COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAWSON REAMS
No. 1410 EDA 2024
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED MARCH 11, 2025
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37; J-S47022-24; Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001083-2010
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J. MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.
The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows: On September 16, 2010, a jury convicted Reams of robbery, possessing an instrument of crime, and firearm violations. On January 14, 2011, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty years of imprisonment. Reams appealed. On February 29, 2012, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Reams, 46 A.3d 831 (Pa. Super. 2012) (non-precedential decision). Reams did not seek further review. Later in 2012, Reams filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his right to file an allocatur petition with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
On August 13, 2013, Reams filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. Thereafter, the PCRA court issued a
On October 2, 2023, Reams filed the PCRA petition at issue. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. On March 8, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss without a hearing because the petition was untimely filed and Reams failed to establish a timeliness exception. Reams filed a response. By order entered April 26, 2024, the PCRA court dismissed Reams’ petition. This appeal followed. Both Reams and the PCRA court have complied with appellate rule 1925.
Reams raises three substantive issues on appeal. Before addressing their merits, we must first determine whether the PCRA court correctly determined that Reams’ petition was untimely filed and that he established no timeliness exception.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Reams has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA‘s time bar. In his PCRA petition, Reams checked the box claiming he could meet the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA‘s time bar.
This Court has explained the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA‘s time bar as follows:
The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted).
[Reams] states that he discovered “new evidence” but never actually identifies the evidence in his [PCRA] Petition or 907 Response. From [Reams‘] filings, the Court gleans several potential timeliness arguments, none of which have merit, that [Reams] may be seeking to set forth.
First, [Reams] appears to argue that he recently became aware of amendments to the PCRA statute that were signed into law in in 2018, as well as the cases of Commonwealth v. Burton, [158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) and Commonwealth v. Small[, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)]. However, discovery of the law does not satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA‘s time-bar. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021) (decisional law and rules of procedure are not “facts” for the purposes of the newly-discovered fact exception); see Commonwealth v. Pinero, [241 A.3d 474, at *4 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision)] (finding no distinction between new decisional law and new statutory law for purposes of the newly-discovered fact exception).
Second, [Reams] raises several layered ineffectiveness claims arguing that all of his prior attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise claims that he received an illegal sentence, that trial counsel failed to raise a misidentification defense, and that trial counsel failed to raise a claim of actual innocence. It is well-established that ineffective assistance of counsel is not a “new fact” within the meaning of the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA‘s time-bar. See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.3d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000). Moreover, [Reams] would have been aware of trial counsel‘s alleged failure to raise a misidentification defense or a claim of actual innocence at the conclusion of his trial.
Furthermore, [Reams‘] claim that he received an illegal sentence alone does not make his petition timely. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 521-23 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(when a petition is facially untimely, a [petitioner] is required to prove a timeliness exception in order for an illegal sentencing claim to be reviewable on the merits).
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/30/24, at 7-8 (citations to record omitted). Thus, the PCRA concluded that Reams’ petition was untimely and that the court lacked jurisdiction to address its merits. Id. at 8.
Our review of the record supports the PCRA court‘s conclusion. In his brief, Reams essentially repeats the arguments that the PCRA court correctly discussed and rejected. Even on appeal, Reams does not clearly identify what “new fact” he alleges would entitle him to post-conviction relief. Thus, because Reams’ petition was untimely, both this Court and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider its merits. Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA court‘s order dismissing Reams’ PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/11/2025