193 Ky. 395 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1921
Opinion op the Court by
Reversing.
The policy of life insurance on which appellee, Hattie C. W-ood brought this action and recovered in the lower court a judgment for $2,000,00 against the appellant, Columbian National Life Insurance Company, contains a clause insuring only:
“ Against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means (excluding self-destruction, or any attempt thereat, while sane -or insane).”
Her husband, Thomas O. ..Wood, the insured, committed suicide in August, 1918, by shooting himself through the head. Briefly the facts are these: Wood and his wife had become estranged and she had taken their nine months’ old baby and leaving Hopkinsville, their home, went to the home of her father in the country, where she remained a few days, later returning to the city of Hopkinsville. She had consulted an attorney about instituting divorce proceedings. Wood was employed in
Courts generally hold a clause in a policy exempting life insurance companies from liability for death by suicide, enfofcible, and this too when the act is done by the insured while “sane or insane.” Our rule, we think, is somewhat more humane, just and equitable and allows a recovery on a policy which contains a suicide clause, “whether sane or insane,” if the mind of the insured was so far gone at the time he committed tile act which resulted in his death that ho did not know he was taking his life or that the act which he was -committing would likely result in his death. If he had mind enough to know that the act would probably result in his death, or if he inflicted it with that intention, it is his act in law, for which 'the company is n-ot responsible. Masonic Life v. Pollard, 121 Ky. 351, 14 R. C. L., page 1233.
The lower court in instructing the jury said: “If you believe from the evidence that the deceased, Thomas O. Wood, took his own life ¡by shooting himself with a pistol, you will find for the defendant, whether the said Wood was sane or insane at the time, unless the jury should further believe from the evidence that at the time he shot himself, if he did shoot himself, the said Thomas O. Wood was so insane that he did not know he was taking his life; and if the jury believe from the evidence- that at the time he shot himself, if he did shoot himself, he was so insane that he did not know that he was taking his life, or if the jury should believe from -the evidence that his act of self-destruction was the result of an irresistible impulse over which his will had no control and that such act of self-destruction was not an act of his volition, the jury should find for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00, the amount sued for.” And in a second instruction the court told the jury: “Although you may believe from the evidence that Thomas Wood was insane at the time he shot himself, if he did shoot himself, yet the jury should find for the defendant, unless you should believe from the evidence that at the time he did so, he was so insane that he -did not know the act he was committing would probably result in his death.” Counsel for appellant admit that the foregoing instructions are prac
The mother, Mrs. Elizabeth A. Wood, was the beneficiary in the policy at the time of its issual, but when appellee, Mrs. Hattie C„ Wood, married decedent he caused her to be made beneficiary in the policy. She continued so until only a few days before the death of Wood, when he again changed the beneficiary, making’ it payable to his mother, Elizabeth A. Wood. Thus it stood at the time of Wood’s death. In bringing her action appellee, Mrs. Hattie C. Wood, averred that at the time the insured undertook to change the beneficiary in the policy the last time and make the policy payable to his mother, he was insane and unable to enter into any contractual obligation or to understand or appreciate the nature or effect of the transaction. This averment was traversed by the insurance company, thus making an issue. Although Mrs. Elizabeth A. Wood withdrew her answer, asserting claim to the policy just before the trial started, nevertheless appellee is not entitled to maintain this action or recover on the policy if she was not at the time of the death of Wood the beneficiary of the policy, and she was not such beneficiary unless Wood was so insane at the time he undertook to change the beneficiary the last time as to incapacitate him to comprehend the nature and effect of such transaction, and therefore to render it void. This issue should have been submitted to the jury by a proper instruction.
The court having declined to do so, although such an instruction was offered, reversible error resulted.
Judgment reversed.