128 Ga. 487 | Ga. | 1907
(After stating the facts.)
■2. The controlling issue in the case was whether Norris, who made the contract for the purchase of the lumber from the plaintiff, was the agent of the defendant. It was insisted by the plaintiff that he was such agent; and-this was stoutly denied by the defendant. The- court admitted in evidence two létters from the defendant to^ Norris, one of them, dated January 12, 1905, relat
The letters were certainly admissible, to be considered by the jury in determining the issue of agency or no agency. If they established any agency at all, it was a general agency to buy lumber. '“A general agent is one who is authorized to do all acts connected with a particular trade, business, or employment. A special agent is one who is authorized to do one or more specific acts in pursuance of particular instructions, or within restrictions necessarily implied from the act to .be done. In short, the former imports not an unqualified authority, but an authority which is derived from a multitude of instances, whereas the latter is confined to an individual instance.” 1 Am. & Eng. Ene.1 of Law (2d ed.), 985; Jesse French Piano Co. v. Cardwell, 114 Ca. 340, and cit. In Butler v. Maples, 76 U. S. 773, Mr. Justice Strong says: '“The distinction between a general and a special agency'is in
Error is also assigned upon several extracts from the charge, the-complaint in such assignments being that the judge did not submit to the jury the question whether the agency was general or special, and that he did not charge as to what constituted a special agency, and that the charge in effect instructed the jury that a special agency could be raised by implication. The evidence-introduced in behalf of the plaintiff authorized a finding that Norris was the general, agent of the defendant for the purchase of lumber. The evidence in behalf of the defendant authorized a finding that he was no agent at all. In no view of the casé was-the law of special agency involved. Hence there was nothing in' the charges complained of which was prejudicial to the defendant. There was no error in admitting the evidence of the witness Walden, as to the statement to him by Norris that he was the defendant’s agent, the evidence having been admitted, as shown by the note of the judge to the motion for a new trial, simply for the purpose of impeachment. There was no error in refusing to admit the letter from the defendant to Norris for the purpose of showing-that Norris was not the agent of the defendant. This was merely a declaration by the defendant in its own favor. The evidence-was conflicting, but there was ample evidence to authorize the ver
Judgment affirmed.