Com. v. Smith, L.

Sep 1, 2026
1653 WDA 2025

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:

Laron Darnel Smith (“Smith“) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following the entry of his guilty — but mentally ill — pleas to third-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP“).1 We affirm.

A detailed recitation of the facts is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal. We thus provide the trial court‘s succinct recitation of the facts underlying this case, as follows:

. . . On November 9, 2020, Ernest Mills, Jr., [(“Mills“)] and his girlfriend . . . were walking on Brighton Road in the City of Pittsburgh. [Smith], who resided in the same building as . . . Mills, followed [him] and [his girlfriend] down Brighton Road. [Smith] put on a mask and fired several shots from a firearm into the back of . . . Mills. [Mills’ girlfriend] was standing next to . . . Mills at the time he was shot. [Smith] then fled from the scene. . . . Mills died as a result of the gunshot wounds. Investigators were unable to discover a motive for the shooting.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/26, at 2.

As a result of this incident, police arrested Smith and the Commonwealth charged him with the above offenses.2 Smith‘s counsel filed a motion petitioning the court to reexamine Smith‘s competency, as the physician who first examined Smith concluded that he was “in the beginning stages of schizophrenia” and “that it [was] prudent to evaluate” him once more. Application for Incompetency Examination, 5/15/21, at unnumbered 2. The trial court granted counsel‘s motion. The second evaluation revealed that Smith was both incompetent to stand trial and in need of inpatient psychiatric/psychological examination and treatment. Accordingly, the trial court committed Smith to a hospital pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act3 so that he could receive treatment for an initial period not to exceed sixty days.4

On September 26, 2022, Smith entered an open guilty — but mentally ill — plea to each of the above-listed crimes, and the trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI“) report. Consequently, on January 5, 2023, and with the benefit of the PSI report, the trial court imposed three consecutive standard range sentences for an aggregate term of sixteen and one-half to forty-three years’ imprisonment.5 Smith did not file any post-sentence motions following the imposition of this sentence, nor did he file a direct appeal.

In December 2023, Smith filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“),6 therein alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal, as he had previously instructed her to do. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition seeking the reinstatement of Smith‘s post-sentence and direct appeal rights as a result of trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness. The PCRA court thereafter reinstated Smith‘s post-sentencing and appellate rights, nunc pro tunc. See Order, 3/5/25, at unnumbered 1. Smith then filed a timely, counseled post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence on the basis that the trial court did not adequately consider a litany of sentencing factors. Before the trial court could rule on this motion, however, Smith filed6

a notice of appeal. Accordingly, because Smith filed the appeal while his post-sentence motion was still pending, this Court ultimately quashed it as premature. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 Comment (stating “[n]o direct appeal may be taken by a defendant while his or her post-sentence motion is pending“).

In August 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Smith‘s post-sentence motion. While Smith did not initially file a notice of appeal within thirty days of this order, he later petitioned the trial court to once more reinstate his appellate rights, nunc pro tunc, and on December 1, 2025, the trial court granted the reinstatement. Smith then filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Smith raises the following issue for our review: “Is there a substantial question as to the discretionary aspects of [Smith‘s] sentence due to the trial court‘s sentence being manifestly unreasonable?” Smith‘s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Importantly, challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not appealable as of right. See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015). Instead, this Court must conduct a four-part analysis prior to reviewing the merits of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, determining:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant‘s brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the sentencing code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In the instant case, Smith filed a timely post-sentence motion, a timely notice of appeal, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Accordingly, we now review both Smith‘s statement of questions presented and his Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether he has presented a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that we cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists). Pertinently, an appellant raises a substantial question when he “advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge‘s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Relevantly, although claims of excessiveness may raise a substantial question as to the appropriateness of a sentence under the sentencing code, even where the sentence is within statutory limits, it is well settled that bald claims of excessiveness cannot raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 624 (Pa. 2002). Likewise, this Court has long held that a substantial question does not exist where an appellant claims only that the trial court failed to properly consider certain mitigating factors when calculating his sentence. See Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (specifying that such claims may only raise a substantial question where the sentencing court imposed a sentence within an aggravated range). This is especially the case where the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI report, as the existence of this report presumes that the court properly considered and weighed all of the relevant information, including any mitigating factors, prior to sentencing. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766 (Pa. Super. 2006) (explaining that a sentencing court‘s reliance on a PSI report requires us “to presume that the court properly weighed the mitigating factors present in the case“).

Here, we observe that between his statement of questions presented and his Rule 2119(f) statement, Smith argues only that his sentence was “manifestly unreasonable[;] contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process[;] and not consistent with the gravity of the offense, the need of the public for protection[,] and [his] rehabilitative needs[.]” Smith‘s Brief at 4, 7. Such generalized arguments notably fail to raise a substantial question justifying our review, as they neither: (1) refer this court to any “specific provision of the sentencing code” that Smith believes is “inconsistent” with his sentence; nor (2) include any sufficiently detailed explanation as to how Smith‘s sentence is “contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” See Glass, 50 A.3d at 727 (emphasis added). Indeed, as it pertains to Smith‘s arguments in support of this second prong — that his sentence is manifestly unreasonable and that the trial court ignored certain mitigating sentencing factors when calculating it — we emphasize that the former argument represents a bald claim of excessiveness which cannot raise a substantial question, and that the latter argument is necessarily precluded by the sentencing court‘s reliance on a PSI report. See Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 624; see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171; Fowler, 893 A.2d at 766.

Thus, because we determine that Smith has failed to raise a substantial question for our review, we decline to review the merits of his discretionary sentencing claim and affirm his judgment of sentence. See Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 83; see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 170.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

DATE: 09/01/2026

Notes

1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 2705.
2
We note that although the Commonwealth initially charged Smith with homicide instead of murder, it ultimately replaced the homicide charge with the charge of third-degree murder in exchange for Smith agreeing to enter an open guilty — but mentally ill — plea.
3
See 50 P.S. § 7402(b).
4
The trial court thereafter extended this commitment period multiple times per the recommendation of hospital staff, who determined prior to each extension order that Smith was not psychiatrically prepared for discharge, and that he instead required further treatment.
5
The trial court did not impose any sentence in relation to the charge of firearms not to be carried without a license.
6
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.