225 P. 1089 | Utah | 1924
The respondent, as administrator of the estate of William J. Anglum, deceased, asks judgment against defendant for the possession of certain personal property alleged to belong to the estate and damages for the detention of the same.
It is alleged that the deceased died intestate November 2, 1918, in Salt Lake county, leaving as his only heirs the surviving widow, the appellant, and a daughter, Irene Munley. The complaint then alleges that at the date of his death the decedent was the owner and in possession of certain hotel furniture, fittings, and effects, and also a lease of the Adrian Hotel, in Salt Lake City, of the value of approximately $6,000 and $1,564 in money on deposit in a local bank in the
The prayer is for a delivery of the property of the estate to the administrator, judgment for the rents and profits accruing from the possession of the same, and for such further and different relief as may be just and meet in the premises.
The action was originally instituted by a local bank as special administrator. The findings are to the effect that the respondent was a special administrator. It, however, appears from the record that subsequent to the institution of the action the present respondent, Columbia Trust Company, was appointed administrator of the estate, and as such was substituted as plaintiff. We shall treat this case as having been prosecuted to judgment by the regular administrator.
In the amended answer the appointment of the administrator is admitted. It is also admitted that at the elate of the death of William J. Anglum there was on deposit with a local bank in the joint names of the deceased and appellant the sum of $1,564. Possession of the hotel is also admitted; also that appellant carried on and conducted the business of said hotel. There is a general denial. As a separate and affirmative defense it is alleged that on or about May 18, 1918, the deceased and the appellant purchased the hotel, together with the lease and good will, and undertook to pay therefor the sum of $2,800, $75 quarterly after the expiration of six months from the date of the purchase, and that at the date of the deceased’s death there had been paid to apply on the property the sum of $900, and no more. It is then alleged that the appellant had paid the costs and expenses of the last illness of the deceased, amounting to the sum of $197.65; that
Trial was had to the court. Findings of fact were made and judgment entered against appellant for possession of the hotel property, for the money on deposit in bank, with interest, and for $1,000 damages. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The errors assigned assail the findings as not being supported by the evidence and as being contrary to the evidence. Under the errors assigned it is also contended that the findings as made do not support the judgment and that the court failed to find upon material issues presented by the affirmative defense.
The property involved is personal property. There are two heirs, the widow and a daughter. The daughter is a married woman, over the age of twenty-oné years, and resides with her husband. It appears that either in the month of April or in the early part of May, 1918, the appellant and her husband moved from the state of Montana to Salt Lake City. Shortly thereafter they began negotiations which, on May 18th of that year, resulted in the purchase of the hotel property in controversy. At that time the appellant and the
The court made findings to the effect that William J. Anglum, at the date of his death, was the sole owner and was in possession of the furniture, fittings, effects, and lease of the Adrian Hotel; that he was also the sole owner of the $1,564 on deposit in the joint names of deceased and his wife; that upon the death of William J. Anglum the appellant, as the widow, took possession of the estate, and has ever since retained the same, and was at the date of trial in possession of the same, and had conducted the hotel and collected the rents, issues, and profits therefrom; that demand for possession was made by respondent, and that demand was refused. The court also found that the appellant and deceased did not jointly purchase the Adrian Hotel, and that appellant, prior to the death of her husband, had no right or interest or claim 4o any part or parcel of the property; that appellant had received profits from the operation of the hotel over and above all expenses in excess of $1,000.
In the assignments these findings are separately assailed. It will be convenient to consider the court’s finding as to the ownership of the money on deposit in the, bank and of the hotel property separately.
It is without dispute that the original account in the bank was in the name of William J. or Mrs. William J. Anglum. The account remained in that condition until the death of the husband. The appellant testified positively that it was agreed that the account should be so kept, and gave as the reasons for that agreement that it yms understood and agreed that the survivor should have the absolute right and ownership of the money so deposited. The legal question respecting that item is whether the court was right under the evidence in concluding that that money was a part of the estate of the deceased.
There is not, nor in our judgment can there be, any doubt that it was the intention of the deceased and appellant that any money remaining in the joint account at the death of the other should become the property of the survivor. The form of the deposit itself indicates joint control over the funds so
Respondent relies upon the opinion of this court in Holman v. Savings Bank, 41 Utah, 340, 124 Pac. 765, as being decisive of appellant’s rights in the money deposited in the bank. The facts in that case were not similar to the facts here. In the record of that case it did not' appear that there was any relationship between tUfe owner of the money, Mrs. Eslinger, and the claimant, Mrs. Holman. Nor were there any facts, except the form of the deposit, to indicate an intention to make a gift. The lower court held that there was no such intention, and this court affirmed the judgment. In the present action, as has been pointed out, there are cogent reasons in addition to the testimony of Mrs. Anglum that it was the intent of the parties to establish a joint ownership of the funds deposited with the right of survivorship. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the transaction are much more convincing than the statements of Mrs. Anglum, and would have justified the court in concluding that there was a joint ownership with the right of survivorship independent and regardless of the testimony of appellant.
The Supreme Court of New York, in considering a question similar to the one under consideration here, in Kelly v.
“The possibility of so fixing a bank account that two persons shall be joint owners thereof during their mutual lives and the survivor take upon the death of the other is so well established that we may assume and need not discuss it. I think also it is so apparent that it must be conceded that the account in question on its face imports such joint ownership by appellant and the deceased with final sole ownership by survivorship. It has been written, however, in various decisions, that the mere form of the account in such a case as this will not be regarded as sufficiently establishing the intent of the person making it to create a trust in behalf of another or to give to such another joint interest in or ownership of the deposit” — citing cases.
In R. C. L. p. 527, a statement of the law upon this question will be found as follows:
“It is well established that a bank account may be so fixed that two persons shall be joint owners thereof during their mutual lives, and the survivor take the whole on the death of the other. In creating a joint bank account with right of survivorship, it is a matter of no importance that the particular terms ‘joint ownership’ and ‘joint account’ are not used; the controlling question is whether the person opening the account intentionally and intelligently created a condition embracing the essential elements of joint ownership and survivorship. No particular formula is required, and courts will be controlled by the substance of the transaction rather than by the name given it.”
See, also, Dickson v. Jonesboro Trust Co., 154 Ark. 155, 242 S. W. 57; Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S. W. 1081; In re Klenke’s Estate, 210 Pa. 572, 60 Atl. 166; George v. Dutton’s Estate, 94 Vt. 76, 108 Atl. 515, 8 A. L. R. 1014.
Both appellant and respondent, in support of their claims, rely upon the opinions of this court in Boyle v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah, 112, 142 Pac. 136, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 363, and Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah, 42, 210 Pac. 987. In each of those eases the question determined by the court was whether there was a gift inter vivos, not whether there had been the creation of a joint ownership with right of survivorship. An examination of those opinions, however, will emphasize the fact that the intention of the parties should control, and not the mere form of deposit. The rule announced in those cases should control the parties here so far as the money deposited in
“In addition to the forms of deposit there are usually also facts and circumstances shown from which the courts deduced the intention of the alleged donor to make a gift or that he did not so intend. It may be said that each case depends to a very large extent on its own facts and circumstances. In all of the cases cited above the essential element, namely, the joint ownership or that a gift was actually intended and executed for the purpose of creating a joint ownership, is either clearly established by the evidence or found as a fact by the trial courts.”
The opinion in Denigan v. Hibernian Sav. & Loan Soc., 127 Cal. 137, 59 Pac. 389, holds that a deposit in favor of F. D. or E. D., F. D. being the husband, in the absence of any evidence of the purpose of the deposit except the form of the deposit does not indicate or support an intent to part with the title to the money so deposited. That case, however, clearly indicates that, if it had been made to appear by other evidence that such was the intent, it would have been the duty of the court to give effect to such intent.
There does not appear in this record any conflict in the testimony as to what was the intent of the parties at the time they made this deposit. The only conclusion that finds support in the evidence, in our judgment, or that can logically or legally be deduced or inferred therefrom, is that the finding of the trial court respecting the ownership of this deposit
The court also made a finding that the hotel was the property of the deceased at the time of his death. That finding, in our judgment, is supported by substantial, competent evidence. The testimony is all to the effect that the sale of the hotel was made to the deceased; that he conducted it in his own name during his lifetime, and that he had control and management thereof. The fact that his wife worked in and about the hotel cannot affect the deceased’s ownership.
The court made no finding as to the value of the hotel property. Neither is there any finding that there was any other property except the deposit in bank belonging to the estate. It does however, sufficiently appear that the hotel and bank deposit are the only property in question, and that the deceased had no interest in other property. It is contended by appellant that, as it sufficiently appears that the value of the estate will not exceed the exemptions allowed to the widow under Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6409, and as it does appear that there are no debts, and that the funeral expenses and expenses of the last illness have been paid by the widow, the administrator should not be awarded or adjudged to be entitled to the possession of this property. The appellant relies upon the principle or rule of law expressed in 18 C. J. at page 880, as follows:
“Where there are no unpaid debts and the sole heir or distribu-tee is in possession of the personal property, the courts will uphold and protect his equitable title against the legal right and title of the administrator, also where the personal property of an estate is of less value than a certain amount, and consequently comes within a statute giving it all to the widow, and she is in possession of it, she has an equitable title thereto as against the heirs, even though there is no administration.”
Other authorities to the same effect cited are: Lewis v. Lyons, 13 Ill. 117; 23 C. J. 1172; Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 South. 104, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 225; White v. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 47 South. 166, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568; Kos
The court made no finding as to the value of the hotel property. In our judgment it appears that the value of the property is not less than $2,500. The rule invoked, therefore, does not apply to the facts as they appear in this case.
The widow, appellant, voluntarily paid the obligations of her deceased husband contracted at the time of the purchase of the hotel, and necessarily has a claim against the estate for the money so paid. She is also entitled to have claims allowed for the voluntary payments made of the expenses of the last sickness. "We do not understand, however, that the cases go to the extent of permitting an heir of an estate, after voluntarily paying the ordinary obligations of a deceased person, to claim the amounts of such payments and thus reduce the value of the property of the estate so as to entitle such heir to a summary distribution of an estate under the exemptions allowed by statute; in other words, to reduce the value of an estate by the amount of such payments to prevent a probate court from assuming jurisdiction of the property of the estate.
The appellant interposed as a defense the amounts paid for the funeral expenses, the expenses of the last sickness, including hospital dues and medical services; also an item for the erection of a monument. These items are all proper charges against the estate. The expenses of the last sickness were debts existing and in effect at the time of the death of the deceased. Funeral expenses were necessarily contracted in burying the deceased. Funeral expenses take prcedence over all claims against ■ an estate. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 7666. These expenses are a necessary part of caring for and disposing of the body of the deceased. There is authority authorizing any one paying or advancing the necessary means for funeral expenses, provided such amount is reasonable, to offset the same against any claim that the estate may have against the party advancing such expenses. The reasoning upon which that authority is based appeals to us as being not only sound and just, but founded upon necessity and the require-
The court further found that the rents and profits derived from the operation of the hotel over and above all expenses of operation were in excess of $1,000, and judgment was awarded against appellant for $1,000 with interest. There is competent, substantial testimony to support that finding. The amount paid for funeral expenses, if found by the court to be reasonable, should be allowed as an offset against the $1,000 judgment. Under our Constitution and statutes equitable defenses are authorized and permitted against legal claims. As we have indicated, the appellant is entitled to be reimbursed from the estate for the amount paid on the note to Mrs. Adams and for the expenses of the last sickness, and the court should, in its discretion, withhold enforcement of the balance of the $1,000 judgment until the claims of the appellant against the estate have been adjudicated.
The cause will be remanded to the district court with 'directions to correct its findings and modify its judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellant will be allowed costs.