COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DONALD KNUPP
No. 1439 WDA 2021
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
February 22, 2023
2023 PA Super 28
OPINION BY COLINS, J.
J-S29036-22
OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: February 22, 2023
Appellant, Donald Knupp, appeals the judgments of sentence that the Washington County Court of Common Pleas imposed after a jury found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 He challenges the trial court‘s denial of his suppression motion, admission of prior bad acts evidence, and denial of an evidentiary admission objection. Upon careful review, we sua sponte vacate Appellant‘s concurrent sentence for knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance and affirm the remaining judgments of sentence without need for a remand.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
The Washington County Drug Taskforce (“WCDT“) had been conducting an investigation into [Appellant] (a “target“) allegedly trafficking cocaine in the spring in of 2018. Michael Manfredi was a police officer at the time as well as a member of the WCDT. Through the WCDT, he conducted a series of controlled buys of cocaine from [Appellant] at his barbershop.1 Detective Manfredi used confidential informants ([`]CI[″]) for the controlled buys.2 The first controlled buy from [Appellant] took place on June 12, 2018. The CI arranged this purchase by first calling [Appellant] at telephone number [redacted telephone number]. Detective Manfredi testified that he was present for the phone call, he overheard the conversation between [Appellant] and CI, and that he was familiar with [Appellant‘s] voice at the time. The Detective testified that he has known [Appellant] since 2012.
The CI proceeded to [Appellant‘s] barbershop located at 520 West Chestnut Street, Washington, Pennsylvania to purchase $220 worth of cocaine (3.6 grams). Detective Manfredi orchestrated a second controlled buy on June 14, 2018. For this controlled buy, the CI purchased $1,400 worth of cocaine (29 grams). A third
On June 19, 2018, a confidential source informed Detective Michael Manfredi that [Appellant] was going to “re-up” his cocaine inventory that day. The confidential source had previously informed Detective Manfredi that [Appellant‘s] source of cocaine was a barbershop [in] the Southside neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Consequently, Detective Manfredi contacted the FBI and spoke with Special Agent Piccini to discuss [Appellant] and the investigation and asked for assistance. With this information, [Agent] Piccini drove to East Carson Street to conduct surveillance. [Agent] Piccini observed [Appellant] arriving at a barbershop and photographed him walking into the shop carrying a dark colored backpack.
[Detective] Manfredi and Officer Martin of the City of Washington Police Department were waiting near [Appellant‘s] barbershop, located at 520 West Chestnut Street, Washington, to return from Pittsburgh in a blue Dodge Ram pickup truck.3 When [Appellant] arrived at his barbershop in the blue pick-up truck, Officer Martin and Detective Manfredi exited their vehicles and approached [Appellant‘s] truck. According to Detective Manfredi, he noticed a small amount of marijuana in the truck. He asked for [Appellant‘s] consent to search the vehicle, which [Appellant] provided. Therein, a blue backpack was located with $10,000 therein, 6 Washington Financial Bank deposit receipts, and remnants of a marijuana cigarette.
Detective Manfredi called [Pennsylvania State Police] Trooper Christine Marth, the K-9 narcotic detection handler, for assistance. Trooper Marth testified that she had her canine, Brutus, sniff for cocaine located inside [Appellant‘s] truck. [Trooper Marth testified that] Brutus did not alert for any cocaine inside [Appellant‘s] truck, but that her canine did alert on the $10,000 found in [Appellant‘s] backpack, and $500 in his wallet.4 Importantly, $1,150 (initially testified to being $920 by mistake) of the $10,000 in backpack was money used in the controlled purchase of cocaine via a confidential information (CI) from
[Appellant] testified that he intended to use this money for purchasing a motorcycle that he was to see in Pittsburgh, and that his mother, Vicki Knupp, gave him one-half of the $10,000 for the motorcycle.6 According to [Appellant], the owner of the motorcycle cancelled [Appellant‘s] appointment at the last minute. [Appellant], therefore, decided to get a haircut on the South Side, then return to his barbershop because he had an appointment.7
Detective Manfredi drafted search warrants of [Appellant‘s] two bank accounts at Washington Financial Bank (one checking, one savings) and search warrants of [Appellant‘s] barbershop, his apartment directly above the barbershop, and Vicki Knupp‘s house as a consequence of aforementioned facts.8 Judge Valarie Costanzo approved the warrant request on August 8, 2018, and they were executed on the same date. The search of the barbershop yielded 190 grams of cocaine located in a black bag sandwiched under white plastic bags on top of a washer/dryer unit in a storage room marked “Employees Only.” The bag also contained a Crown Royal bag, wherein the WCDT found a black digital scale and spoon, both of which were covered in a white
Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/22, 1-4 (record citations omitted).
We note, in addition to the offered summary, that Detective Manfredi alleged in his trial testimony that Appellant made inculpatory statements after a Miranda2 warning in he which stated that he had bought 4.5 ounces of cocaine from a person named Cook at a bar in Pittsburgh and that “there may be a little bit left over from a previous cocaine purchase that was within the barbershop.” N.T. 3/23/21, 149, 196-97. Moreover, the police determined that sixty dollars of the money that was recovered from Appellant‘s wallet at the time of the search warrant execution was buy money from the controlled cocaine purchase that was completed on August 7th. Id. at 174-75.
Relevant to the first claim presented in this appeal, Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the car stop. Appellant‘s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, 3/29/19, 4-7. Because he alleged that he was illegally stopped and that his truck and backpack were thus illegally searched, he asserted that the search warrants issued based on the evidence obtained from the car stop were illegally issued. Id. at 4-10. He objected to the legality of the stop because of, inter alia, the lack of specificity for the tip concerning him traveling to Pittsburgh for a resupply of cocaine and the supposed lack of evidence concerning the reliability of the police confidential source for that tip. Id. at 4-5; Brief in Support of Suppression, 8/1/19, 1-6. He also alleged that the search of his backpack in his truck exceeded his consent to a search. Appellant‘s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, 3/29/19, 6-7; Brief in Support of Suppression, 8/1/19, 6-7. After a hearing on August 1, 2019, the trial court denied the motion in a deferred order. Order, 8/19/19, 1-7. The court found that there were sufficient facts to support reasonable suspicion for the detainment of Appellant, probable cause to permit the search of his truck, and probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants. Id. at 3-6.
Appellant proceeded to be tried before a jury on March 23-25, 2021, and was found guilty of the above-referenced charges. Verdict Slip, 3/25/21, 1; Verdict, 3/25/21, 1-2. During trial, Appellant raised an objection to the admission of ammunition and a firearm magazine recovered by the police, the denial of which is the focus of his third claim herein. N.T. 3/23/21, 187-89.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
Did the trial court err in the denial of the motion to suppress on August 19, 2019? - Did the trial court err in the admission of prior bad acts of the Appellant on March 18, 2021?
- Did the trial court err in overruling the Appellant‘s objection to the admission of evidence involving a firearm during trial on March 23, 2021?
Appellant‘s Brief at 5 (original text in all caps).
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his suppression motion claiming that the trial court erred by concluding that there was reasonable suspicion permitting the car stop on June 19, 2018, and probable cause based on the evidence obtained during the search of his truck that permitted any of the subsequent searches in this case. Appellant‘s Brief at 21-25. “Once a motion to suppress has been filed, it is the Commonwealth‘s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant‘s rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012), citing, inter alia,
In reviewing an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we are guided by the following standard of review:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to trial court‘s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). “It is within the suppression court‘s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant first asserts that there was insufficient evidence for reasonable suspicion for the car stop because the confidential informant‘s tip that he was going to “re-up” on cocaine in Pittsburgh on June 19, 2018, lacked specificity. He states, “There was no specific location given, nor was there any additional information given that would be predictive of the Appellant‘s behavior or would narrow down the potential occurrences that could be the case given the wide scope of variables involved.” Appellant‘s Brief at 23. He then argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the odor of marijuana coming from his truck provided probable cause by itself. Id. at 24. Lastly, he asserts that the evidence obtained as a result of his consent to a search of his truck should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal seizure. Id. at 25.
To conduct an investigative detention, police must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012). “In reviewing whether reasonable suspicion ... exists, we
Here, the suppression court determined that there was ample support for reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances:
According to [Detective] Manfredi‘s testimony the confidential source had previously provided information to the Washington County Taskforce regarding criminal investigations and had determined that such information was accurate. [Detective] Manfredi also stated that the taskforce used the confidential source to purchase cocaine from [Appellant] in “controlled buy situations.” In fact, prior to June 19, 2018, [Detective] Manfredi and his colleagues had conducted seven controlled purchases of cocaine from [Appellant] with the assistance of confidential informants. Further, Special Agent Piccini informed [Detective] Manfredi that “Tending Styles” [(the barbershop in Pittsburgh that Appellant traveled to on June 19, 2018)] was [] known to them to be a source of cocaine distribution. Pursuant to a totality-of-the-
circumstances standard, this Court concludes that the informant‘s reliability and basis of knowledge passes constitutional muster. ...
[T]his Court finds that the above facts were sufficient to sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] had just purchased cocaine at “Trending Styles.” Therefore, the police could detain [Appellant].
Order, 8/19/19, 3-4 (record citation and footnote omitted).
Appellant‘s argument – contrary to the suppression court‘s analysis – overlooks the mandate that “reasonable suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.” In re D.M., 727 A.2d 556, 559 (Pa. 1999) (emphasis in original). The fact that the “re up” tip did not include a specific destination and that Appellant‘s actions could have appeared to be innocent or lawful in a vacuum did not countermand the adequate grounds for reasonable suspicion. Prior to the car stop, the police had conducted at least seven controlled purchases of cocaine from Appellant‘s barbershop from March to June 2018, with at least three of those transactions occurring during the month that the car stop took place. N.T. 8/1/19, 12, 22, 46, 57; Application in Support of Search Warrant for Application for Search Warrant 726-2018, 8/9/18, 4, 9-16. Moreover, while the “re up” tip regarding a purchase in Pittsburgh did not include a specific destination, the police surveilled Appellant going to a location in Pittsburgh that they knew was a source for cocaine distribution just prior to the car stop occurring when Appellant returned to his barbershop. N.T. 8/1/19, 12-21, 33-35, 52.
To the extent that Appellant challenges whether the odor of marijuana provided insufficient grounds for probable cause, the presence of that odor is a red herring for purposes of our review. Appellant was not stopped or
While the suppression court acknowledged in its denial order that a marijuana odor by itself provided probable cause under caselaw that has now been abrogated, that observation is immaterial where Appellant ultimately granted consent to a search of his truck which he does not even challenge in this appeal. Order, 8/19/19, 4, citing Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 633, 635 (Pa. Super. 1975) (holding the smell of marijuana provides probable cause to search), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263, 1283-88 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle during a police traffic stop, alone, is not sufficient to establish probable cause), and Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 43 (Pa. 2021)
While a showing of probable cause was necessary for the issuance of a search warrant and the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances was necessary to justify a warrantless search of an automobile under Alexander, supra, Appellant relieved the Commonwealth of any burden to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances for a warrantless automobile search by consenting to a search. On appeal, Appellant offers no evidence or arguments to contravene the existence or voluntariness of that consent. He notes that “[t]his consent was given while [he] was in the back of the police car,” but even a suspect who has been detained and handcuffed may still voluntarily
In the absence of any apparent challenge to his consent to a search, we cannot find that the suppression court erred by not concluding that the evidence seized from his truck was obtained as a result of an illegal search. We are bound by the facts found by the suppression court, including that he voluntarily consented to a search of his truck. Following the consent granted, the police were permitted to search Appellant‘s truck and his backpack contained therein which held a large sum of money that, in addition to other evidence, supported the affidavits of probable cause for the search warrants later issued in this case. See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170, 185 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[G]eneral consent to search a vehicle extends to closed, but readily opened, containers discovered inside the car.“) (citation omitted).
We find no basis to conclude that the trial court erred by denying Appellant‘s suppression motion. There were articulable grounds for reasonable suspicion justifying the car stop in this case and, during that lawful stop, Appellant granted the police consent to search his truck which yielded evidence that was permissibly used by the Commonwealth to subsequently obtain search warrants for additional evidence. To the extent that the suppression court made any legal conclusions about the presence of an odor
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the trial court‘s partial grant of the Commonwealth‘s motion in limine that allowed the admission of evidence concerning the controlled drug sales which involved the use of prerecorded buy money that was later recovered by the police. Appellant‘s Brief at 25-28. He claims that evidence admitted by this ruling “was more prejudicial than probative and was used for improper purposes under Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 404(b).” Id. at 26.
As an initial matter, Appellant‘s brief fails to indicate where in the record he preserved his claim regarding the Commonwealth‘s motion in limine pursuant to either the “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” section of
Even if Appellant preserved his theories for this issue, we would not conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that the evidence at trial concerning the three controlled drug sales during the investigation of
Here, the trial court admitted only evidence concerning the three controlled drug purchases which involved prerecorded buy money that was
The controlled purchases admitted at trial were relevant to establish the history and natural development of the facts. They formed an integral part of the criminal investigation because they provided the evidentiary basis for the car stop of Appellant and the police referred to them in the affidavits of probable cause for the search warrants for Appellant‘s barbershop and his banking recordings. Evidence of these purchases informed the jury about the course of the investigation that resulted in Appellant‘s arrest and thus were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to the general prohibition on admitting prior bad acts evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 139 (Pa. 2007) (res gestae evidence admitted to explain events surrounding criminal conduct so that the case presented to a jury did not appear in a vacuum).
This evidence was also relevant and admissible under
Although the prior bad act evidence was certainly prejudicial, the prejudice was ameliorated by a cautionary instruction that the trial court issued to the jury, see N.T. 3/25/21, 87-88, explaining the limited purposes for which it could consider the evidence. See Echevarria, 575 A.2d at 623-24 (holding that any possible prejudicial effect of testimony concerning prior controlled drug sales was cured by an instruction to a jury advising that that evidence should only be used for determining Echevarria‘s possession of a controlled substance and his intent to deliver it); Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1280 (Pa. 2016) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court‘s instructions[.]”). The use of the limiting instruction, along with the initial limitation that only evidence concerning the recovered controlled buy money would be admitted, leads us to the conclusion that Appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by the partial grant of the Commonwealth‘s motion in limine and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of the three controlled drug sales.
In his last issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the admission of evidence concerning the recovery of
During his direct examination, Detective Manfredi testified, without any objection, that the recovered evidence included, among other things, ammunition, which was two boxes of 40-caliber Smith & Wesson brand and two boxes of 270 Winchester brand, and a firearm magazine. N.T. 3/23/21, 180. The detective separately listed the various recovered items and identified the recovered ammunition and magazine as “item number 12.” Id. The prosecutor then proceeded to present the various recovered items to the detective and marked and moved them into the evidentiary record as trial exhibits. Id. 180-87. When the prosecutor addressed the ammunition evidence, the detective again identified it without any objection. Id. at 187. When the prosecutor asked the detective to open the exhibit and show the ammunition to the jury, Appellant‘s counsel raised the objection that is the focus of this claim after the detective identified the ammunition for a third time. Id. at 187-88.
Q. I‘m going to hand you Commonwealth‘s Exhibit 64.
A. This is Commonwealth Exhibit 64, marked on this. This has all of the consistent case number, Donald Knupp, date, time, and location. This says, “Item 12 ammunition; 40 S&W, two boxes; 270 Win, two boxes; and a 40 cal magazine,” as it‘s marked on this evidence tag and fairly consistent with Item 12 on Mr. Knupp‘s inventory receipt of seized property.
Q. If you could briefly open that up and show the jury the ammunition.
A. I‘m not being nice anymore. I will just start setting them here. So this is a -- here is a box of 40 Smith & Wesson ammunition. They are bullets within, full metal jacket bullets. This is a box of 270 Win, 270 Winchester bullets, a box, and within are spent brass shell casings and live and live bullet ammunition.
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I would object to this evidence. Mr. Knupp is not --
[Prosecutor]: Then we‘ll approach.
[Defense counsel]: He‘s not sure --
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor --
The Court: Yes. Please come up.
(Whereupon, a sidebar was held.)
[Defense counsel]: I would just object to this evidence in particular. He is not charged with any firearms violations. It‘s not dispositive. It‘s not even probative here. It‘s just prejudicial. We got a lot of evidence in here already, and I don‘t know why we have to take the time on this ammunition.
[Prosecutor]: Well, Your Honor, I mean, these are all evidence that was seized from the becomes [sic]. We admitted a lot of
evidence that he is not necessarily charged with. We didn‘t charge him with the marijuana. It was admitted today. It is everything that is seized and confirms the inventory. The Court: I understand that. [Defense counsel], I don‘t think is disputing that. But what is the relevance to the actual crime charged?
[Prosecutor]: Because the search was conducted certain items were seized by officers. This officer indicated, and later an officer is going to testify that later individuals who are dealing in drugs have firearms and ammunition and things of that nature. And that‘s part of this case.
[Defense counsel]: I don‘t see how it‘s probative at all to anything here.
[Prosecutor]: That‘s not the point.
The Court: Okay. To the extent that [the prosecutor] says that she will have some expert testimony with respect to that matter, then the Commonwealth is permitted. I will allow it.
[Defense counsel]: Note my objection please.
The Court: Your objection is noted.
N.T. 3/23/21, 187-89.
The Commonwealth‘s expert witness later testified that firearms were among the items he expected to find when executing search warrants in drug investigations:
A. Well, obviously, narcotics. We look for large quantities of United States currency, communication devices, packaging material, cut agents, firearms. Because it‘s a cash business, it‘s a cutthroat business, drug dealers rub off on one another. And people know that a person has large amounts of cash, wants to rob them and take their cash. So a lot of times, narcotics dealers possess firearms. So we always look for firearms in these searches....
The trial court advises us that it found the ammunition evidence was relevant to the drug charges at issue and was not so prejudicial that it needed to be excluded from trial:
Based upon th[e expert] testimony, the trial court is unable to conclude that the prejudicial value of testimony regarding ammunition located in [Appellant‘s] apartment outweighed its probative value. This Court finds the firearm evidence to be relevant because the ammunition taken in conjuncture with the drug charges that have been filed against [Appellant]. Law enforcement‘s expertise and experience has taught them that ammunition, and firearms, are associated with illicit drug trafficking.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/22, 7.
First, we are presented with the question of whether the evidence concerning the ammunition and magazine was relevant where Appellant was facing charges only involving the possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, and was not being tried for any firearms offenses. Appellant‘s Brief at 29-30.
Here, all the facts and circumstances surrounding Appellant‘s possession of the recovered drugs were relevant to determine whether he had the intent to deliver those drugs. In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363, 367 (Pa. Super. 2008). On sufficiency review, our appellate courts have considered the presence of a firearm as a relevant factor for consideration of a drug possessor‘s intent to deliver. See Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Pa. 2007); In re R.N., 951 A.2d at 367. We have additionally treated the presence of ammunition as a relevant consideration for determination of that intent element. See Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 115 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (observing that the determination of whether a person possesses a drug with intent to deliver is based upon the totality of circumstances, including whether police found firearms and ammunition in close proximity to drugs).
Our treatment of firearms and ammunition during sufficiency review for charges of possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver naturally leads to the conclusion that the ammunition evidence in the instant case was relevant for admissibility purposes. This conclusion is consistent with the theory addressed in the Commonwealth‘s proffered expert testimony: if one stores firearms and ammunition in close proximity to drugs, it makes it more probable that the drugs were possessed with the intent for sale because the firearms and ammunition may be used for, among other things, protecting the
In the alternative, Appellant argues that the evidence of the ammunition and the magazine caused him “undue prejudice” and should have been excluded pursuant to
Appellant argues that the evidence concerning the ammunition and the magazine “served no purpose other than to inflame the jury against” him, that “[t]he mere suggestion that the presence of firearms indicates drugs trafficking is inflammatory,” and that the Commonwealth‘s expert testimony
We would be remiss if we concluded our review without addressing the fact that Appellant‘s sentence contains an obvious defect rendering it illegal. Because there is no apparent issue with our jurisdiction for this appeal, we may address the legality of Appellant‘s sentence sua sponte. See
The bills of information make it clear that Appellant‘s drug possession charges only involved his possession of cocaine. Bills of Information, 9/17/18, 1. While the trial evidence referenced the separate recovery of quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and pills, see N.T. 3/23/21, 179-80 (referring to items 1, 11, and 12), the Commonwealth only proceeded to a verdict on the drug charges based on Appellant‘s possession of the cocaine seized on August 9, 2019. N.T. 3/25/21, 88 (trial court‘s jury instructions: “... Mr. Knupp is charged with possession of a controlled substance, that being cocaine. He is also charged with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, that being cocaine as well.”). At sentencing, however, the trial court imposed concurrent imprisonment terms for both drug possession charges. Sentencing Order, 6/18/21, 1.
Whether convictions merge for sentencing purposes is a question implicating the legality of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009). Our sentencing merger statute at
Judgment of sentence for knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance vacated. Judgments of sentence for possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2023
Notes
N.T. 3/25/21, 87-88.Further, each element must be proved by beyond a reasonable doubt. But before I give you that information, ladies and gentlemen, I must give to you a cautionary instruction. Okay? You have heard evidence intending to prove that the defendant was involved in controlled buys of cocaine, for which he is not on trial here. I am speaking of the testimony to the effect that alleged sales of cocaine took place on June 12, 2018, June 15, 2018, and August 7th of 2018, by Mr. Knupp.
This evidence is before you for a limited purpose. That is for the purpose of intending to show his possession of and intention to deliver cocaine that was seized on August the 9th of 2018. This evidence must not be considered by you in any other manner or for the purposes I just stated. You must not regard this evidence as showing that the defendant is a person of bad character or criminal tendencies, from which you might be inclined to infer guilt. Please remember this, ladies and gentlemen.