154 A. 359 | Pa. | 1931
This appeal is from a judgment rendered in favor of respondents in mandamus proceedings brought by John J. Owens, Esq., District Attorney of Lackawanna *167 County, to compel respondents, Directors of the Poor of Scranton Poor District, to deliver to Fred J. Huester, the duly elected collector of taxes in and for the City of Scranton, so much of the tax duplicate of the Scranton Poor District as was assessed and to be collected within the territorial limits of that city. Respondents demurred to the petition. Argument on the demurrer was heard by the court sitting in banc, and upon entry of judgment for respondents, petitioner appealed.
The Act of May 8, 1929, P. L. 1643, under which petitioner makes claim, provides for the creation of the office of collector of taxes for cities of the second class A and charges the incumbent of that office with the duty of collecting all city, county, school and poor taxes levied within the territorial limits of cities of that class. The act provides that the proper authorities of city, county, school and poor districts shall promptly turn over to the collector of taxes their respective tax duplicates covering assessments to be collected within such territorial limits, together with the warrant to collect the same. The petition for mandamus stated that Fred J. Huester had been elected tax collector for the City of Scranton, which city is of the second class A, had duly qualified and been installed, that the proper authorities had furnished him with tax duplicates and warrants authorizing collection of city, county and school district assessments within that municipality for the year 1930, but that the Directors of the Poor of the Scranton Poor District, part of which district lies within the limits of the city, had not turned over to Huester the duplicate and warrant covering taxes to be collected within the city limits for the Scranton Poor District and demanded the same for him. Respondents declined to recognize Huester in his demand for a duplicate and warrant as collector for the poor district, or any part of it, and refused his demand.
Upon the court issuing an alternative writ to the directors of the poor, they made answer, stating that the *168 Scranton Poor District was a municipal organization created by special acts of assembly (to wit: Act of April 9, 1862, P. L. 352; Act of June 4, 1879, P. L. 78; Act of May 16, 1866, P. L. 230, and Act of June 7, 1881, P. L. 48), that, acting under authority of these special acts of assembly, they had appointed Frank L. Martin as collector for the poor district and that the duplicate and warrant to collect the tax had been turned over by them to him. Respondents contend that the Act of May 8, 1929, P. L. 1643, did not supersede or repeal in whole or in part the above mentioned local legislation creating and governing the Scranton Poor District and accordingly they denied that Huester was the lawful collector for any portion of the poor assessments they had levied for the Scranton Poor District. The special acts of assembly creating and governing the Scranton Poor District, all of which were incorporated by reference in the answer, provide a system under which the directors of that district are to elect a tax collector and otherwise proceed as they did here. The Act of May 8, 1929, P. L. 1643, upon which petitioner bases his claim, is entitled: "An act relating to the collection of city, county, school and poor taxes within the territorial limits of cities of the second class A; establishing the office of collector of taxes therein; defining its duties and powers; changing the powers of and imposing duties upon cities of the second class A, counties, school districts and poor districts, and the officers thereof; and imposing penalties." The entire controversy is reducible to one question: Does the Act of 1929 supersede the special acts creating and governing the Scranton Poor District in so far as regards the officer who shall collect the poor taxes levied and collectible from residents and property owners within the territorial limits of the City of Scranton? The Act of 1929 does not affect the system established by the older acts of assembly in so far as concerns the collection of poor taxes within that part of the Scranton Poor District lying outside the city limits; *169 and inasmuch as there is no controversy upon this subject in the present case, we will not discuss that situation.
In entering judgment in favor of respondent directors of the poor, the court below declared the Act of 1929 unconstitutional.
Appellees contend that the Act of May 8, 1929, P. L. 1643, violates the Constitution because it is special or local legislation, regulating and reclassifying counties, school districts and poor districts, contrary to article III, section 7, of the Constitution, prohibiting the General Assembly from passing "any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties, townships, wards, boroughs or school districts," and article III, section 8, prescribing advertisement of local or special bills "in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated." Appellees argue that the act provides for classification of counties, school districts and poor districts not by population, which they admit may be constitutionally permissible, but on the basis of territorial and geographical considerations, which they contend is violative of the Constitution. There is little merit in this argument, as a reading of the act plainly shows that it was not passed for the purpose of reclassification — as that term is to be understood from the decisions of this court reviewing legislation which introduced new classes in the various political subdivisions of the State. The classification of cities denominated "Second Class A" was brought about by the Act of March 9, 1927, P. L. 18, whose constitutionality has not been heretofore, and is not now, questioned. On the general subject of classification of political and municipal divisions being local or special legislation which is not unconstitional, see Lloyd v. Smith,
On the contrary, the evident intent and purpose of the Act of 1929 was to provide one collector to whom all "city, county, school, and poor taxes" collectible from the taxables "within the territorial limits" of cities of the second class A shall be paid. The fact that there is, at present, but one city in the State whose population brings it within the second class A, so that the uniform purposes of the act at this time do not have application to more than one tax collector in the State, is not sufficient to render the act special legislation, as in the natural progress of events other cities may come into the class: Blankenburg v. Black,
Appellants urge the further contention that if the Act of 1929 is general legislation, then, to the extent that it repeals the special acts creating the Scranton Poor District, it must be considered special, and if special, as it was admittedly not advertised in conformity with the provisions of article III, section 8, of the state Constitution, it is unconstitutional. The law as it has been enunciated by this court does not lead to the conclusion appellee urges when applied to the present situation. A general statute does not repeal by implication a local law with different or inconsistent provisions, as we stated in Com. v. Brown,
Finally, appellees suggest that the author of the legislation was "in considerable doubt as to its constitutionality" because he included in its 12th section a statement that the provisions of the act are severable, and if any be declared unconstitutional, that decision shall not be construed to defeat the remaining provisions. This point, made as an argument against the validity of the statute, is patently opposed to the well-known theory upon which courts proceed to examine the constitutionality of legislation. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that, "in determining the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, courts will always presume in the first place that the act is constitutional. They also presume that the legislature acted with integrity, and with an honest purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid down by the Constitution": Sutherland on Statutory Construction, volume 1, section 82, pages 133-4. The inclusion of clauses declaring that, in the event of partial unconstitutionality, the remaining severable provisions will stand, and that such is the legislative intent, does not alter this fundamental rule.
We accordingly conclude that the Act of 1929 under consideration is constitutional, and that the judicial process prayed for by petitioner should issue to the several respondents, the Directors of the Poor of the Scranton Poor District, commanding them to make and deliver to Fred J. Huester, Collector of Taxes for the City *174 of Scranton, a tax duplicate for such poor taxes as are to be collected within the territorial limits of the City of Scranton, together with a warrant to collect the same.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the mandamus is directed to issue, costs to be paid by the Scranton Poor District.
Mr. Justice MAXEY did not sit at the argument of this case and did not participate in deciding the questions here passed upon.