Com. v. Ommundsen, P.Com. v. Ommundsen, P.
Phillip Michael Ommundsen (“Ommundsen“) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to criminal attempt to commit statutory sexual assault and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.1 After careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant procedural history as follows. In March 2025, Ommundsen entered a negotiated guilty plea to the above-mentioned offenses. He waived a recitation of the factual basis for the charges. Nevertheless, we note that in his own post-sentence motion, he acknowledged that he had “communication with an adult civilian posing as a minor.” Optional Post-Sentence Motions, 6/16/25, at 2. Ommundsen completed a written
On June 4, 2025, the trial court imposed the negotiated aggregate sentence of eighteen months to five years’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ consecutive probation.3
Ommundsen presents the following issues for our review:
- Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, hence created manifest injustice, when it denied [Ommundsen‘s] post sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea to attempt-statutory sexual assault, to wit: [Ommundsen‘s] plea was not “knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or understandingly” entered?
- Whether a manifest injustice resulted when [Ommundsen] was denied his request to withdraw his guilty plea when he entered his plea as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, to wit: [Ommundsen] entered a plea of guilty to an offense that cannot be considered attempt-statutory sexual assault as he did not attempt to have intercourse “with a complainant under the age of [sixteen] years,” but rather with an adult posing as a minor?
Ommundsen‘s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
For ease of disposition, we will address Ommundsen‘s two claims together. Ommundsen argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not enter it knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and (2) the ineffective assistance of his counsel induced his plea.
We consider the applicable standard of review:
We review the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. “Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.”
Commonwealth v. Gabra, 336 A.3d 1052, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
This Court has stated:
[A] request to withdraw a guilty plea made after sentencing is subject to a higher scrutiny “since courts strive to discourage [the] entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.” Therefore, in order to withdraw a plea after the imposition of sentence, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice which resulted in a “manifest injustice.” A defendant meets this burden only if he can demonstrate that his plea was entered involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.
Commonwealth v. Alameda, 339 A.3d 504, 509-10 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations omitted). “In determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Gabra, 336 A.3d at 1057 (citation omitted).
Moreover, once a defendant enters a guilty plea, it is presumed he was aware of what he was doing. “A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his colloquy.” In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we note “[t]he law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: [a]ll that is required is that [appellant‘s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”
Alameda, 339 A.3d at 510 (unnecessary capitalization and citations omitted).
Our Crimes Code defines statutory sexual assault, in part, as follows:
(b) Felony of the first degree. − A person commits a felony of the first degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16 years and that person is 11 or more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not married to each other.
A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.”
Our Crimes Code is clear in defining the two (2) elements of the offense of attempt by providing: (1) that the actor intend to commit an offense; and (2) that the actor take a substantial step toward completion of the offense. The Code then specifically provides that impossibility is not a defense if the completed offense could have occurred had the circumstances been as the accused apprehended them to be. . . .
Commonwealth v. Aguilar, 340 A.3d 311, 319-20 (Pa. Super. 2025) (some citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Ommundsen first argues that the Commonwealth could not establish statutory sexual assault because law enforcement arrested him in a parking lot before any sexual act occurred. Further, Ommundsen reasons that he
Ommundsen next argues that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because his plea counsel did not properly advise him as to the lack of evidence to support the charges. Ommundsen also argues that plea counsel was ineffective because he did not advise him that he could challenge his charges with pretrial motions, nor did he file any motions. Lastly, Ommundsen argues, without further explanation, that plea counsel failed to advise him “that there was conflicting case law in Pennsylvania, hence that he had a possible defense to his case.” Id. at 13.
Here, the trial court reasoned that the Commonwealth could have prosecuted Ommundsen‘s charges. It considered an analogous Court of Common Pleas decision, which the trial court cited as ”Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-33-Cr-336-2023, Omb. Op., 01/25/2024.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/25 at 1-2. In that case, the trial court rejected the defendant‘s claim that he could not have committed attempt offenses because of “a mistake of fact,” where he was communicating with an adult and not a fifteen year old girl, as he believed. Id. The Brown court reasoned that, with respect to an attempt charge, the identity of the supposed victim was “immaterial,” and
After careful review of the record and considering the totality of circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ommundsen‘s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea hearing, he stated that he understood the factual allegations, the nature of the charges against him, and the burden of proof necessary for conviction. Ommundsen is bound by the statements he made during the hearing. See Alameda, 339 A.3d at 509. Additionally, Ommundsen‘s mistaken belief that he was communicating with an underaged victim would not in itself defeat an attempted statutory sexual assault charge. See Aguilar, 340 A.3d at 319-20.
Furthermore, we deny relief on Ommundsen‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. “Our Supreme Court has made clear that ineffectiveness claims are not to be raised in the first instance on direct appeal but must await collateral review.” Alameda, 339 A.3d at 511 (citation omitted). The Court permits an exception where the trial court held a hearing on a claim of
Here, the trial court did not hold a hearing on Ommundsen‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, there is no developed record on this issue. We deny relief without prejudice to Ommundsen to raise a proper ineffective assistance of counsel claim on collateral review.
As none of Ommundsen‘s claims entitle him to appellate relief, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
DATE: 7/30/2026