The plaintiff seeks by this suit in equity to restrain the defendant from prosecuting an action at law brought by him in the State of Missouri. The defendant filed a demurrer, which was in substance on the ground that no cause for relief in equity against the defendant was stated in the bill. The case was reported to this court to determine the correctness of the interlocutory decree sustaining the demurrer before further proceedings.
The allegations of fact well pleaded in the bill of complaint are, for the purposes of the present decision, admitted by the demurrer. Jubilee Yacht Club v. Gulf Refining Co. 245 Mass. 60, 61. Whiting v. Mayor of Holyoke, 272 Mass. 116, 118. Dealtry v. Selectmen of Watertown, 279 Mass. 22,26-27. They may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of this Commonwealth with its principal place of business in Boston. It is engaged in the business of insurance. The defendant is a member of the bar of this Commonwealth, resident here, who does not practice in Missouri and who has no connection with Missouri “beyond such casual matters as might come to the attention of any Boston lawyer.” In March, 1915, the plaintiff issued a policy of accident insurance to one Edward L. Foulke whereby he was insured “against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means.” The plaintiff also agreed by the policy to pay the sum of $7,500 to one Nelle Foulke as beneficiary “if such injuries result in” the death of the insured “within ninety days -of the accident, or if as the result of such injuries the insured continuously from the accident to date of loss is totally disabled.” The policy was delivered in Missouri. Nelle Foulke (hereafter called the beneficiary) is a citizen and resident of that State. On June 22, 1934, while the policy was in force, the insured
The plaintiff contends that it is entitled under the Constitution of the United States to litigate the claim made under this policy in the Federal courts and that therefore
The question thus raised has not been decided in this Commonwealth. In Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, it had been found as a fact that the assignee was the absolute owner of the chose in action there in question, and it was held that there was no ground to restrain such assignee from prosecuting his action in the courts of another State. It there was said, at pages 55, 56, that, in view of the fact that ■ the assignee was the absolute owner of the claim, “it'is immaterial" what his motives were for purchasing it. He had the right to enforce it in any competent tribunal. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even if the assignment to Dunham was colorable, it furnishes no ground for removing the case to the Circuit Court of the United States, and intimates that it is for the State court to decide whether this fact furnished any defence in the suit pending before it. Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 421. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43. But it is not necessary for us to consider what might be the effect of a merely colorable transfer, as it is found that the transfer to Dunham was valid, and not colorable.”
The plaintiff relies upon these words of the Constitution of the United States, art. 3, § 2: “The judicial power shall extend ... to controversies . . . between citizens of different states; ” and upon this provision in § 24 of the Judicial Code as amended, c. 231, 36 U. S: Sts. at Large, 1087, 1091: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . : First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity . . . where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, and ... is between citizens of different States . . . .” This statutory provision vests jurisdiction of such suits in the Federal court, so that a plaintiff falling within its terms may institute his suit in that court. This statutory provision does not divest the State courts of jurisdiction. Therefore a plaintiff has the option to begin his suit either in the Federal or in the
A bona fide assignment of a chose in action to one who is a citizen of the same State as the defendant will defeat the jurisdiction of the Federal court because there is then no longer a controversy between citizens of different States. The same result is reached by a colorable transfer or assignment made for the purpose of preventing removal. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 641. Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778, 781. Carson v. Dunham, 121 U. S. 421, 426. Bernblum v. Travelers’ Ins. Co. 9 Fed. Sup. 34, 35. It was said in Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43, 45, that while “the courts of the United States have . . . power to dismiss or remand a case, if it appears that a colorable assignment has been made for the purpose of imposing on their jurisdiction, no authority has as yet been given them to take jurisdiction of a case by removal from a State court when a colorable assignment has been made to prevent such a removal. Under the law as it now stands resort can only be had to the State courts for protection against the consequences of such an encroachment on the rights of a defendant.” Thus it appears that the plaintiff has no constitutional right to a trial of this cause on its merits in the Federal court. The Constitution of the United States provides for jurisdiction in the Federal courts over controversies between citizens of different States, and reposes in the Congress power to provide in such cases for the displacement of jurisdiction in the State courts. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92
Persons within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth may be restrained from prosecuting actions in other States “which will work wrong and injury to others, and are therefore contrary to equity and good conscience.” Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545, 550; S. C. 7 Allen, 57.
It is said in Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 641, with respect to somewhat similar facts, that it may “be a good defence to an action in a State court, to show that a colorable assignment has been made to deprive the United States court of jurisdiction; but ... it would be a defence to the action, and not a ground of removing that cause into the federal court.”. The plaintiff has every opportunity to present in the courts of Missouri in the action there pending the defence thus suggested. The argument of the plaintiff in substance is that relief should be afforded it in this suit because there is danger that the courts of Missouri will not justly decide the rights of the parties. As was said in Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 56: “We cannot yield to such an argument without a violation of every principle of inter-state comity. ... In our judgment, it would be indefensible for the' courts of this Commonwealth to restrain the prosecution of a suit pending in the court of a sister State, which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, upon the ground that the decision of that court may differ from our own opinion, or from the decisions of other courts of equal authority.”
The facts in Terral v. Burke Construction Co. 257 U. S. 529, are so different from those in the case at bar as to render that decision inapplicable.
In view of the decisions here reviewed, we think that no error is disclosed in the action of the Superior Court.
Interlocutory decree affirmed.