Columbus v. FlowersColumbus v. Flowers
On brief: Lawrence L. Flowers, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
D E C I S I O N
SADLER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Lawrence L. Flowers, appeals from the June 11, 2019 judgment entry of the Franklin County Municipal Court finding appellant guilty of violating a city of Columbus traffic law. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} A complaint issued on May 16, 2019 alleged appellant violated
{¶ 3} On May 23, 2019, appellant entered a not guilty plea. On the same day, appellant filed, pro se, a motion to dismiss the traffic ticket, citing
{¶ 4} On May 24, 2019, the trial court issued a notice to appellant that the case was “scheduled for a court trial before [a judge] on * * * June 11, 2019.” (May 24, 2019 Notice at 1.) On May 29, 2019, subpoenas were issued to Columbus Division of Police Officer Kenneth Kropp1 and to the other individual involved in the crash, Alvin Brown, Jr. The cause came for trial before a judge on June 11, 2019. Appellant appeared pro se.
{¶ 5} At the outset of the trial, the judge and appellant discussed the motion to dismiss. The judge asked appellant on what grounds he brought the motion to dismiss, and appellant replied, “[u]nder the circumstances, the way this is applied, I won‘t have [a] chance of getting a fair trial.” (Tr. at 3.) When the judge inquired as to why he believed this, appellant stated “[b]ecause it‘s just me against the stop sign and someone who said I ran it.” (Tr. at 3.) The judge asked “why that is not okay” and stated that appellant “still ha[d] not told the Court any grounds, legal grounds, to dismiss [the] case.” (Tr. at 3.) Appellant reiterated “[b]ecause I won‘t be able to get a fair trial * * * under the circumstances, I don‘t believe that the statute was constitutionally applied. * * * How can I
{¶ 6} Plaintiff-appellee, City of Columbus, called Alvin Brown, Jr., the driver of the other car involved in the crash, as a witness. According to Brown:
I was proceeding south on Wilson, headed to work at 5:30 p.m. I had to be at work at 6. I live right around the corner. I was not really going fast. I was proceeding south on Wilson. He was coming, going east on Deshler. Stop sign. He didn‘t yield to me coming across Wilson, and I hit him on the side. And he ended upon on the right side of Deshler, across Wilson.
(Tr. at 8.) Brown confirmed that appellant had a stop sign but did not yield the right of way, while Brown did not have a stop sign. Brown further testified police were called to the scene, he spoke to an officer, and the officer made a report.
{¶ 7} On cross-examination, appellant asked Brown how many people were around when officers arrived, and Brown testified there were two to three kids, a man who pulled up to the scene to see if everyone was okay, and people who “came to see what was going on.” (Tr. at 11.) Brown was not looking at the porches to know if additional people were there. Brown denied being in a rush to get to work and stated he did not know anyone on Wilson. Regarding how far back Brown was when he saw appellant‘s van, Brown testified that “[w]hen I saw the van is when I struck you.” (Tr. at 12.) The following exchange then occurred:
[Appellant:] Did the officer ask you that you waived the right of way to me?
[Brown:] Did I waive the right of way?
[Appellant:] Did the officer ask you that?
[Appellee‘s Counsel:] Hearsay.
THE COURT: If the officer was here, you would be able to ask the officer that; but I am not going to be able to allow that. So I will sustain that as well.
[Appellant:] I guess I will take the verdict.
(Tr. at 14.)
{¶ 8} Appellee rested its case. Appellant declined to testify on his own behalf despite the trial court repeatedly offering him the opportunity to do so. When the trial court asked appellant if he had any witnesses to call, appellant inquired whether the trial court was telling him he could get a continuance, and the trial court replied “[n]o.” (Tr. at 16.) Appellant called no witnesses and said he stood “on all four corners of the motion to dismiss.” (Tr. at 16.) No exhibits, including the police crash report, were admitted into evidence.
{¶ 9} In a judgment entry filed the same day, the trial court denied appellant‘s motion to dismiss and found appellant guilty of violating
{¶ 10} Appellant filed a timely appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 11} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
[1.] DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE CONSTRUCT OF OHIO TRAFFIC RULES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE BY DEFECTS AND MIS-CONDUCT IN THE INSTITUTION OF THE PROSECUTION.
[2.] DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE DILIGENCE ON HIS OHIO TRAFFIC RULES-PRETRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS COLUMBUS OHIO DIVISION OF POLICE TRAFFIC TICKET 1465061 AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW UNDER THE CONSTRUCT OF OHIO TRAFFIC RULES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE BY BIAS AND PREJUDICE OF THE PRE-TRIAL-TRIAL JUDGE COLUMBUS OHIO FRANKLIN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE CYNTHIA L. EBNER.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Appellant‘s First Assignment of Error
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends he was denied due process of law “under the construct of Ohio traffic rules and the rules of evidence by defects and
{¶ 13} In this assignment of error, appellant appears to maintain that his trial on the stop sign violation was, in general, an unfair proceeding that failed to reach the truth. In this regard, appellant cites to
{¶ 14} In terms of what appellant believes made his trial unfair specifically, appellant makes three basic assertions, which we paraphrase as follows: (1) the trial court erred in casually and summarily disposing of appellant‘s motion to dismiss; (2) appellee should have called the police officer who issued the citation to testify rather than Kropp, who lacked personal knowledge of the events; and (3) in light of the narrative in the crash report, Brown qualified as a “self-contradicting witness” under
{¶ 15} First, regarding the trial court‘s handling of appellant‘s motion to dismiss, our review of the transcript shows the trial court did not treat the motion casually but repeatedly sought explanation of the legal grounds for appellant‘s motion. Furthermore, the trial court acted in a manner consistent with
{¶ 16} Second, regarding calling the ticketing officer as a witness instead of Kropp, appellant specifically argues that appellee was obligated to call the police officer who issued the traffic citation as a “condition precedent” to maintaining its case under
{¶ 18} We will exercise our discretion and proceed to address appellant‘s argument under the plain error standard of review. “A court will find plain error only when ‘(1) there was an error or deviation from a legal rule, (2) the error was plain and obvious, and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial.’ ” State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 273, quoting State v. Mohamed, 151 Ohio St.3d 320, 2017-Ohio-7468, ¶ 26. “But even if an accused shows that the trial court committed plain error affecting the outcome of the proceeding, an appellate court is not required to correct it; we have admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Emphasis sic; citation omitted.) State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 23.
{¶ 19} Appellant cites to the exchange in the transcript where appellee objected to appellant asking Brown about whether an officer asked him a question at the scene of the accident about waiving the right of way. The full exchange cited by appellant includes:
[Appellant:] Did the officer ask you that you waived the right of way to me?
[Brown:] Did I waive the right of way?
[Appellant:] Did the officer ask you that?
[Appellee‘s Counsel:] Hearsay.
THE COURT: If the officer was here, you would be able to ask the officer that; but I am not going to be able to allow that. So I will sustain that as well.
[Appellant:] I guess I will take the verdict.
(Tr. at 14.)
{¶ 21} To the extent appellant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee‘s objection based on hearsay generally, appellant has not shown how not allowing Brown to answer the question posed here affected the outcome of his trial. Appellant‘s argument is premised on the narrative in the crash report, which was not admitted into evidence and is absent from the appellate record. Moreover, as previously discussed in this assignment of error, appellee provided sufficient evidence to support the violation of
{¶ 22} Considering all the above, appellant has not demonstrated he was denied due process of law under Ohio traffic rules, the rules of evidence, or “by defects and mis-conduct in the institution of the prosecution.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 4.) Therefore, appellant‘s assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
B. Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 24} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends he was denied “due diligence on his Ohio traffic rules-pretrial motion to dismiss [his ticket] and equal
{¶ 25} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 34. See Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Berman, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-563, 2019-Ohio-1068, ¶ 43, appeal not accepted, 156 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2019-Ohio-2892 (considering an appellant‘s claim of judicial bias as it relates to an alleged due process violation). Judicial bias is demonstrated by “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.” State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469 (1956). “A judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and a party alleging bias or prejudice must present evidence to overcome the presumption.” Wardeh v. Altabchi, 158 Ohio App.3d 325, 2004-Ohio-4423, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 26} Under this assignment of error, appellant essentially contends the trial court judge was biased against him due to: (1) her handling of the motion to dismiss at trial in a casual manner insufficient under
{¶ 27} Appellant has not provided legal authority showing any of these contentions serve as evidence of judicial bias. As a result, appellant has not demonstrated reversible error on appeal. Sims at ¶ 11; Hubbard at ¶ 34;
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 29} Having overruled appellant‘s two assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and NELSON, JJ., concur.
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Notes
Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle or pedestrian in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.