*1 recently recognized a of action cause Although this Court under an pay due first benefits faith refusal for bad Mutual Carter v. American Richard E. contract, insurance Company, contempo- filed Insurance Fire v. State Farm Mutual Nichols opinion; raneously Company, (1983), this Insurance 306 S. E. Automobile person does not extend to who is of action who under the insurance contract and named insured to or a contingent interest, mere such as an inchoate possesses a interest, insured. dower judge. Accordingly, affirm the order of the trial Moore, JJ., M. Ness and and Paul Justice, concur. Acting Associate CORPORATION, Appellant, v. RESORT MANAGEMENT COLUMBIA INC., BEAUFORT, PROPERTIES, Harvey, Barry OF Odom and Respondents. King, (307 (2d) 228) *2 Anthony Taylor Tyler Tyler R. oí Donald W. W. Donald Columbia, appellant. Associates, & for Dowling, Sanders, Dukes, Barry L. Johnson Novit & Beaufort, Boney, A. and Harold Svalina for 14, 1983. Sept. Justice:
Ness, by appellant Management is an action Columbia Cor- This Inc., respondents against Properties, of Beau- Resort poration King, agents Harvey, Odom, fort, Barry asserting Properties tortious interference Resort Develop- relationship with Harbor Island business respondents’ judge granted ment agree. for motion reviewing summary must con- In all drawn there- evidence and reasonable inferences strue Hewitt, most Salvo v. light favorable to from Associates, Inc., & Coleman any genuine If the evidence fails to reveal inquiry to an into the is not desirable facts
material law, application judgment will be af- clarify the Digest, Judg- in 12 collected West’s S. C. See cases firmed. ment, presented appellant’s
The evidence behalf shows Johnson, agent partner the sole Clyde F. of Harbor authority en to Island negotiations, negotia commencedserious into contractual ter May 1980regarding purchase and tions real located on Is development of certain Harbor Mr. option Johnson a draft Appellant land. 17,1980, by incorpo redrafted on June agreement which by Mr. changes requested rating certain Mr. Johnson attorney. On June develop purchase and option to agreement on the an reached being Island, conditioned such property on Harbor agreed upon, being changes being retyped to include upon signed. and his by Mr. Johnson shows contacted further Appellant’s evidence Development of Harbor Island respondents at the behest agent Properties act as sales have Resort Corporation to development at Harbor proposed condominium appellant’s having with Mr. Appellant’s president, while lunch Island. Johnson, respondent Barry and discussed Odom met develop plan and sell condominium units at Respondents indicated interest and Island. Harbor Appellant’s vice-president with re- met more information. confidentiality proposed devel- spondents and disclosed 25,1980, agreements. opment plans and On June and related agency agreement they appellant gave respondents an .considering deal. sign a better refused to Mr. Johnson The evidence indicates contacted *3 21, 1980, sign appellant’s him and not to on June 27, drafting agreement were an offer. On June Development Corporation informed Harbor Island longer option agreement was an no Properties had made a better offer. because Resort proposed option agreement judge found the came frauds, § within the statute of S. C. Code Ann. 32-3-10 thus, acquired appellant rights no contractual respondent interfered since the could have was executed; recognize does not that South Carolina action for tortious interference with relations, citing Winston, Inc., Rinehart and (1978); (2d) genuine 242 E. and that issues S. C. S. no existed, thus, respondents entitled to of material agree dispute with the trial there is no We subj being (1) retyped was conditional ect to its changes, (2) by include (3) signed parties. proposed option provided option agreement itself was not to com- parties. mence until it was executed both previously held parties contemplate We that when the precedent to condition agreement as a of a written execution is until the arises bound, valid contract no (1978); Bugg Bugg, 272 S. C. S. v. executed. this E. 367 Since Pegram, Holliday v. par being signed clearly conditioned contract was no valid contract ties, hold there we would interfered. respondent could have allege a valid Further, petition does not any acquired had existed or that contract Instead, appellant chose to charac rights. interference with a “busi for tortious the action as one terize appeal that relationship,” and contends oh ness recently decided recognize this cause of action. should Holt, Rinehart and in Smith v. adversely to supra. Affirmed. JJ., concur.
Littlejohn J., dissent. Gregory, (dissenting): Justice Gregory, dissent. respectfully Bugg Bugg, 272 v. majority opinion’s reliance on Pegram, (1978) and parties involved misplaced.1 The (1911), is 71 E.S. Here, dispute. parties to the contract those cases were party to the respondent is (the Harbor Island Corporation). appellant did majority’s assertion that
Contrary to the rights with which had contractual that it allege in its Paragraph interfered, allege in appellant did *4 cer- Corporation the “reached appellant and its subsidiary whereby appellant or its understandings” tain multi-family market, develop, and sell undertake would it Were Corporation. the property owned upon real units may interference, have Corporation the respondent’s not for 1 Bugg espoused to the trial principle was not The appeal. passed under on in his order nor 374
fulfilled its verbal Whether the Corporation intended to fulfill its verbal and whether it would have done so but for re spondent’s interference a jury, factual issue for the not Pool, to decide. See Duckett v. judge, 238, 11 the trial (1890). therefore, Summary was not proper. cases collected in Digest, See West’s South Carolina Judgment, majority opinion Rinehart,
The further cites 446, 242 270 S. C. S. E. (2d) where a cause of held that action tortious interference with a relationship does not exist South I opinion Carolina. While am still the tortious inter right with the ference to contract constitutes an actionable Smith, right, supra, infringement (Lewis, of a not dissenting), do believe that dispositive issue is of this Again, jury it was for case. the to determine whether would Corporation have fulfilled ap its and, so, if whether ap interfered with relationship with the judge held there was no could have interfered alleged agree because the comply not Frauds, ment did the Statute of S. C. Code (1976). §Ann. 32-3-10 This was error. The Statute Frauds as pleaded. must Corporation a defense be American Wholesale Mauldin, 128 S. C. S. E. (1924). Respondents did plead the Statute as a not defense and could done so. protection afforded personal Statute privilege is a parties to the may of the be waived. Walker v. Preacher, Corporation, action, is not would pro be Statute, tected to an stranger oral
A contract cannot himself avail Statute fact that Frauds renders the contract unen Harleysville Co., Hatcher v. Mutual Insurance forceable. (1976). Respondents, being strang and the ers to Cor avail themselves of the poration, cannot Statute of Frauds defense. reverse and for trial.
I would remand concurs.