COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KAREEM J. STANSBURY
No. 303 EDA 2019
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SEPTEMBER 05, 2019
2019 PA Super 274
J-S48006-19
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
OPINION BY BOWES, J.:
FILED SEPTEMBER 05, 2019
Kareem J. Stansbury appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“). We affirm.
We relate a concise summary of the history of this case. Appellant drove up to a home in Philadelphia and fired shots at two individuals sitting on the porch: Abdul Scott, his brother, and Rachel Ostrow, a resident of the building. Appellant was charged with various crimes related to the incident at two separate docket numbers: one as to victim Scott (CP-51-CR-0006485-2014) and one as to victim Ostrow (CP-51-CR-0006484-2014).
The two cases proceeded to a consolidated trial, at which Appellant exercised his right to represent himself. After a mistrial and a second trial, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and other firearm-related crimes. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five to seventy years of
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition docketed in both cases. Therein, he raised two claims regarding evidence at his trial: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine to exclude the 911 telephone call during which Appellant was identified as the shooter. PCRA Petition, 5/15/18, at ¶¶ 12-13. The PCRA court appointed counsel pursuant to
Counsel filed a no-merit letter, captioned at both docket numbers, and requested to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Counsel indicated that the issues Appellant wished to raise could not afford relief because they were previously-litigated on direct appeal, and, further, that Appellant could not raise the claims under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel because Appellant had represented himself. No-Merit Letter, 11/7/18, at unnumbered 2. In a single document including both case numbers, the PCRA court advised Appellant of his right to respond to counsel‘s letter pro se or with privately-retained counsel, and issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant‘s petition without a hearing pursuant to
On January 4, 2019, the PCRA court entered a single order, at both criminal case docket numbers under one caption, dismissing Appellant‘s PCRA petition and granting counsel‘s request to withdraw. The order contained the following language pursuant to
This Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed pursuant to our Supreme Court‘s holding in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). In that case, the High Court held that an appeal must be quashed if an appellant fails to file separate notices of appeal at each docket number implicated by an order resolving issues that involve
Appellant filed a response to the rule to show cause in which he indicated, inter alia, that the PCRA court “failed to advise the pro se Appellant of the defect and afford the Appellant an opportunity to correct the defect.” Response to Rule to Show Cause, 2/25/19. As a result, the rule was discharged and the issue referred to the merits panel for consideration. Order, 6/18/19.
Hence, before we may delve into the substance of Appellant‘s appeal, we must determine whether Walker and its progeny mandate quashal. At the time Appellant requested the opportunity to correct the defect in his notice of appeal, time had expired for him to file timely, Walker-compliant notices of appeal. See
Nonetheless, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that the failure to file a timely appeal as a result of a breakdown in the court system is an exception to that general rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 136-38 (Pa.Super. 1995) (discussing cases and holding failure of clerk of courts to advise defendant that his post-sentence motion had been denied by operation of law excused late-filed appeal).
We have many times declined to quash an appeal when the defect resulted from an appellant‘s acting in accordance with misinformation relayed to him by the trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Flowers, 149 A.3d 867, 872 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding breakdown in court operation granted this Court jurisdiction over untimely appeal where trial court failed to correct counsel‘s misstatement about deadline for filing appeal and incorrectly provided that the appellant had an additional thirty days to appeal from order denying motion for reconsideration of sentenced imposed upon revocation of intermediate punishment); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa.Super. 2007) (compiling cases in which the “courts of this Commonwealth have held that a court breakdown occurred in instances where
In the case sub judice, the PCRA court advised Appellant that he could appeal the dismissal of his PCRA petition by filing within thirty days a notice of appeal from its order. The court, still referring to its order that disposed of a PCRA petition pending at two separate docket numbers, again utilized the singular in advising Appellant where to file “Said notice of appeal[.]” Order, 1/4/19 (emphasis added). Hence, while Walker required that Appellant file separate notices of appeal at each docket number, the PCRA court informed Appellant that he could pursue appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal.
We conclude that such misstatements as to the manner that Appellant could effectuate an appeal from the PCRA court‘s order amount to a breakdown in court operations such that we may overlook the defective nature
Appellant presents the following issues, which we have reordered for ease of consideration:
- The trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing and denying Appellant‘s pre-trial motion in limine was unreasonable and allowed highly prejudicial and harmful evidence to be introduced against Appellant at his second trial. Thus, denying him a fair trial and resul[t]ing in a miscarriage of justice[.]
- The Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence at Appellant[‘]s trial to establish his identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt thereby violating due process and resulting in a miscarriage of justice[.]
- The PCRA court erred denying Appellant‘s PCRA petition without a[n] evidentiary hearing when the petition raised gen[uin]e issues of material facts[.]
Appellant‘s brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We begin with the applicable law. “Our standard of review of a PCRA court‘s dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court‘s determination is supported by the record evidence and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Root, 179 A.3d 511, 515-16 (Pa.Super. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is an appellant‘s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Miner, 44 A.3d 684, 688 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Appellant‘s first two issues involve allegations of trial court error. The PCRA court dismissed these claims on the basis that “not only `could’ Appellant have raised those issues on direct appeal, he ‘did’ raise them.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/25/19, at 9.
To be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must plead and prove, inter alia, that “the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”
With the remaining issue Appellant presents to this Court, he contends that the PCRA court should not have dismissed his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve material issues of fact. Given that the record clearly established that the only claims raised in Appellant‘s petition were
As Appellant has failed to convince this Court that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due, we affirm the order dismissing his petition without a hearing.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/5/19