176 Ga. 620 | Ga. | 1933
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer. Petitions setting up a case of virtual adoption upon somewhat similar facts have been discussed in a number of cases decided by this court. The rights of petitioner under the facts alleged were discussed at length in Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 765 (78 S. E. 30, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 773). In that case it was said in part: “The authorities very generally establish the proposition that a parol obligation by a person to adopt the child of another as his own, accompanied by a virtual though' not a statutory adoption, and acted upon by both parties during the obligor’s life, may be enforced, upon the death of the obligor, by adjudging the child entitled as a child to the property of the obligor who dies without disposing of
Nor did the court err in overruling the special demurrer based upon alleged nonjoinder of essential parties. The suit was properly brought against the administrator. It was so ruled in Crawford v. Wilson, supra, and in Copelan v. Monfort, 153, Ga. 558 (113 S. E. 514).
Judgment affirmed.