COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DENNIS LEE HASSINGER
No. 168 MDA 2020
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED JULY 09, 2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
J-A03020-21; NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
Dennis Lee Hassinger appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of three counts of arson.1 We affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural history underlying this appeal can be summarized as follows. In the early morning hours of October 30, 2018, the Centre County courthouse and adjacent sheriff‘s department sustained fire damage to their roofs. During the investigation, police asked the sheriff‘s department to review security surveillance footage from cameras around the courthouse. The surveillance footage revealed an individual dressed in boots, camouflage shorts, and a dark hooded sweatshirt walking around the courthouse and sheriff‘s department. The footage also showed the same
Police then obtained and executed a search warrant where Hassinger was staying and recovered clothing that matched what was seen in the video. The police also recovered a lighter and yellow grocery bags similar to the ones burnt onto the concrete on top of the courthouse and found on the pavement across the street from the courthouse. Video taken two days earlier from the Dollar Store showed Hassinger purchasing a two-liter bottle of soda, and requesting plastic bags, which are yellow. Police also recovered Hassinger‘s cell phone and Facebook account, which revealed texts and posts indicating an еxtreme animosity toward the Centre County court system and law enforcement.
Most of the Facebook posts were made in late January 2018, in the days leading up to and during Hassinger‘s trial in the Centre County courthouse on unrelated charges stemming from a domestic incident which occurred in 2017.2 In one of those posts, Hassinger referenced a 1996 criminal case against him, and claimed “[t]wo lying ass Pennsylvania State Police troopers Said i attacked them in my own home.” N.T., 9/24/19 at 125-26. In other
Hassinger indicated in another Facebook post that he had received a letter advising him that he was “a convicted felon 2 twice over,” and claimed that this was an “injustice for anybody to be taken advantage of by the justice system,” and stated that he “was not giving up without a fight” and would “[f]ight fire w/fire.” Id. at 123. Hassinger additionally claimed that Centre County was “F—kn evil bullsh-t” and stated “GodDamn u to HellFireAndBrimstone Lake of fire Ur firey prison awaits youso f—kn burn where u don‘t get use to it thee flames of Hell were you wish for death.” Id. at 116-18.
Police arrested Hassinger and charged him with multiple counts of arson and related offenses. When Hassinger was asked why he committed the arson, he initially stated “I don‘t know,” but later denied any involvement. The Commonwealth developed a theory that Hassinger, who had an extensive criminal record, harbored extreme animosity toward the courts and law enforcement which provided a motive for him to set fire to the courthouse and sheriff‘s department. On this basis, the Commonwealth sought to introduce, inter alia, a 1996 conviction for terroristic threats, and a 2005 conviction for burglary, assault, harassment, and trespass.3 Both Hassinger and the Commonwealth filed motions in limine to preclude/permit the introduction of (1) Hassinger‘s criminal record; and (2) lay opinion testimony from law enforcement personnel identifying Hassinger in surveillance footage. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the prior convictions were admissible on the basis thаt they showed motive and/or intent, and their
The matter proceeded to a jury trial in September 2019. During trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of six law enforcement officers, each of whom identified Hassinger as the individual in the surveillance video. The Commonwealth also introduced Hassinger‘s prior convictions. In relation to the 1996 conviction for terroristic threats, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce the testimony of Trooper Warren Sasserman, who explained that he and Corporal Daniel Hawk of the Pennsylvania State Police were dispatched to serve a mental health warrant on Hassinger that had been issued based on information supplied by Hassinger‘s mother. When they encountered Hassinger and informed him of the warrant, Hassinger stated, “I am not going anywhere with you fucking pigs, I will kill the first one that touches me, you‘re going to call more fucking cops because it‘s going to take more than two of you.” N.T., 9/24/19, at 21-25. Hassinger attempted to evade Trooper Sasserman and Corporal Hawk, and when Corporal Hawk blocked Hassinger‘s exit, Hassinger starting swinging at them and a physical altercation ensued. Id. at 25. Trooper Sasserman and Corporal Hawk wrestled Hassinger to the ground, and were eventually able to immobilize and handcuff him, although Hassinger continued to kick and attempt to break free.
In relation to the 2005 conviction for burglary, assault, harassment, and trespass, the Commonwealth introduced the bill of information, the complaint, and evidence that Hassinger plead guilty to the above charges. See N.T., 9/24/19, at 53-56. The Commonwealth also introduced the sentencing order. Id. at 56-58.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Hassinger guilty of three counts of arson. The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (“PSI“). On November 21, 2019, the trial court sentenced Hassinger to an aggregate prison term of ten to twenty years. Hassinger filed post-sentences motions, which the trial court denied. Both Hassinger and the trial court complied with
Hassinger raises the following issues for our review:
- Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate [Hassinger‘s] due process rights to a fair trial when it allowed the Commonwealth to (1) introduce evidence of a conviction from 1996 as well testimony regarding the circumstances of said conviction, (2) introduce evidence of a conviction from 2005, and (3) introduce evidence that [Hassinger] was on parole supervision at the time of these offenses?
- Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate [Hassinger‘s] due process rights to a fair trial when it allowed six law
enforcement witnesses to testify that in surveillance video footage, the individual depicted was [Hassinger]? - Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced [Hassinger] far in excess of the guidelines for these crimes?
Hassinger‘s Brief at 5.
In his first issue, Hassinger challenges the trial court‘s ruling permitting the admission into evidence of his 1996 and 2005 convictions. Our standard of review concerning the admissibility of evidence at trial is well-settled:
The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court‘s evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 494 (Pa. 2015).
Under our Rules of Evidence, “[r]elevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also
Additionally, courts will allow evidence of prior bad acts under the res gestae exception, which applies when the distinct crime or bad act was part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and was
Hassinger argues that the Commonwealth failed to show that the arson was logically connected to his 1996 convictions for resisting arrest and terroristic threats or his 2005 convictions for burglary, assault, harassment, and trespass. He maintains that the prior convictions involve completely different crimes, occurred remotely in time (13 and 22 years prior to the arson), and involved different victims.
Hassinger also challenges the trial court‘s ruling that the prior convictions were admissible to prove identity because he argued at trial that someone else committed the arson.4 Hassinger claims that to be admissible to prove identity, the trial court was required to consider five factors (1) the manner in which the crimes were committed; (2) the weapons used; (3) the ostensible purpose of the crime; (4) the location; and (5) the type of victims. See Hassinger‘s Brief at 35 (citing Weakley, 972 A.2d at 1189). Hassinger
Hassinger additionally claims that the trial court abused its discretion in relying on the res gestae exception as an alternate basis to permit admission of the 1996 and 2005 convictions. Hassinger maintains that under the res gestae exception, other crimes evidence is admissible to tell the complete story of the crime on trial “by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.” See Hassinger‘s Brief at 36 (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491 (1988)). According to Hassinger, the res gestae exception does not apply because his 1996 and 2005 convictions do not involve happenings near in time and place and do not involve the immediate context of the current crime.
Hassinger further maintains that, even if the 1996 and 2005 convictions were admissible under
Hassinger further asserts that in relation to the 1996 conviction, the trial court should not have permitted testimony from Trooper Sasserman that
Finally, Hassinger claims that these errors were not harmless because the uncontradicted evidence of guilt (clothes, lighter, yellow plastic bags) was not overwhelming, and the erroneously admitted convictions were not cumulative of other evidence.
The trial court addressed Hassinger‘s first issue and concluded that it lacked merit. It reasoned:
As stated at length, evidence regarding prior bad acts or crimes may be admissible for the purpose of proving motive and intent. The evidence in the form of officer testimony regarding a twenty (20) year old cаse and evidence of [Hassinger‘s] prior record was necessary under the res gestae rationale and within this court‘s discretion upon the proper balancing between probative value and potential prejudicial effect. Importantly, the evidence was deemed necessary to support the Commonwealth‘s case and to rebut the defense in arguing the crimes were committed by someone other than [Hassinger], and in order to present the
narrative and history of the case clearly and accurately to the jury. The testimony admitted offered insight primarily into [Hassinger‘s] mindset toward police enforcement and the courts, and the reason for why the charged offenses were likely attributed by [Hassinger] to his history with these institutions. Additionally, the Commonwealth correctly pointed out in its argument for admissibility the limited amount of evidence sought to be introduced in comparison to the amount of similar evidence actually available.
Similarly, evidence of [Hassinger‘s] prior record, including what he believed to be a wrongful felony conviction, was the only means of providing the jury with a complete story, and the likelihood of unfair prejudice remained minimal compared to the probative value. Importantly, it is [Hassinger‘s] own recent social media posts and text messages which make reference to these specific incidences, including the prior “wrongful” felony conviction. While this court was exceedingly careful in limiting what was ultimately allowed to be introduced into evidence, it is also important to note [Hassinger‘s] role in making such evidence relevant through his social media accounts and text messaging. As such, included within the balancing of the appropriate factors regarding any possible prejudice, [Hassinger‘s] own аctions in making such evidence relevant so close in time to the crimes committed played a large part in the court‘s decision. Without the introduction of such evidence, the jury would be left without any context from which to determine [Hassinger‘s] state of mind and motive. . . . Even assuming the evidence was prejudicial to [Hassinger], including that of identity . . ., it was certainly not unduly prejudicial.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/20, at 4-5 (footnote, internal quotation marks, and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting Hassinger‘s convictions from 1996 and 2005 as evidence of motive, intent,
While Hassinger‘s 1996 and 2005 convictions occurred thirteen and twenty-two years prior to the arson, the mere fact that they were remote in time does not require their exclusion from evidence. Our Supreme Court has held that although “testimony may involve events so remote from the date of the crime that it has no probative value . . . no rigid rule can be formulated for determining when such evidence is no longer relevant.” Drumheller, 808 A.2d at 905 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1976)). Instead, the remoteness of prior bad acts “affects the weight of that
In the instant matter, Hassinger made his 1996 and 2005 convictions relevant through posts he made on his Facebook account nine months prior to the arson. In those posts, Hassinger repeatedly indicated his belief that he was wrongly convicted оf prior crimes, that law enforcement personnel were liars, and the Centre County court system was corrupt. Hassinger also made repeated references in his Facebook posts to fighting these entities and to condemning them in various incendiary manners. Given this factual sequence, the 1996 and 2005 convictions were clearly part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were necessary to tell the complete story. See Drumheller, 808 A.2d at 905; see also Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 740 A.2d 237, 245 (Pa. Super. 1999) (finding no ineffectiveness where counsel failed to object to the trial admission of a PFA order issued twelve years prior to a subsequent prosecution for arson where both instances of conduct involved the same victim and the order was relevant to defendant‘s ill will, malice, or motive); Commonwealth. v. Cosby, 224 A.2d 810 (Pa. Super. 2007) (upholding admission of
While Hassinger would have preferred that the jury not hear about his prior convictions, the trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury‘s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 501 (1988). Given the clear relevance of the prior convictions to Hassinger‘s mindset, and Hassinger‘s history of verbal and physical conflicts with law enforcement personnel, he has not demonstrated that the probative value of the prior convictions outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice. See
Moreover, Hassinger did not contest the admission of his Facebook posts which included numerous accusations and condemnations against law enforcement and the Centre County court system, as well as references to his prior convictions and adverse encounters with law enforcement. Thus, even if the admission of the 1996 and 2005 convictions was erroneous, such admission was harmless because the convictions were merely cumulative of other properly admitted and unchallenged evidence.
Additionally, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 states that in cases where a witness is not testifying as an expert, his or her opinion testimony must be limited to what is: “(a) rationally based on the witness‘s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness‘s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 701.”
The trial court considered Hassinger‘s second issue and concluded that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
[Hassinger] . . . contests the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony used to identify [him] on Centre County Courthouse video surveillance. Our Superior Court has on other occasions allowed the introduction of such testimony when it is rationally based upon perception and helpful in the determination of a fact in issue. In the case sub judice, identity was a key fact in issue, and the testimony provided regarding identity was clearly based upon the reliable perception of the witnesses. Specifically, the witnesses were exceedingly familiar with [Hassinger] due to the long history of [Hassinger‘s] interactions with the court system
and law enforcement, including with the witnesses. Due to the familiarity of the witnesses with [Hassinger] and certain of his distinct characteristics including that of unique gait, distinctive facial profile and hairline, and its usefulness in assisting the jury in its determination of identity, the court in its discretion properly found such evidence admissible for this purpose.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/20, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that the lay opinion testimony provided by law enforcement personnel was admissible. Under appropriate circumstances, this Court has upheld decisions to allow law enforcement personnel to provide lay opinion testimony. See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 101 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding that the admission of a detective‘s lay opinion testimony identifying the appellant as the shooter in surveillance videos was proper because it was based upon his perceptions and was helpful in allowing the jury to reach a clear understanding); see also Commonwealth v. Spencer, 639 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding the witness‘s opinion that the gait of the robber and the gait of the appellant were similar was properly admitted under
Moreover, the trial court provided a cautionary instruction to the jury informing them that the testimony of a law enforcement officer or police officer should not be treated as any more or less authoritative than the testimony of any other witness, and that the jury should apply the same standards when considering such testimony as they would any other witness. See N.T. 9/25/19 at 52. For these reasons, Hassinger‘s second issue entitles him to no relief.
Although, Hassinger also challenges in this appeal the number of law enforcement witnesses who provided lay opinion testimony, he never raised
In his final issue, Hassinger challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:
[this Court conducts] a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and903 ; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, seePa.R.Crim.P. [720] ; (3) whether appellant‘s brief has a fatal defect, [see]Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) ; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see]42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b) .
Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted).
When an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must consider his brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also
In the instant case, Hassinger filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claims in a timely post-sentence motion, and included in his appellate brief a separate
In his
A bald claim of excessiveness due to the сonsecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Diehl, 140 A.3d 34, 45, (Pa. Super. 2016). However, a claim that a sentence is excessive, paired with a claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822 (Pa. Super. 2015) (excessive sentence claim, in conjunction with assertion that sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises substantial question). Further, a claim that a sentence was unreasonable because it was outside the sentencing guidelines raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008). Finally, a claim that the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside the standard sentencing guidelines without stating adequate reasons on the record presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014). Thus, Hassinger has raised a substantial question for our review.
In reviewing Hassinger‘s discretionary sentencing claim, we are mindful of the following principlеs.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied
the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Where, as here, the trial court imposes a sentence of total confinement, the sentence must be consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See
Hassinger asserts that the trial court imposed an unreasonable sentence by imposing consecutive sentences above the aggravated range without providing adequate reasons. Hassinger contends that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to his mental health issues, which include possible bi-polar disorder, depression, personality disorder, psychotic
Hassinger additionally argues that the trial court failed to properly respect and consider the sentencing guidelines when imposing sentence. He claims that the trial court failed to adequately consider that Hassinger attempted to set fire to the courthouse and Sheriff‘s office at a time when he knew that no one would be in those buildings. While Hassinger acknowledges the trial court‘s concern for the residential properties surrounding the courthouse which might have caught fire and caused harm to the residents therein, he asserts that this risk was already taken into consideration for the guidelines and offense gravity scores applicable to arson.
Finally, Hassinger argues that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs. He points to an NPR interview in support of his claim that confinement to state prisons causes mental illness to worsen resulting in greater recidivism and threats to public safety.8
[T]he court has relied on the presentence memos submitted by both defense counsel and the Commonwealth, has heard arguments from defense counsel and [the] Commonwealth today, has heard statements made by [Hassinger] today. The court has reviewed the PSI, has considered [Hassinger‘s] character, education, and his circumstances and has looked to the guidelines of the sеntencing code.
[T]he Court must consider the following when it fashions a sentence for a defendant. It has to look at one, the protection of the public; two, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the victim and the community; and three, to the rehabilitative needs of the [d]efendant.
As to the rehabilitative needs of [Hassinger], the court finds that [Hassinger] has shown no remorse or acceptance or responsibility for his actions. A review of the PSI and the prior record contained within that PSI shows that [Hassinger] has a long misdemeanor record of approximately 11 misdemeanors as well as with these two new convictions, three felonies, and that for over 30 years involved in the criminal justice system has failed or refused any form of rehabilitation. In fact, as we sit here today, as evidence[d] by the convictions for arson, the behavior‘s only escalating. And the court will mаke a note that [Hassinger] was even on parole at the time of the arson offense.
As to the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the community, through [Hassinger‘s] criminal history, interactions with the court, and current convictions, he has shown an extreme level of unpredictableness, impulsive[ness], and violent behavior and severe animosity towards law enforcement and the court system.
Looking at the current offense, [Hassinger] was convicted of hurling a Molotov cocktail, which is an extremely incendiary device, on both the courthouse and the sheriff‘s department. It‘s important to note that both these buildings are located in the heart of downtown Bellefonte with residential structures across the street on both sides of the courthouse and the
sheriff‘s department. The court also notes that these older homes and buildings have cаught fire, looking at The Bush House and the Do De, which is across from the courthouse and adjacent to the courthouse annex. So as convicted, during the early morning hours, as the residents in the homes most likely slept, [Hassinger] committed arson which risks an extreme danger to those community members surrounding the courthouse and the sheriff‘s department.
The sentence imposed must calculate a protection of the public and recognize the gravity of [Hassinger‘s] actions against the safety of this community. [Hassinger‘s] actions, combined with his [lack of] remorsefulness and dangerous obsessiveness with the criminal justice system require a maximum sentence to ensure the protection of the public, and that the court finds a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crimes and the protection of the public.
The court has reviewed the statement of reasons for sentence, pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section 9721(b) submitted by the Commonwealth, and finds that those four paragraphs are consistent with what the [c]ourt is now putting on the record, and will sign that.So, accordingly, the court will deviate from the standard and aggravated ranges and issue the following sentence[.]
N.T., 11/21/19, at 24-27 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Additionally, the trial court contemporaneously issued the following written statement of reasons for the sentence imposed pursuant to
AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2019, in addition to such other reasons set forth by this court, the sentence of imprisonment imposed this date is supported by the following:
- The buildings targeted by [Hassinger‘s] acts of arson represent key institutions of justice whose functions include the protection of constitutional and statutory rights, providing citizens with a forum to peaceably resolve their disputes, and ensuring the peace and
dignity of the community through the orderly, accountable administration of the law. - [Hassinger] has expressly rejected all attempts at rehabilitation throughout the course of his 30 year history with the criminal justice system.
- Throughout the entire course of these proceedings, [Hassinger] has exhibited no remorse for his criminal acts.
- The evidence presented during the trial demonstrates that [Hassinger] harbors extreme animosity toward the court system generally and law enforcement in particular. This Court specifically finds that this animosity, joined to [Hassinger‘s] history of violent, impulsive criminal conduct, including the present arson offenses, render him a danger to the community and, specifically, those persons involved in the administration of justice. As such, [Hassinger‘s] rehabilitative needs require that he be subjected to a lengthy term of imprisonment in a state correctional institute.
Statement of Reasons for Sentence, 11/22/19, at 1-2.
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court made a sufficient and adequately informed contemporaneous statement when it imposed Hassinger‘s sentence. Additionally, the record demonstrates that the court took into consideration all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors when fashioning that sentence.
First, the court was fully informed by a PSI, which the court discussed on the record. See N.T., 11/21/19, at 23-27. Importantly, where a PSI exists, and it is clear the sentencing court reviewed it, we presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information regarding the
The court also considered Hassinger‘s extensive criminal record spanning more than three decades, his failure to rehabilitate, his lack of remorse for his crimes, and his refusal to accept any responsibility for his actions. The court discussed the gravity of the offenses, and the potential devastation and loss of life that could have resulted from Hassinger‘s actions. Finally, the court considered Hassinger‘s dangerous obsessiveness and extreme animosity toward the Centre County court system in general and law enforcement personnel in particular, as well as his unpredictable, impulsive and violent behavior toward the court system and law enforcement. In light of all these facts, the trial court determined that it was necessary to deviate from the sentencing guidelines because a more lenient sentence would not be consistent with the seriousness of the crimes in question, the need to protect the public from the gravity of danger presented by Hassinger, and his laсk of remorse and accountability.
As we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in fashioning Hassinger‘s sentence, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/09/2021