COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Travis Maurice RAY, Jr., Appellant.
No. unknown
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
February 17, 2016
134 A.3d 1109
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.
Submitted Jan. 19, 2016.
With respect to the allegations regarding Detective Dove, Appellant solely relies on the newspaper article reporting on Dove‘s possible misconduct and does not articulate what evidence he would present at the evidentiary hearing on remand. In accordance with Castro, the article concerning Detective Dove does not constitute after-discovered evidence that entitles Appellant to a new trial.
With respect to Appellant‘s allegations that Detective Pitts coerced Fowler into making a false identification, Appellant referenced the aforementioned newspaper article and argues that he would subpoena the testimony of three individuals, Nafis Pinkney, Shaquille Rainey, and Unique Drayton, all of whom claimed that Detective Pitts used aggressive and violent tactics to pressure them into making false statements in murder investigations. However, even assuming such testimony is producible and admissible at an evidentiary hearing, these statements would solely be used to impeach Detective Pitts‘s credibility. The proposed witnesses, if available to testify, would allege that Detective Pitts committed misconduct in coercing their statements in other murder cases, but none of the witnesses can provide any new evidence concerning his conduct in this case. As such, Appellant has not shown that he is entitled to a new trial by presenting after-discovered evidence that will not be used solely to impeach a witness‘s credibility as required by Castro. Id. at 588, 93 A.3d at 821. Accordingly, we deny Appellant‘s motion for an evidentiary hearing on his proposed after-discovered evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant‘s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Thomas L. Kearney, III, District Attorney, Stephanie E. Lombardo, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellee.
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:
Appellant, pro se, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas by the Honorable Richard K. Renn on March 4, 2015, following a bench trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm.
Appellant was convicted of one count each of fleeing or attempting to elude police officer, accidents involving damage to attended vehicle or property, and five counts of accidents involving damage to unattended vehicle or property.1 Also on that date, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven and one half months to twenty-three months in prison on the fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer conviction and a consecutive term of twelve months of probation on the accidents involving damage to attended vehicle or property conviction. Appellant was ordered to pay the costs of prosecution for the remaining counts.
Appellant‘s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw on March 9, 2015, asserting that Appellant had filed a complaint against him with the Disciplinary Board. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw on March 10, 2015, and Appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion on March 17, 2015, which was denied April 1, 2015. On April 15, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The next day, the trial court directed Appellant to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
- Jurisdiction over the person of [Appellant] or jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas to even hear the case.
- Grading of offense
- Violation of 6 amendment and
Pa. Constitution § 9 . - Sufficiency of evidence
- Weight of evidence
- Violation of the 13th amendment excessive bail or fines or punishment
- Duress or extortionate credit loaning.
See “Notice,” filed 5/5/15, at ¶¶ 1-7.
In this Court‘s April 24, 2015, Order, the trial court was directed to hold a hearing, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998) (requiring on-the-record inquiry to determine whether waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent and voluntary). In its Order of April 28, 2015, the trial court noted that while a Grazier hearing had been held on April 1, 2015, prior to proceeding to arguments on Appellant‘s post sentence motions, the issue of Appellant‘s waiver of his right to counsel on appeal had not been addressed. As such, it stated it would convene a hearing to determine whether Appellant wished to waive his right to counsel on direct appeal as he had expressed his desire to do for purposes of arguing post-sentence motions.
On June 3, 2015, the trial court held a Grazier hearing3 at which time it informed Appellant he would be bound by the same rules of appellate procedure should he choose to proceed pro se as would a defendant represented by counsel; notwithstanding, Appellant indicated he wished to continue to proceed pro se. N.T., 6/4/15, at 2-6. He later stated he wanted the assistance of “backup counsel just for the formatting.” Id. at 6-7. Following the Grazier hearing, the trial court provided this Court with its finding that Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently elected to proceed pro se on appeal. In an order of June 4, 2015, the trial court appointed Marc J. Semke, Esquire as standby counsel.
On August 20, 2015, the trial court filed its Opinion Pursuant to
On August 26, 2015, Appellant filed his “Statement of Matters Complained of Under
I. Whether the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict of felony three fleeing or at-
A. The Commonwealth failed to establish that [Appellant] endangered a law enforcement officer or member of the general public due to the defendant engaging in a high speed chase.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant‘s post sentence motion arguing that the juries [sic] verdicts were against the weight of the evidence as:
A. There was a lack of physical evidence
B. Officer Craven‘s testimony contradicted the affidavit of probable cause.
C. Officer Craven‘s testimony contradicted his own testimony during the preliminary hearing.
D. Dash camera video did not provide evidence that [Appellant] was driving the vehicle.
III. Whether [Appellant] was denied rights granted by the 6th Amendment and Section 9 of the PA constitution by not compelling Sunciarai Manning to Testify.
IV. Whether the Court had jurisdiction over the defendant?
In the “Statement of the Questions Involved” portion of his appellate brief, Appellant presents these same claims. See Brief for Appellant at 5.
Before we consider the merits of the questions Appellant has raised for our consideration, we must first determine whether he has preserved them for our review. The Commonwealth asserts Appellant has waived all issues for our review for his failure file a
Upon our review of the record, we disagree that Appellant did not timely file his “Notice” as a purported
In any event, as this Court has noted, a timely-filed
Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process. When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. In other words, a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all. While [Commonwealth v.] Lord[,] [553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998)] and its progeny have generally involved situations where an appellant completely fails to mention an issue in his Concise Statement, for the reasons set forth above we conclude that Lord should also apply to Concise Statements which are so vague as to prevent the court from identifying the issue to be raised on appeal.
Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa.Super.2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
We find that the issues Appellant listed in his “Notice” fail to adequately and concisely identify the issues he sought to pursue on appeal. Instead, he presented vague fragmented statements and phrases without specifying to which of his convictions they pertained. As such, even if it had had the document in its possession, the trial court would have been impeded in its preparation of a meaningful legal analysis. Similarly, Appellant‘s attempt to preserve his issues for appellate review by filing a Rule 1925(b) statement on August 26, 2015, must fail. As noted, the trial court ordered Appellant to file his Rule 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days in its April 16, 2015, Order. Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement over four months later; therefore, it is patently untimely.
We acknowledge that Appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal, and had requested the assistance of standby counsel simply to aid in his “formatting” of the appeal; however, his status as a pro se litigant does not entitle him to any advantage due to his lack of legal training. Further, a layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding to a reasonable extent assumes the risk that his lack of legal training will place him at a disadvantage. Kovalev v. Sowell, 839 A.2d 359, 367 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2003). Accordingly, a
Herein, the trial court specifically informed Appellant as it had done previously with regard to his filing of post-sentence motions that by proceeding pro se he would be bound by the rules of appellate procedure and his failure to abide by them would put him at risk of waiving important issues on appeal. N.T., 6/4/15, at 2-6. Nevertheless, Appellant indicated he wished to proceed pro se, and only after the trial court filed its Opinion pursuant to
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find Appellant has failed to preserve the issues he may have raised on appeal in a properly filed Rule 1925(b) statement. As such, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of Sentence Affirmed.
STEVENS, P.J.E.