COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. HECTOR MANUEL RIVERA
No. 1000 MDA 2023
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARCH 15, 2024
2024 PA Super 48
OPINION BY BECK, J.
J-S03038-24;
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.
OPINION BY BECK, J.: FILED: MARCH 15, 2024
Hector Manuel Rivera (“Rivera“) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Berks County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court“) after a jury convicted him of multiple counts each of trafficking in individuals, conspiracy to commit trafficking in individuals, involuntary servitude, conspiracy to commit involuntary servitude, prostitution and related offenses, conspiracy to commit prostitution and related offenses, criminal use of a communication facility, and delivery of a controlled substance.1 Before this Court, Rivera challenges the admission at trial of expert testimony under section 5920 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code,2 relating to the behavior of sexual violence victims, and discretionary aspects of his sentence. Because we conclude that
the trial court properly permitted the expert testimony at issue under section 5920, and because Rivera failed to properly preserve his sentencing claim, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
The record reflects that during the latter portion of 2019, Alicia Rider (“Rider“) sustained a series of physical assaults by her fiance. N.T., 1/30/2023-2/1/2023, at 164-68. This abuse included Rider‘s fiance slapping her across the face, hitting her over the head with her phone, dragging her by the head, and throwing her into the shower. Id. During this time, Rider was actively addicted to heroin and crack cocaine. Id.
In November 2019, Rider purchased crack cocaine over the internet from Rivera and another individual referred to in the record only as “Neil.” N.T., 1/30/2023-2/1/2023, at 156-62, 195. After Rider made several purchases from Rivera and Neil, Rivera suggested that Rider have sex with him, Neil, and Neil‘s roommate in exchange for drugs. Id. at 162-63, 202-07. Rider agreed to Rivera‘s proposition, as she wanted access to the drugs. Id. at 202-07.
In April 2020, as the repeated assaults by her fiance continued, Rider contacted Rivera through a mutual acquaintance, Bridget Thompson (“Thompson“), to escape the abuse. Id. at 172-73. Rivera picked up Rider and Thompson and took them to a hotel. Id. at 174-75. Rivera then purchased crack cocaine for the three of them to smoke in a hotel room paid for by Rider. Id. at 176-78. The following day,
In the first three days after being listed on the website, Rider had approximately three to five “dates” (i.e., performing sex acts for money) per day. Id. at 184-85. The money Rider received from the “dates” went directly to Rivera and Thompson. Id. at 184, 262-263. In return, Rivera continued to supply Rider with crack cocaine. Id. at 186, 199. After the third day of sending Rider on multiple “dates” per day, Thompson became upset with Rivera and tired of Rider “whining,” “crying,” and “complaining,” so Thompson stole Rider‘s money and left. Id. at 186, 263-64.
After Thompson left, Rivera and Rider moved to a different hotel where Rider continued to have “dates.” Id. at 189-90. A few days later, however, Rivera and Rider ran out of money. Id. at 191, 225-26. During this time, Rider‘s fiance contacted her, and Rivera encouraged Rider to get money from him. Id. Desperate to escape her circumstances, and despite the abuse she sustained at her fiance‘s hands, Rider arranged to leave with him, telling Rivera that she was going on a “date.” Id. Rider did not tell Rivera she was leaving because she was afraid he would not allow her to leave. Id. Rider explained that Rivera had previously been mean to her and had threatened violence over money. Id.
Around this time, the Pennsylvania State Police received information from a confidential informant that a young woman was being trafficked by Rivera. Id. at 274. On June 18, 2020, police interviewed Rider, during which she detailed her interactions and relationship with Rivera. Id. at 274-75. Based on this information, police arranged multiple controlled buys between Rivera and the confidential informant. Id. at 282, 289-90, 340-41. Rivera was arrested and charged with multiple counts each of trafficking in individuals, conspiracy to commit trafficking in individuals, involuntary servitude, conspiracy to commit involuntary servitude, prostitution and related offenses, conspiracy to commit prostitution and related offenses, delivery of a controlled substance, and criminal use of a communication facility.
Prior to Rivera‘s trial, the Commonwealth provided notice of its intention to introduce expert testimony on human trafficking and sexual violence victim dynamics pursuant to section 5920. See Memorandum Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Pursuant to
At trial, Agent Fabian provided a general explanation of the meaning of the phrase “human trafficking,” some of the terminology associated with human trafficking, and how perpetrators carry out human trafficking schemes (e.g., what websites traffickers use and how they advertise to potential clients). N.T., 1/30/2023-2/1/2023, at 99-110. Agent Fabian also discussed misconceptions associated with human trafficking, explaining that while violence does happen in human trafficking, traffickers are often able to control their victims through other coercive means, such as controlling access to drugs for someone with a substance abuse disorder.
On February 1, 2023, a jury found Rivera guilty of all charges other than one of the three charged counts of involuntary servitude.3 On May 23, 2023, the trial court sentenced Rivera to an aggregate term of 33 1/2 to 67 years of incarceration. On May 31, 2023, Rivera filed a post-sentence motion to modify his sentence. The trial court granted the motion in part and merged some counts together instead of running them concurrently, but the overall sentence remained intact, and denied the remaining claims in the motion.
On July 10, 2023, Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 25, 2023, the trial court ordered Rivera to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), and Rivera timely complied.
Rivera presents the following issues for review:
- Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in admitting expert opinion testimony in the area of human trafficking where the expert invaded the province of the jury by drawing inferences from the evidence which effectively conveyed an opinion that [Rivera] was guilty?
- Whether the overall sentence is manifestly excessive?
Rivera‘s Brief at 4.
In his first issue, Rivera argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Agent Fabian to testify as an expert on human trafficking and sexual servitude pursuant to section 5920 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code. Rivera‘s Brief at 21-25.4 Rivera maintains that section 5920(b)(1) permits expert testimony on human trafficking and sexual servitude only to the extent that it assists the factfinder in its understanding of sexual violence victim dynamics, victim responses to sexual violence, and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after an assault. Id. at 25. Rivera argues that “sexual violence” was not at issue in this case because his crimes solely involved subjecting Rider to sexual servitude in exchange for providing her access to controlled substances. Id. at 25. In Rivera‘s estimation, the facts did not support a finding that his crimes involved sexual violence, rendering the testimony irrelevant and inadmissible, and that the
The trial court found Agent Fabian‘s testimony admissible pursuant to section 5920, which permits experts to testify to facts and opinions regarding victim responses and behaviors in criminal proceedings related to sexual assaults. N.T., 1/30/2023-2/1/2023, at 57. The trial court permitted Agent Fabian‘s testimony, finding it relevant to “1) characterize Rivera‘s conduct as being consistent with someone engaged in the business of sex trafficking and promoting prostitution and 2) explain the behavior of Rider.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/7/2023, at 6.
The standard of review for evidentiary challenges is well settled:
The decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the trial court‘s sound discretion, and evidentiary rulings will only be reversed upon a showing that a court abused that discretion. A finding of abuse of discretion may not be made merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Matters within the trial court‘s discretion are reviewed on appeal under a deferential standard, and any such rulings or determinations will not be disturbed short of a finding that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 710-11 (Pa. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The statute at the heart of this issue is
Rivera‘s entire argument is premised upon his belief that the crimes for which he was convicted were not crimes of sexual violence, but were drug related, rendering the expert testimony as to the dynamics of sexual violence, a victim‘s response to sexual violence, and/or the impact of sexual violence on a victim during and after an assault irrelevant and inadmissible. Rivera‘s Brief at 25. This raises the question of the meaning of the phrase “sexual violence”
To determine the meaning of “sexual violence” as it appears in section 5920, we begin with a review of the statute itself. When an issue of statutory interpretation is before this Court, the Statutory Construction Act5 guides our analysis. Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2022). The paramount principle of the Statutory Construction Act is that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
“The General Assembly‘s intent is best expressed through the plain language of the statute.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 981 A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. 2009). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
“We also presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable, and that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To that end, courts must read and evaluate each section of a statute in the context of, and with reference to, the
other sections of the statute[.]” Commonwealth v. Gurung, 239 A.3d 187, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). We presume “that the legislature placed every word, sentence and provision in the statute for some purpose[.]” Id. at 192 (citation omitted).
There is no question, and Rivera does not challenge, that the expert testimony defined in section 5920(b) is admissible in criminal cases involving crimes of sexual violence and domestic violence. Notably, although section 5920 has a “definitions” provision included in the statute, the General Assembly only defines the phrase “domestic violence,” and not “sexual violence” therein. See
Beginning with section 5920(a)(1), it permits the admission of the expert testimony described in section 5920(b) at a trial for any crime listed in subchapters H and I of SORNA, all of which are sexual offenses. SORNA establishes a statewide registry of sexual offenders.
Turning to section 5920(a)(2), the statute enumerates specific crimes contained in Pennsylvania‘s Crimes Code for which section 5920(b) expert testimony can be presented. The criminal proceedings include those brought under:
(i)
Chapter 30 (relating to human trafficking), if the offense involved sexual servitude.(ii)
Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
(iii)
Section 4302 (relating to incest).(iv)
Section 4304 (relating to endangering welfare of children), if the offense involved sexual contact with the victim.(v)
Section 5902(b) or (b.1) (relating to prostitution and related offenses).(vi)
Section 6301(a)(1)(i) (relating to corruption of minors), if the offense involved sexual contact with the victim.(vii)
Section 6301(a)(1)(ii) .(viii)
Section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).(ix)
Section 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with minor).(x)
Section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of children).
As is clear from the above recitation, the General Assembly limits the enumerated crimes for which the expert testimony provided in subsection (b) may be provided to those involving sexual conduct committed by the defendant. See id. For example, sections 3011 and 3012 of the Crimes Code define the crimes of trafficking in individuals and involuntary servitude, which involve subjecting a victim to either labor servitude or sexual servitude. See
Similarly, for the crime of prostitution, section 5920(a)(2) limits the admissibility of section 5920(b) testimony to charges brought under “Section 5902(b) or (b.1) (relating to prostitution and related offenses).” Id. § 5920(a)(2)(v) (emphasis added). The crime of prostitution is generally defined as a person engaging in sexual activity as a business.
This is also true for the crime of corruption of minors,
There are several statutory provisions included in section 5920(a)(2) for which a criminal defendant can be charged for committing sexual acts and nonsexual acts, but the General Assembly has restrained the availability of expert testimony on sexual violence victim dynamics defined in section 5920(b) to only the subset of those crimes that involve sexual acts. Thus, through its limiting language, and by specifically identifying the sexual crimes to which expert testimony detailed in section 5920(b) may be provided, the General Assembly has defined the phrase “sexual violence.” The statutory term “sexual violence,” when read in context with the overall statutory framework, can only apply to the crimes and offenses identified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). We are bound to conclude that the General Assembly‘s choice to specifically identify certain crimes and charged conduct was a deliberate choice reflecting its intent that these crimes—and only these crimes—constitute crimes of “sexual violence” for which expert testimony contemplated in section 5920(b) is admissible. See Gurung, 239 A.3d at 192.
This interpretation is supported by the separate allowance of such testimony for the offenses defined as constituting “domestic violence” as stated in subsections (a)(3) and (c). As the expert testimony identified in section 5920(b) is only permitted to help the trier of fact understand “the dynamics of sexual violence or domestic violence, victim responses to sexual violence or domestic violence and the impact of sexual violence or domestic violence on victims during and after being assaulted,” and crimes constituting “domestic violence” are specifically identified as such in the statute, the remaining crimes and conduct identified necessarily constitute crimes of “sexual violence.” See generally
In the case at bar, Rivera was charged with multiple counts of trafficking in individuals, involuntary servitude, and prostitution. See Criminal Information - Amended, 1/26/2023. The trafficking in individuals and involuntary servitude offenses were all based upon Rivera placing Rider into sexual servitude; the prostitution offenses related to Rivera inducing Rider to commit prostitution. See id. The offenses of human trafficking involving sexual servitude, involuntary sexual servitude, and inducement to prostitution are all crimes of sexual violence as defined by section 5920(a). See
We are likewise unpersuaded by Rivera‘s argument that Agent Fabian‘s testimony was irrelevant because the terminology, activities, and behaviors associated with human trafficking and sexual servitude are all within the knowledge of a layperson. Rivera‘s Brief at 22. While a layperson may understand some of the activities and terminology associated with human trafficking and sexual servitude, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence “do not preclude a single witness from testifying, or offering opinions, in the capacity as both a lay and expert witness on matters that may embrace the ultimate issues to be decided by the fact-finder.” Jones, 240 A.3d at 890 (citing Pa.R.E. 701, 702). Additionally, in this case, although Agent Fabian testified regarding human trafficking and sexual servitude generally, see N.T., 1/30/2023-2/1/2023, at 99-110, much of his testimony was dedicated to why victims of human trafficking and sexual servitude do not simply remove themselves from the situation and the dynamics related to victims of crimes of sexual violence. See id. at 110-20. In other words, he provided the very testimony that section 5920(b) contemplates. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s determination that Agent Fabian‘s testimony was relevant and admissible under
For his second issue, Rivera challenges discretionary aspects of his sentence, asserting that that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 33 1/2 to 67 years of incarceration. Rivera‘s Brief at 26-27. “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). To invoke this Court‘s jurisdiction to review a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of his appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that Rivera properly preserved his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim in a post-sentence motion and filed a timely notice of appeal. See Post-Sentence Motion, 5/31/2023; see also Notice of Appeal, 7/10/2023.
Rivera also includes a 2119(f) statement in his brief before this Court. Therein, Rivera asserts that his sentence was manifestly excessive and “redundant” because he received multiple consecutive sentences, “effectively punishing [him] many times over for the same essential offense.” Rivera‘s Brief at 5. This argument, however, differs significantly from the sentencing claim Rivera sets forth in the argument section of his appellate brief, which says nothing about the consecutive nature of his sentence. See id. at 26-27. Instead, Rivera argues that the trial court relied upon improper facts in fashioning his sentence.10 Id. at 26. The Commonwealth has expressly objected to Rivera‘s failure to raise this argument in his Rule 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth‘s Brief at 17. Because Rivera failed to raise this specific sentencing claim in his Rule 2119(f) statement, we cannot review his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158, 166 (Pa. Super. 2012) (concluding that if an appellant fails to include a discretionary sentencing issue in his Rule 2119(f) statement and the Commonwealth objects, the issue is waived); see also Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that the 2119(f) statement must “sufficiently articulate[] the manner in which the sentence imposed violates a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or the norms underlying the sentencing process” for this Court to conduct its review).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/2024