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Com. v. Alvarez, A.Com. v. Alvarez, A.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Aug 31, 2026
2347 EDA 2025

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:

Angel Alvarez (“Alvarez”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) following his convictions of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”).1 On appeal, Alvarez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After review, we affirm.

On March 8, 2020, Philadelphia Narcotics Officer Rollie Ramos saw two men, Alvarez and Omar Mendez (“Mendez”) standing together on the 2900 block of North Howard Street in Philadelphia. Ramos observed a man approach Alvarez and Mendez. Mendez retrieved a pill bottle from a nearby drainage pipe, removed a few pills and exchanged those pills with the man for United States currency.

Five minutes later, Officer Ramos observed another man approach Alvarez and Mendez. This time, Alvarez reached under a white Mitsubishi SUV, removed a black container, took out a square blue object, replaced the black container back under the SUV, and handed the blue object to the man in exchange for United States currency. After the man left, Officer Ramos gave the man’s description to other police officers in the area. One of the officers stopped the man and recovered three clear Ziploc packets with blue glassine inserts. The packets contained heroin and fentanyl.

A few minutes later, Officer Ramos observed another man approach Alvarez and Mendez. Alvarez again reached under the white Mitsubishi SUV and removed the black container. Alvarez took out a few objects from the black container, placed the container back under the SUV, and handed the objects to the man in exchange for United States currency. After the man left, officers in the area stopped him and recovered a Ziploc bag with blue glassine inserts and a black marking containing heroin and cocaine.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Ramos observed a woman approach Alvarez and Mendez. Mendez then retrieved the pill bottle from the drainage pipe and gave her pills in exchange for United States currency. Ramos then observed another man walk up to Alvarez and Mendez. For the third time, Alvarez reached under the white Mitsubishi SUV, removed the black container, took out a few objects, and put the black container back under the car. Ramos then exchanged the objects with the man for United States currency. Again, Ramos sent the man’s description to nearby police officers. The officers stopped the man and recovered a Ziploc bag with a blue glassine insert and a black marking containing heroin, as well as an orange tinted Ziploc containing cocaine.

After observing the transactions, Ramos arrested Alvarez and Mendez. The police did not recover any narcotics on Alvarez’s person. However, police recovered the black container under the white Mitsubishi SUV, and found narcotics that matched the drugs recovered from each of the people the police stopped after they met with Alvarez and Mendez. The Commonwealth charged Alvarez with the above-mentioned crimes.

Following multiple continuances and changes of counsel, the case proceeded to a bench trial on May 20, 2025. Ultimately, the trial court found Alvarez guilty of PWID and simple possession. The trial court sentenced Alvarez on August 14, 2025, to eleven and a half to twenty-three months of house arrest, followed by ten years of reporting probation.

Alvarez filed a timely notice of appeal on September 4, 2025. That same day, Alvarez’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. On September 5, 2025, the trial court appointed Alvarez new counsel. Although the court had not yet ordered counsel to file a 1925(b) statement, the docket reflected that new counsel did so the same day he was appointed. The 1925(b) statement, however, was not included in the certified record before this Court.

On September 23, 2025, the court ordered Alvarez to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, but Alvarez did not file another 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, finding Alvarez’s issues waived for failing to file a concise statement.

On appeal, Alvarez raises two questions for our review.

1) The evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is insufficient to establish all elements of [PWID].

2) The evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is insufficient to establish all elements of possession of controlled substance.

Alvarez’s Brief at 7.

Before addressing Alvarez’s claims, we must first address the trial court’s finding of 1925(b) waiver. Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/2025, at 1-2. The law is clear that where a court orders an appellant to file a 1925(b) statement, the appellant must file a statement that concisely identifies each error the appellant intends to assert in the timeframe ordered by the court. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1), (4)(ii). Compliance with the requirements of Rule 1925(b) is mandatory. See Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 692 (Pa. 2020). “Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the [s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). When a Rule 1925(b) order is issued, “the clerk of courts must furnish copies of the order to the parties and record the date of service of the order in the docket pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 114.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 472 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. 2002) (noting a court’s compliance with Rule 114 is not discretionary).

The docket reflects that the court ordered Alvarez to file a 1925(b) statement on September 23, 2025. The order states that notice was sent to the parties the same day. However, the docket does not state the date of service or notice of the order. Under Rule 114, docket entries must contain the date of service of the order or court notice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2). Therefore, the order reflecting that notice was sent is not enough to be compliant with Rule 114, as the docket must also reflect that notice was sent. Based on this failure, we cannot determine the date of service of the order and cannot conclude that Alvarez failed to comply with the trial court’s directive. See Chester, 163 A.3d at 472 (declining to find issues waived for failure to file a 1925(b) statement because the date of service did not appear in the docket). Thus, we do not find Alvarez’s claims waived on this basis.2

As both of Alverez’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, we address his claims together. He contends that the direct and circumstantial evidence fails to link him to the crimes. Alverez’s Brief at 14-15. Specifically, Alvarez points to Officer Ramos’ testimony that people approached Mendez rather than Alvarez; he did not actually know what Alvarez or Mendez gave the people and only saw a “blue object”; and officers did not recover any drugs on Alvarez’s person. Id. at 16-18.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence according to the following standard:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the [factfinder] to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the [factfinder].

Commonwealth v. Rosario, 307 A.3d 759, 764-65 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

In relevant part, section 13(a)(30) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (“Drug Act”), commonly known as PWID, prohibits a person not registered under the Drug Act from engaging in “manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).3 “To sustain a conviction for PWID, the Commonwealth must prove both the possession of the controlled substance and the intent to deliver the controlled substance.” Commonwealth v. Bernard, 218 A.3d 935, 943 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The intent to deliver may be inferred from an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2000). Factors to consider whether the defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver include “the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and the sums of cash found in possession of the defendant.” Bernard, 218 A.3d at 943 (citation omitted).

To convict someone of possession of a controlled substance under the Drug Act, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act[.]” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

[P]ossession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession. Where a defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited items, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had constructive possession to support the conviction. Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. We have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning that the defendant has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid application, we have held that constructive possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances. It is well established that, as with any other element of a crime, constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence. In other words, the Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband at issue.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa. Super. 2018) (cleaned up).

At trial, Officer Ramos testified that while he was surveilling the 2900 block of North Howard Street, he observed Alvarez and Mendez standing under a canopy looking in different directions. N.T., 5/20/2025, at 11. He then saw Mendez engage in two suspected drug transactions and Alvarez engage in three drug transactions. Id. at 11-16. Officer Ramos explained that during each transaction involving Alvarez, a person would approach him, Alvarez would then remove a black container from under a white Mitsubishi SUV, take small items from the black container, and exchange the items for money. Id. at 12, 14, 15; see also id. at 21, 24 (noting the items looked like packaging for heroin and cocaine). Officer Ramos then broadcasted the description of the buyers to nearby police officers. Id. at 12, 14, 15-16. The responding officers found Ziploc bags with illegal drugs on each buyer packaged in clear or orange Ziploc bags, with the clear baggies containing blue glassine inserts. Id. at 38-39, 47, 53-55. Officer Ramos testified that he signed off on a property receipt which showed that the officers recovered twenty-four packets of orange Ziploc bags and five clear Ziploc bags with blue inserts from the black container that was under the white Mitsubishi SUV. Id. at 27-28. The parties stipulated that the drugs recovered from buyers during the second, third, and fifth transactions—those in which Alvarez delivered the drugs to the buyers—tested positive for heroin, fentanyl and/or cocaine, and the narcotics recovered from the black container contained 3.25 grams of crack cocaine and .165 grams of heroin and fentanyl. Id. at 57-58.

For his part, Alvarez testified that he was walking through the area on his way home from work and got caught up talking to his old friends. Id. at 65. Alvarez explained that after three to five minutes of conversation, police arrested him and approximately six other people. Id. He stated that he had been clean since 2019. Id. at 62-63.

Viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Alvarez’s convictions for PWID and possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found the officers’ testimony, including Officer Ramos, to be credible. Id. at 76; see also Rosario, 307 A.3d at 765 (the factfinder is free to assess the credibility of the witnesses and believe all, part, or none of the witnesses’ testimony). Officer Ramos observed Alvarez retrieve drugs from under a vehicle and sell them to three people. This was confirmed when police subsequently stopped the buyers and found drugs on them—drugs with the same packaging and coloring as those later found in the box of drugs located under the car. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish Alvarez possessed the drugs when he opened the container from under the SUV to make the sales, and had the intent to deliver the drugs when he transferred them to the buyers. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2008) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support PWID conviction where police officers observed defendant engage in two narcotics transactions and subsequently recovered narcotics from buyers).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2026

Notes

1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30).
2
Although courts “may” remand to determine whether a Rule 1925(b) order was properly served, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(1), we decline to do so. Furthermore, Alvarez attached his premature 1925(b) statement, dated September 5, 2025, to his brief, and it shows that Alvarez raises the same two claims on appeal that he included in his 1925(b) statement.
3
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 13, as amended.

Case Details

Case Name: Com. v. Alvarez, A.
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Aug 31, 2026
Citation: 2347 EDA 2025
Docket Number: 2347 EDA 2025
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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