Com. v. Lock, J.Com. v. Lock, J.
Aрpellant, Joshua Douglas Lock, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on June 13, 2019. We affirm.
On September 3, 2018, Appellant was issued a non-traffic citation for violating
(a) Confinement and control.--It shall be unlawful for the owner or keeper of any dog to fail to keep at all times the dog in any of the following manners:
(1) confined within the premises of the owner.
The citation declared: “[Appellant] failed to keep a dog confined to the premises of the owner. Dog did attack and injure a neighbor’s cat.” Non-Traffic Citation, 9/3/18, at 1.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
On October 16, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge in the magisterial district court and the district court sentenced Appellant to pay a $300.00 fine and $9,331.43 in restitution to the cat’s owner. See Certificate of Disposition, 10/16/18, at 1. Appellant acknowledges that the $9,331.43 constitutes “the cost of the veterinary services provided to treat the injured cat.” Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Appellant filed a timely appeal from his summary conviction and, on April 26, 2019, Appellant appeared before the court of common pleas for a trial de novo. During the trial, Appellant admitted his guilt and Appellant further admitted: “I permitted one of our dogs to get loosе, while the dog was running off the leash, it attacked the cat and caused considerable harm to the cat.” N.T. Trial, 4/26/19, at 1. Nevertheless, Appellant contended that the magisterial district court erred in sentencing him to pay restitution. See id. at 1-2. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the sentence of restitution was illegal, as the applicable restitution statute,
On June 13, 2019, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the charged summary offense and sentenced Appellant to pay a $300.00 fine and $9,331.43 in restitution. Appellant filed a timey notice of appeal, raising two claims:
[1.] Whether restitution can be ordered in a prosecution for injuries to an animal under the “Dog Law”[?]
[2.] Whether the trial cоurt erred when it ordered restitution for a property crime under
Appellant’s Brief at 1-2 (some capitalization omitted).1
“In the context of criminal proceedings, it is well-settled that an order of restitution is not simply an award of damages,
In this case, the trial court imposed restitution as a part of Appellant‘s direct sentence, in accordance with
(a) General rule.--Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crimе . . . the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.
. . .
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(c) Mandatory restitution.—
(1) The court shall order full restitution:
(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss. . . .
The above statute demands that the trial court order “full restitution . . . to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss.”
Because [
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 ] imposes restitution as part of a sentence, its penal character must not be overlooked and it would seem to us that restitution can be permitted under18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 only as to losses for which the defendant has been held criminally accountable. This is in keeping with the well established principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. See1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1) .
Harner, 617 A.2d at 705; see also Commonwealth v. Walker, 666 A.2d 301 (Pa. Super. 1995) (while drunk, the defendant was involved in a two-car
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In this сase, Appellant committed his offense on September 3, 2018 – prior to the effective date of the amendments. Further, the parties agree that the pre-amendment version of
collision; he was thereafter convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI); the Superior Court held that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to pay restitution, under
We have explained that, under the plain terms of
damage suffered by the victim.” Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d 163, 170 (Pa. Super. 2018).
We turn now to cоnsider the precise nature of Appellant‘s challenges to the trial court‘s restitution order. Regarding challenges to the imposition of restitution, we have held:
the appellate courts have drawn a distinction between thosе cases where the challenge is directed to the trial court‘s [statutory] authority to impose restitution and those cases where the challenge is premised upon a claim that the restitution order is excessive. When the court‘s authority to impose restitution is challenged, it concerns the legality of the sentence; however, when the challenge is based on excessiveness, it concerns the discretionary aspects of the sentence.
Commonwealth v. Oree, 911 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also In re M.W., 725 A.2d at 731 (holding that, when an issue “centers upon [the court‘s] statutory authority” to impose the sentence, as opposed to the “court‘s exercise of discretion in fashioning” the sentence, the issue implicates the legality of the sentence); Walker, 666 A.2d at 307 (“chаllenges alleging that a sentence of restitution is excessive under the circumstances have been held by this court to be challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing”).
Both of Appellant’s claims on appeal contend that the trial court lacked statutory authority to order restitution for veterinary bills the victim paid to treat his injured cat. Appellant’s Brief at 4. These claims implicate the legality of Appellant’s sentence. See Oree, 911 A.2d at 173. Thus, sinсe Appellant’s challenges go to the legality of his sentence, “our standard of review
[regarding his challenges] is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 787 n. 12 (Pa. Super. 2008).
First, Appellant claims that restitution is not one of the prescribed penalties for violating the Dog Law and, thus, the trial court did not have the ability tо sentence him to pay restitution for violating the Dog Law. Appellant’s Brief at 6. This claim fails.
As quoted above,
Appellant’s violation of
for violating
Next, Aрpellant claims the trial court lacked statutory authority to order restitution for the amount the victim spent to treat his injured cat. According to Appellant:
[
Section 1106 ] authorizes the imposition of restitution for an injury to property to the extent . . . that the value of the property has been decreased. No other applicable basis exists for determining the amount of restitution. Accordingly, the calculation of restitution based upon the cost of veterinary carе incurred in the treatment of the injured animal . . . is patently illegal. . . . [R]estitution [] cannot be determined by the cost of the veterinary services provided in treating the injuries to the cat. [Restitution] is limited to the decrease in the value of the cаt.
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
Appellant’s argument is unavailing. As we have held, “[r]estitution, . . . as it relates to property damage, can be made by either the return of the original property or the payment of money necessary to replace, or to repair the damage to, the property.” Commonwealth v. Genovese, 675 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added). Simply stated, the victim in this case was statutorily entitled to “full restitution” “so as to provide [him]
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with the fullest compensation for [his] loss.”
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/08/2020
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