COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JUSTIN JAMES SACCOMANDI
No. 497 EDA 2016
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NOVEMBER 23, 2016
J-S90037-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Aрpeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 22, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002510-2015
BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J. AND JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:
A jury found Justin Saccomandi guilty of simple assault for attempting by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.1 The trial court sentenсed Saccomandi to two years’ probation. Saccomandi filed timely post-sentence motions, which the court denied, and a timely notice of direct appeal. Both Saccomandi and the trial court complied with
Saccomandi raises a single argument on appeal: “The trial court erred in denying the defense‘s motion for acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to rebut [] Saccomandi‘s defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidеnce is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may nоt weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant‘s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unlеss the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of thе evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.2011).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence of record is as follows. On March 13, 2015, Frederico Aguilar (“the victim“) was traveling south on Route 322 in Delaware County, when he noticed a red pick-up truck accelerate towards his vehicle from behind as the victim approached a red light. The victim was traveling with his wife and two children (a 16-year-old son and a 9-year-old daughter) on their way to pick up dinner. After the light turned green, the victim proceeded to the next red
The victim gave Saccomandi the finger and turned left when the light turned green. In response, Saccomandi turned left from the wrong lane of traffic and proceeded to follow the victim‘s vehicle, revving his engine while screaming at him. At the next red light, Saccomandi stopped closely behind the victim, screamed that he “would kill him” and gave “the most evil look.”
Saccomandi‘s aggression continued after the light changed: he sped up next to thе victim‘s vehicle so that he was traveling parallel to him in the opposite lane of traffic and again screamed that he would kill the victim. Saccomandi then turned into a church parking lot and the victim followed him in. Saccomandi parked his pick-up truck, but kept it running; the victim parked his car about 20 feet away from Saccomandi. The victim did not block the exit.
The victim and his son (both unarmed) began walking towards Saccomandi‘s truck but froze as they saw Saccomandi reaching towards an object. Saccomandi then brandished a handgun out of his driver‘s side window, pointed it at the victim and his son, and yelled at them to “back up, back up.” Saccomandi and his son remained still, but Saccomandi fired a shot at their feet. The bullet struck about one foot away from the victim.
Officer Gaspari of the Chichester Police Department responded to the 911 call, spoke to the family, and then recovered a .40-caliber handgun round. Another witness, Lisa Hernandez, was on the road that same evening and obsеrved Saccomandi driving his red pick-up truck in a reckless manner while screaming and cursing at the victim‘s vehicle. Saccomandi‘s truck cut Hernandez off on multiple occasions as he screamed obscenities at the victim and his family. Hernandez recorded the truсk‘s license plate number, and when she learned of the shooting on March 18, 2016, she called the police to report the license plate.
Later on March 18th, Detective Jones of the Chichester Police Department connected the license plate number to Saccomandi. The victim picked Saccomandi out of a photo line-up. The detective drove to Saccomandi‘s home and asked Saccomandi about the incident. Saccomandi responded: “The incident with the three Mexicans?” The pоlice executed a search warrant at Saccomandi‘s home and recovered a firearm, but not the one used in the shooting. The next day, however, Saccomandi produced the .40-caliber handgun used in the shooting.
Whereas the defendants in Maloney and Little merely pointed their weapons at the victims, Saccomandi threatened to kill the victim and his
With this evidence of simple assault as a backdrop, we turn to Saccomandi‘s claim that the Commonwealth failed to rebut the evidence of self-defense. When the defendant claims that he acted in self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence satisfies elements (2) and (3) of the tеst articulated in Smith. With regard to element (2), which focuses on whether the defendant provoked or continued the use of force, the Commonwealth sustains its burden “if it proves ... that the [defendant] was not free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty ...” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 736, 740 (Pa.2012). In Mouzon, the defendant followed a group of women down a flight of stairs while verbally haranguing them and threatening to kill them. The victim, a “rather large man,” interceded on the womens’ behalf by approaching the defendant and began fighting with him. The defendant produced a gun and shot it twice, killing the victim and injuring a bystander. Our Supreme Court held that this evidence proved that the defendant provoked the use of force, thus negating his claim of self-defense:
The altercation between [the defendant and the victim] did not occur spontaneously, or in isolation; it was the culmination of an ongoing confrontation in the bar initiated by [the defendant] alone and continued and escalated by [the defendant] alone. As a matter of law, we conclude that [he] was not free from fault in provoking or continuing ‘the difficulty’ that led to the slaying, so as to warrant his usе of deadly force, such that he cannot be held responsible for shooting two people, one fatally.
[The defendant] is correct that there is decisional law suggesting that merely insulting or scandalous words of a light or trivial kind do not suffice to establish the requisite рrovocation to negate a claim of self-defense. But, the uncontradicted evidence here shows that [his] words and actions were substantially more
provocative than a mere verbal insult. [He] did not simply utter rude or crass comments to the women; he clоsely followed the women down a flight of stairs, verbally haranguing them the entire time. Moreover, he threatened to kill them, in no uncertain terms. Not all words are the same; and words combined with conduct can be extremely provocative. Threats to kill, moreover, invitе response or even interference, including from those with a sense of chivalry, and even from those of a mind to go further and punish the provocateur. [The defendant] may well have been emboldened by alcohol consumption, as he now says. But, it is no less likely thаt his actions represented a bravado borne of the fact that he knew -- where others in the bar, including [the victim], did not -- that, in harassing and threatening the women, he was armed not only with his wits and his fists, but with a loaded handgun concealed in his waistband ... Those circumstances establish that [thе defendant] was not free from fault, but provoked what became a fatal encounter, irrespective of what he now alleges he may or must have believed respecting the need to defend himself.
Id. at 751. The present case is similar to Mouzon. In a fit of road rage, Saccomandi drove alongsidе the victim and his family, tailgated them, gunned his engine, and came to abrupt, shuddering stops, all while threatening to kill them. This vile conduct led to the confrontation in the parking lot where Saccomandi fired his gun at the victim. Admittedly, the victim himself was not entirely blameless, because he fоllowed Saccomandi‘s vehicle into the parking lot and advanced towards the vehicle on foot with his teenage son. The fact remains however, that Saccomandi himself was not free from fault in provoking or continuing this incident. The evidence thus negates his claim of self-defense.
With respect to element (3), a duty to retreat exists “if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete
Saccomandi attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by citing to his own testimony and ignoring the Commonwealth‘s evidence against him. In so doing, he ignores this Court‘s duty to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, herein the Commonwealth. Viewed under this standard, the evidence is sufficient to establish Saccomandi‘s guilt.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
