles prohibiting hybrid representation were not implicated. While the trial court reasonably followed the dictates of Rule 576(A)(4)—as it was not informed that Appellant was filing post-sentence motions in an essentially unrepresented capacity, it became clear during the PCRA hearing that Appellant‘s motions were not deserving of Rule 576 nullification.
For this reason, we vacate the Order denying PCRA relief, reinstate Appellant‘s post-sentence rights and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, and remand to the trial court, which shall accept for review Appellant‘s timely pro se post-sentence motions previously filed with the court.
Order vacated. Post-sentence rights and direct appeal rights reinstated nunc pro tunc consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/25/2020