Columbia Hospital Corp. of Houston v. Moore

case, jury a rational could present In the CORPORA- COLUMBIA HOSPITAL beyond a reasonable doubt

have concluded Columbia TION OF HOUSTON d/b/a possession his explanation Dixon’s Center, Appellant, Bellaire Medical false. told property of the stolen was He his police that the television was and the v. However, jewelry girlfriend’s. was his and Charlotte Johnston Jesse MOORE both property victim identified the Hale, Individually Carolyn and as addition, court. In and in of scene Representatives Kath- Estate of pieces jewelry contained victim’s Deceased, Moore, Appellees. erine initials. State, England Dixon cites v. 727 Jesse Moore Charlotte Johnston Carolyn Hale, Individually (Tex.App. — Austin Representatives Kath- of the Estate pet.), no which the defendant Deceased, Moore, Appellants, erine the prop that his roommate stole claimed property erty, and the was where v. defendant, roommate, his and others Hospital Corporation of England distinguishable had access. Columbia Bellaire Houston d/b/a possession because the defendant’s Center, Appellee. Medical per property stolen was not shown sonal. The State did not demonstrate No. 01-99-00284-CV. explanation possession his his false Texas, Appeals Court of case, present po or unreasonable. In the (1st Dist.). Houston property person. on Dixon’s lice found presented evidence The State Feb. victim, property belonged notwith Dixon’s standing possession. claim of

Consequently, jury was entitled personal

convict Dixon based on his possession his property

recent

false assertion that it was his. We over- appeal.

rule Dixon’s second issue on affirmed. Wilcox,

Donald P. for Amicus Curiae. Dallas, P. Jung, Appellant. Michael Frankel, Houston, Richard Appellee. COHEN, Panel consists of Justices TAFT, and PRICE.* OPINION COHEN, Justice. first-impression The appeal issues (1) whether interest as- sessed Liability under the Medical (MLIIA)1 Improvement Insurance Act’s subchapter P is from excluded the dam- ages cap and whether the damages cap applicable defendant who is may be multi- plied by culpable defen- number judge dants. The trial answered both in the affirmative and rendered ae- * Price, Justice, 4590i, §§ C. Honorable Frank former 1.Ol- 1. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Appeals, Court of First District of Texas at Supp.2001). ió.02 Houston, sitting by assignment. verdict, postjudgment plus pre- and judge jury trial cordingly. agree We with the interest, stipulated expenses of Accordingly, we medical only on first issue. $174,202.53, ex- stipulated and remand with instructions. funeral reverse $4,361. penses also Background I. severally for all jointly and liable Columbia Hale, Carolyn and De- plaintiffs. Charlotte Johnson to all On damages awarded individually representatives judge and as trial modified cember deceased, Moore, the estate Kathrine judgment final to reflect (the Moore sued parties) Columbia, and Jesse Moore ($1,305,6912) applicable Corporation of Houston Hospital Columbia cap separately to each applied but Bellaire Columbia Medical Center d/b/a plaintiffs damages, than to the col- rather (Columbia) two and Katherine Moore’s against award Columbia. Conse- lective treating physicians, Drs. Uriel Mushin only Columbia’s quently, because Train, wrongful under the death Jordan the single to the estate exceeded and survival statutes Katherine amount, only was Co- capped; that award surgery Moore’s death after at Columbia plaintiffs lumbia’s to the other was resulting anguish their and for own mental capped. judge The also excluded companionship and loss of and consortium. interest, expenses, funeral jury negligent; found all defendants expenses cap.3 from the medical negligence percent assessed causal at 60 jointly and judge further found Columbia Mushin, Columbia, 30 to Dr. percent all medical funeral severally Train; percent plain- Dr. to the estate and for all expenses awarded damages collectively tiffs’ actual to be $8 damages plaintiffs to all other million. may the estate. The awards be sum- than indi- capping Columbia’s un- marized as follows shaded areas Without MLIIA, the trial sums for which Columbia was der rendered cate those liable): November 1998 on held Prejudgment Principal Total Defendant_Plaintiff_Amount_Interest_Amount (non-medical/non- 300,487.79 1,305,6914 $1,606,178.79 Estate $ $ _funeral)___ 131,794.56 (medical/funeral) 107,138.12 $ $ $ _Estate 24.656.44 34,520.55 334,520.55 300,000 $ $ _Jesse Moore_$ 30,000 3,452,06 33,452,06 $ $ _Charlotte Johnson_$ 3,452.06 33,452.06 Carolyn 30,000 $ $ Hale$ $1,772,829.12 366,568.90 $2,139,398.02 $ Totals: (non-medical/non- 720,000 165,698.63 885,698.63 $ $ Dr. Mushin Estate $ _funeral)_'__ 53,569.06 12,328.22 65,897.28 (medical/funeral) $ $ $ Estate past “expenses necessary medi- parties agree that the value and future 2. The cal, damages cap correctly was calculated for care” hospital, and custodial from date of trial. damages cap). disputes expenses were 3. No one that medical damages cap applied 4.The MLIIA properly excluded from MLIIA’s calculating this amount. cap. See 11.02(b) (Vernon Supp.2001) (exempting 150,000 17,260.27 167,260.27

Jesse $ $ Moore_$ 15,000 1,726.03 16,726.03 Charlotte Johnson_$ $ $ Carolyn 15,000 1,726.03 16,726.03 Hale$ $ $ 953,569.06 198,739.18 $1,152,308.24 Totals: $ $ (non-medical/non- 240,000 55,232.88 295,232.88 Dr. Train Estate $ $ $ _ funeral)_ (medical/funeral) 17,856.35 4,109.41 21,965.76

_Estate $ $ $ 50,000 5,753.42 55,753.42 _Jesse $ $ Moore_$ 5,575.34 _Charlotte $ $ 575.34 Johnson_$_5,000 Carolyn 5,000 5,575.34 Hale$ 575.34 $ $ 317,856.35 66,246.39 384,102.74 Totals: $ $ $ 631,554.47 3,675,809 Plaintiffs’ Total Combined $ $ Recovery_$3,044,254.53 modify Columbia moved to the Decem- II. The Issues Which Agree Both Parties ber judgment, arguing judge 31st the trial (1) erred holding jointly and Columbia Application Damages Cap A. of the amounts over the MLI- a Per-Plaintiff Basis (all $1,305,691 IA damages cap of one, In parties their issue both ar (2) above); shaded areas the chart ap- gue judge applying the trial erred in plying the damages cap plaintiffs to each damages MLIIA it is calcu —however award, rather than to the collective dam- basis, per-plaintiff lated —on a rather than (3) Columbia; ages against awarded per-defendant on a agree. basis. We Hosp., Rose v. Doctors not capping expenses funeral prejudg- (Tex.1990) (“[T]he damages cap should be ment interest. The Moore also applied ‘per on a defendant’ basis because to modify moved the December judg- 31st language clearly applies ment, (1) arguing the judge erred limit- recovery to the against the individual de ing joint liability Columbia’s and several fendant, not the award individual exclude most awarded to the es- plaintiff.”). against tate the doctors first row of We sustain both issue one. parties’ doctor, against each un- above) capping shaded the chart Expenses B. Funeral Columbia’s to the estate at four, In argues issue Columbia $1,305,691, the value of a single damages trial judge including erred funeral $3,917,073, cap, rather than at the value of expenses damages subject within the a single damages cap multiplied by three the MLIIA damages cap. par The Moore for the number of culpable defendants. Compare ties’ brief concedes this. Tex. Both by operation motions were overruled 4590i, § Rev.Civ.Stat.ANN. (Vernon of law. Supp.2001) (exempting only past medical, “expenses necessary Drs. Mushin and Train settled after hospital, and custodial care” from the dam judgment for an undisclosed amount. Co- ages cap). parties appeal. lumbia and the Moore Accordingly, we issue sustain Columbia’s

four. wrongful Prejudgment “A a language: Interest and III. death, dam- Damages Cap property or personal injury, MLIIA’s .”). earns case ages three, In the trial argues issue MLIIA legislature enacted In by not capping prejudgment erred in pertinent which reads disagree. We interest. part as follows: A. The gen- Statutes Notwithstanding [the 16.01. Sec. statute, now eral K, pro- MLIIA section 11.02 codified Tex.Fin.Code vides as follows: ], Supp.2001) §§ 304.101-.108 In a an action on health care in a health care final claim where is rendered in accor- liability claim shall be awarded against care physician pro- health subchapter. with this dance vider, limit of civil dam- 16.02. Sec. ages care physician or health provider shall be to an amount limited $500,000.5

not to exceed (b) claim that In a health care 4590i, specified by § within period art. not settled (Vernon (a) section, of Supp.2001). subchapter judg- This was this Subsection part prejudgment MLIIA as enacted in inter- originally ment must include May 30, 1977, 1977. Leg., past damages by See Act of 65th found trier est R.S., 817, 1, fact, Part Laws shall prejudg- eh. 1977 Tex.Gen. but not include of (effective 1977). 2039, 29, August 2052-53 ment interest by the of fact. trier 1995,6 malpractice 1987 to From medical plaintiffs interest prejudgment collected 4590i, 16.01, §§ art. Tex.Rev.StatAnn. under interest prejudgment (Vernon 16.02(b) (emphasis Supp.2001) statute, in a provided judgment “a added). death,

wrongful personal injury, proper- Corp. B. Healthcare v. Horizon/CMS ty damage case must include Auld 3, 1987, interest.” See Act of 70th June C.S., 3, briefs, 1,§ Leg., parties ch. Tex. filed their 1st 1987 Gen. After 51, 51, 24, May laws much repealed Supreme Act of Court resolved Texas 1997, R.S., 6(a), 1008, § ch. in Leg., 75th 1997 issue Healthcare Horizon/CMS (now 1151, 3091, Auld, Tex. Corp. Laws 3602 codified at v. 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. 34 Gen. § publica- for (designated 304.102 S.W.3d 887 Tex.Fin.Code tion). Supp.2001), supplemental in filed following change parties with the The have $500,000 1985); (Tex. adjusted 5. for inflation 552-54 see also The Horizon/CMS 1151, based Corp. date of under a formula v. Tex.S.Ct.J. 43 Healthcare price 24, 1158, 887, (Tex. on the consumer index. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Aug. S.W.3d 34 4590i, (Vernon Supp. § art. 11.04 2000) (recogniz (designated publication) Stat.Ann. 2001). parties agree that the same). in ing Codification followed 1987. correctly calculated this formula at under 3, C.S., 1987, Leg., 1st Act of June 70th See $1,305,691. the time of 1, 51, 51, 3, § 1987 Tex. Gen. laws re ch. 1997, 24, Leg., pealed May Act of 75th Prejudgment 6. available first became R.S., 1008, 6(a), § Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1985, personal-injury suits when the 3091, (now codified at Tex.Fin.Code Ann. Qual Supreme Court decided Cavnar v. Texas (Vernon Supp.2001)). § 304.102 Inc., ity Parking, S.W.2d Control mandatory briefs on Auld’s effect. The Auld lan- subchapters Court Both use guage. Compare held interest awarded on Tex.Rev.Civ.StatANn. 4590i, 11.02(a) (civil § art. and under the limited”) damages “shall be with id. at statute, general prejudgment § (prejudgment 16.01 interest “shall be subchapter under within fell awarded”) § (judgment “must 11.02(a)’s 1151, 1161, damages cap. Id. at interest). include” prejudgment Neither 887, 890, 901-02, references the other. expressly rejected Court all but one argument the Moore raised their possible It the MLIIA to to read original brief in this Court.7 support See id. at either For exam- party’s position. 1157-59, that, ple, legisla- argues had

ture intended for prevail P requirement subchapter Remaining C. The Sole Issue After 18-year-old liability over limita- the then Auld so, K, tion have said it would remaining The sole issue after but did is bolstered argument not. This Auld legislature, by is whether the adding that, want- legislature the fact when MLIIA subchapter P in intended to damages from exempt type ed to exclude interest from MLIIA cap, expressly. it did so See Tex.Rev.Civ. (ex- (c) 11.02(b), K’s 43 Tex. StatAatn. 13, 1165, S.Ct.J. at 1159 n. pressly exempting cap expenses from medical, 900 n. 906-07 (declining necessary hospital, to consider and custodial providing cap care and does not limit an holding whether Court’s created a conflict situation). in insurer’s a Stowers subchapter P subchapter because P language Such express “exemption” apply, did not holding prejudgment in prejudgment appear interest does not capped governed by interest is in cases not anywhere P in subchapter or else the P, i.e., subchapter governed those cases MLIIA. by instead the general prejudgment inter statute).

est However, P subchapter neither does interest)

(prejudgment expressly state it is harmonize, This Court must if pos K subchapter (damages cap). limited sible, subehapter K’s cap with 4590i, See art. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. subchapter requirement P’s of prejudg § (stating only, “Notwithstanding 16.01 See, e.g., ment interest. Dallas Mer statute], general prejudgment [the interest chant’s & City Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. lia- prejudgment interest a health care of Dallas, (Tex.1993). 489, 852 S.W.2d 495 ”); bility claim ... see shall be awarded Our ultimate goal give Auld, 1166, to effect to the also at 34 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. legislature’s (Hankinson, J., intent. 43 dissenting) Tex.S.Ct.J. S.W.3d (“[Subchapter does confirm P] parties' arguments 7. The prejudgment judgment Moore that the Auld interest in the Rose (1) rejected prejudgment (Tex.1990), Court has are that Hosp., v. Doctors interest is not a form of common law dam- although opinion, not the had mentioned in (2) ages, legislative history the shows no in- precedential parties appar- effect. The Moore interest, (3) cap prejudgment prejudg- tent to ently recognize overruling argu- the of these unavailability ment interest’s at the time of supplemental ments because their brief on legislature MLIIA’s enactment shows the did them. Auld's effect does not reassert it, awarding not to intend the P states subchapter the fact that ported interest is not to the gen- “notwithstanding applies [the men- that it surely would have statute],” per- interest in that new eral tioned or referred merely an alter indicating P man- intent subchapter haps And subchapter.”). statute’s prejudgment interest interest. dates the award breadth, cap’s application. not but See However, analysis does 16.01, quoted §§ bill not (prejudgment 16.02 awarded”; necessarily preclude purpose, in- another such “shall “must interest). despite mandating prejudgment interest clude” Co- While cap. sub- 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. correctly lumbia notes that neither other, (Hankinson, chapter it is states limited (four 1995, and, J., concluding dissenting) justices al- en- P was added in subchapter intent subchapter P showed though MLIIA has since been amend- actment ed, from K has not subchapter been amended exclude relies Therefore, cap). party P MLIIA’s Neither on prevails. subchapter state it legisla- legislative history. any is the “later-enacted statute”: other subchapter ture amended the MLIIA after could be read to Because enactment, any way P’s but never party’s we look to support position, either subjects P to expressly subchapter although it did rule guidance, Auld for statutory K. rule subchapter One con- it, P. In held as the Court struction is that later-enacted statute follows: a controls in case of conflict. Tex.Gov. Legislature expressly provided only 1998). If Code Ann. exception cap, to that conflict, we subchapters conclude the two 11.02(b),which states: we might under rule conclude (a) section does not of this Subsection mandatory language P’s to the amount of apply prevail, exempting prejudg- intended to health care entirely ment from the necessary expenses claim for argues analy- also Bill House medical, hospital, and custodial care that, sis in adding subchapter indicates required before received only with legislature was concerned the inju- in the future for treatment of barring prejudgment interest on ry. allowing it from the damages and to accrue excepted from prejudgment Is interest injury past date on rather than damages, Is cap? Obviously prejudg- not.

with another to sub- creating exception cap? in the ment interest included Be- chapter damages cap: K’s 11.02(a) that section mandates cause Prejudgment interest on future provider’s cap applies health-care eliminated. The substitute will [sic] liability for the defini- damages,” “civil bar of interest prejudgment the award phrase governs tion of that answer on not occurred have question. Section directs to the judgement. It will also allow time “[a]ny legal term or word art that past damages interest part, in this not otherwise defined used the date injury. to accrue from meaning shall such part, in this have' Comm, Practices, with the common law.” Bill is consistent See House Civil falls within the Leg., Prejudgment H.B. R.S. interest Analysis, Tex. 74th (1995). sup- meaning “damages.” As argument may be common-law Columbia’s 11.02(a)

such, Thus, section that up cap. mandates to the amount of the can cap. interest is statutes be harmonized to the extent that damages including prejudgment Id., — 1157-58, Tex.S.Ct.J. 34 S.W.3d not interest —do exceed the (citations omitted); see also id. at Id. (“First, 34 S.W.3d 887 the conclusion uncapped that is is majority repeatedly cited the MLI- contrary legislative to clear intent of limit, purpose, expand, IA’s which is to not 11.02(a) liability section to all for ‘dam- providers’ health care civil for ages,’ as that term is defined in the com- 1153-54, damages. See id. at 34 S.W.3d law, except mon for those medical ex- (noting legislative for capping rationale (“It penses excepted from section damages), 1157 is clear—from the lan- 11.02(b). This al- intent has never been guage legisla- used the statute and the Legisla- tered or diminished Legislature placed tive intent —that the an ”). .... ture unequivocal limit on the amount that a provider health-care must pay a final that, Auld if responded included MLIIA].”) judgment under (emphasis [the interest, that section would (“The added), 1160 purpose article 4590i conflict general prejudgment with the in- limit, expand, pro- not a health-care terest statute because the former mandat- ”); damages.’ vider’s ‘civil see liability cap, ed a while the latter mandat- also Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. a prejudgment ed interest award. 1.02(a)(l)-(ll) §§ (finding that health care 1159-60, 43 Tex.S.CtJ. at payments claims and insurance disagreed. The Court It held inordinately, have same increased that ef- reading that prevail section problem fect is to cause serious in insur- over the general prejudgment etc.), availability affordability, ance comported statute liability-limita- 1.02(b)(l)-(5) (stating MLIIA’s purpose is tion scheme that “unique” to article frequency severity to reduce of such 4590i’s “self-contained structure” and also claims, health to make care more afforda- effectuated statute’s clear intent etc.). reform, through ble and accessible Id., limit liability for health care claims. 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. at 900- Then there is the dissent. Auld is 5-M 01. The Court further noted its conclusion opinion. though justices agreed Even all statutory was consistent with the construc- apply, P did not the four principle tion specific the more justices strongly dissenting nonetheless (MLIIA 11.02(a)) controls over the expressed their belief that general prejudg- more P interest awarded under statute). ment Id. The Court capped: continued: My prejudgment conclusion that interest

This, course, sup- does not mean that not capped [the should be is further general prejudgment interest ported by Legislature’s statute] is the 1995 enact- wholly 4590i, in inapplicable article 4590i cases. ment of article enti- many Interest,” There will be instances when the tled “Prejudgment 11.02(a) damages section do not ex- mandates that a health-care in- judgment prejudgment ceed—or even come close to—the “must include instances, In general prejudg- past damages those terest on found the [the fact, pre- ment requires statute] interest that trier of but shall not include interest be added as on future interest

561 and the cap prejudg- under the by the trier fact.” Tex.Rev.Civ. 4590i, rate, § Although simply can calcu- art. 16.02. ment-interest Stat.ANN. not to this case apply does section interest of prejudgment late amount the at accrued be- the claim issue because capped as dic- Damages remain owed. enactment, fore its that section does 11.02, 4590i, but tated article section interest is not prejudgment confirm that also award- interest can prejudgment Legisla- the cap surely general prejudg- ed dictated [the ture have mentioned or referred would ... statute].8 ment interest subchapter. cap the in that new Thus, harmonizing article instead Moreover, 16.02, Legisla- in the stat- prejudgment-interest 4590i and the specifically prejudgment ture mandates both, give the ute as to effect so past damages, interest on forbids it but reading ignores at man- Court’s best damages. on future Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. datory language prejudgment-in- 16.02(b). 4590i, § Ann. art. This distinc- an and at worst creates terest statute Legisla- suggests tion further unnecessary conflict between that stat- uncap previously ture did not intend to interest, 4590i, an capped prejudgment but rath- ute and article internal er, working prejudg- from the basis 4590i’s conflict between article available, fully ment is deter- interest If prejudgment-interest its new section. past damages. mined to limit it to interest included prejudgment application Court’s can be parts all of both statutes cap, unnecessarily case casts doubt claims; actual given full effect for all despite provision’s effect its clear lan- capped remain under article guage, inconsistency and creates an 4590i, Legisla- within despite article 4590i vio- judgment, awarded on no ture’s efforts careful apparent at draft- to the Legislature’s express lence done ing. purpose language in article 4590i. Id., 887, 43 Tex.S.CtJ. 34 S.W.3d Id., 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. at J., (Hankinson, see dissenting); also J., (Hankinson, dissenting). 1166-66, id. (“As J., (Hankinson, dissenting) far as I 5. Resolution tell, at all the can best Court has done is holding expressly was limited Auld’s cap prejudgment from 1986 to Never- ... interest statute. At worst the creates ... Court theless, was majority opinion an internal conflict the article based between new prejudgment-inter- being 4590i’s and its large part interest’s provision.”). est “damages.” See id. at (holding prejudgment Hankinson continued: Justice awarded under I pro- If statutes reconciled as subject to the MLI- “damages,” which are pose, Legislature’s overriding goal see also Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.ANN. cap); keeping liability damages health-care IA’s (capping liabili- “civil predictable reasonably determinable and course, ty damages”). Of costs of the in an effort to ameliorate the no what “damages,” still matter If interest is system health-care is still met. it. damages statute awards knows the amount to subchapter argument apply We the would P. note that same Nonetheless, if by enacting subchapter and its insurance more affordable P the legislature available). meant to require pre- despite cap, interest then the importantly, More even though subchap- fact that it is “damages” would not matter. ter P did not apply, the four dissenting Nor would it matter prejudgment in- justices went out of way their to express expressly terest is not listed in subchapter their belief that prejudgment interest exemptions. K’s 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. Cf. under P is not 1155, (in 34 S.W.3d majority 894-95 capped. present glimpse This is a at a opinion, holding subchapter K did not holding. It is a 4-0 ruling advance cap punitive damages, reasoning, “Fur- in favor of parties’ position the Moore thermore, Legislature’s specific exclu- the remaining justices because five have sion of medical expenses subchap- [under yet to rule on the matter. See K, ter section ] not compel does 13, 1165, Tex.S.Ct.J. at 1159 n. 34 S.W.3d the conclusion that intend- 900 n. 906-07 (limiting holding to ed to include all non-com- —even statute). general prejudgment interest pensatory damages cap. ‘The —within doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio D. Conclusion simply alteñus is an aid to determine leg- ”) intent, islative not an absolute rule.’ holding prejudgment We hold Auld’s omitted). (emphasis in original; citations awarded under the Auld distinguishable is further to the ex- is not binding when tent holding its is based on article is awarded under MLIIA subchapter 4590i’s “self-contained structure” and on given majority’s expressly limiting that 11.02(a)’s being specific the more holding to the former statute. We further Here, contrast, statute. subchapters K hold that the enactment of subchapter P— and P part statute; thus, of the same the later-enacted statute employing man- neither “specific” is more than the other. datory language a legislative in- —shows Finally, if the legislature intended for sub- tent exclude chapter P prevail K, over awarded under it from Accord- then, although liability would increase to ingly, we hold the Moore may re- extent interest exceeds cover interest on all dam- cap, it in predictable ways would do so ages. necessarily would thus not thwart the We overrule Columbia’s issue three. legislative goals predictable and affordable coverage. insurance Damages Cap Applied IV. id., Tex.S.Ct.J. Jointly Defendant isWho (Hankinson, J., 899-900 dissenting); see Severally Liable 1153-54, also id. at (in two, In its argues issue majority opinion, noting that article by using trial underlying purpose 4590i’s in- erred Columbia’s is to make joint affordable, and several coverage surance to award dam thereby in- creasing availability ages excess of the damages cap of medical care in Texas); $1,305,691. three, In their issues two and (4)-(5) 1.02(b)(l)-(2), (stating parties argue the MLI- Moore trial judge purpose IA’s in limiting joint is to reduce excessive fre- erred Columbia’s and sev cost, quency, severity $3,917,073 of health care eral at all because liability claims and to make health care single damages cap —the Ass’n, 852 number of cul- chant’s Concessionaire’s by three for the & multiplied unambigu- aIf statute is S.W.2d at 495. applied and because pable defendants — E.g., ous, language. clear we its follow all against defendants damages Fixation Spine Advanced Fitzgerald v. $3,675,809. only agree with totaled We (Tex.1999). St/s., Inc., 996 S.W.2d Columbia. 11.02(a) provides MLIIA section A. The Statutes damages liability for “the limit of civil of shall provider or health care physician comparative responsibility exceed an amount not to be limited to follows: provides as (Em- $500,000 adjusted inflation].” [as Liability. § Amount of 33.013. added.) is of There no mention phasis (a) provided in Except as Subsections much care culpable providers, other health (b) (c), a and liable defendant num- by their multiplying less of only for percentage a claimant of contrary, To section states ber. by equal trier of fact damages unambiguously “the” health liability percentage defendant’s of re- to that be limited to the provider care “shall” personal respect with sponsibility death, or injury, property damage, other Purpose C.The MLIIA’s al- damages harm for which the plain reading comports This with lowed. to “reduce purpose, MLIIA’s (b) (a), Notwithstanding Subsection health severity and frequency excessive is, in liable defendant addition to each im- through claims reasonable care (a), under his Subsection in the Texas provements and modifications re- and liable for insurance, tort, sys- practice and medical by the claimant under coverable Section tems,” and its thereby making health care respect to a cause of action 33.0129 and more affordable insurance if percentage responsibility attrib- available. See greater uted to the defendant is than 50 1.02(b)(l)-(2), (4)-(5); 4590i, § accord percent.... 1153-54, 1157, 1160, 34 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. 892-93, 897, Limita- 33.013(a), & Ann. Tex.Civ.Prac. Rem.Code an essen- tion of was considered 1997) (b) (Vernon “CPRC”]. [hereinafter goal reducing tial medical part of the 11.02(a) quoted MLIIA section above. legislature malpractice premiums Meaning B. The Plain Statutes’ Commission,”10 whose and the “Keeton attempt harmonize in enact- findings adopted We CPRC legislature Keith, and MLIIA section See L. ing article 4590i. Darrell Liability Insurance giving legisla while effect to the Medical Texas Survey and See Act—A Improvement ture’s intent. 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. 887, 892-93; Analysis History, Dallas Mer- its Construction 5-6, 7, 11, (Dec.1976) (conclud- port”] requires 9. 33.012 the claimant’s re- Section among percentage damages, covery ing to be reduced his re- reductions in substantial sponsibility any applicable settlement impact things, significantly insur- other would credits. recom- premium ance rates costs Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code (Vernon 1997). § 33.012 measures, limiting among mending, other establishing pain-and-suffering Liability Texas Medical Professional fund). patients' compensation Report Study Commission, Final the 65th Re- Commission [‘‘Keeton Texas 564 Baylor 265,

Constitutionality, 36 disagree. courts. We We discuss each L.Rev. 1984); 307 (Spring below. 1.02(a)(13) (Vernon Supp.2001) (adopting Baptist Hospital of Southeast Tex- 1. Keeton Report’s findings). Commission as, Inc. v. Baber “[T]he understood that arti- cle 4590i is intended to limit in Texas, In Baptist Hospital Southeast ways unique that are to 4590i and to be a Baber, Inc. v. the trial held a physi- determining self-contained structure for hospital jointly cian and severally lia- provider’s liability health-care and dam- ble for about single 1.65 times the ages.” 1160, 43 Tex.S.Ct.J. at 34 296, amount. 672 (Tex.App.— S.W.2d 297 887, S.W.3d 900-01. This intent leads us 1984), Beaumont per writ n.r.e. cu- refd that, to conclude compar- harmonize the riam, (Tex.1986). 714 S.W.2d 310 ative liability statute with MLIIA section appeals affirmed, court of holding the dam- 11.02(a), the prevail. latter must Auld is Id., ages cap was unconstitutional. 672 that, instructive just because it held in the S.W.2d at In refusing hospital’s 298. context general of the inter- error, writ or the Supreme Court held the 11.02(a). est statute MLIIA section court appeals should not have reached id., 1160-61, 43 at Tex.S.Ct.J. 34 constitutionality issue: “Because the 887, S.W.3d 901. Auld is also instructive judgment in this case does not exceed the because it specific held the more statutory combined of both defen- (section 11.02(a), which applied only to dants, and made no hospital because claims) health care liability prevailed over attack joint aspect on the and several the more general pre- judgment, appeals the court of need statute, applied not have decided on this case constitutional death, any wrongful personal injury, or grounds in order to affirm the trial court case). property damage See id. The Id., judgment.”11 714 S.W.2d 310. Ba- logic same applies here because CPRC ber shows that plaintiff may recover an is the general, more amount equal single cap against MLIIA section specific, the more each culpable defendant. It does not state provision governing a defendant’s liability. that the applicable defen- Applying logic, Auld’s the statutes can be dant can multiplied by number harmonized to the damages— extent that culpable sup- defendants. Baber does not including those for which a defendant port parties’ argument the Moore because could be liable—do hospital Baber “made no attack on exceed the Tex. 43 Cf. 1160, joint aspect judg- S.Ct.J. several 310; ment.” Mark D. See id. at see also D. The Case Law Clore, Death Ac- Malpractice Medical Stoiuers, The Moore claim tions: Understanding Caps, this issue has Credits, been resolved in their favor three S.Tex.L.Rev. parties argue hospital

11. The Corp., Moore that the (Tex.Civ.App.— implicitly writ) challenge Baber raised a (op. that its Houston [1st Dist.] no joint-and-several (a "multiply” reh'g) did not party generally may not raise for the First, cap, disagree. Supreme but we rehearing first time on new matters that could Second, opposite. earlier); hospi- Court stated the have been v. raised Trice Prod. Co. Co., expressly argue tal did not Drilling until rehear- Dutton ing, although (Tex.Civ.App. it could have done so before. refd writ —Houston See, n.r.e.) (same). e.g., Deposit (op. reh’g) McGuire v. Federal Ins. 2000) of this (noting applicability the (Spring “Clore”] dress [hereinafter single comparative negligence a can the issue whether defendant calculation the not a This does involve jointly severally held and liable case be situation. any than a MLIIA left defendant is less single cap more was which situation Baber). at n. 2. by liable.” Id. 847 open completely than Thus, a per-defen- while Rose establishes Hospital 2. Rose v. Doctors plaintiff to recover cap and allows a dant Hospital, jury v. the In Rose Doctors single cap the times equal amount an dece- damages to three of the defendants, it of culpable the number members, family judge but trial dent’s the a cap applicable to does not increase the take-nothing a See judgment. rendered culpa- number of single defendant the 245 (Tex.App. S.W.2d —Dallas support Rose does not ble defendants. 1987), part ajfd. part, rev’d in parties’ argument, and it does the Moore (Tex.1990). ap- The court of S.W.2d Wynn this v. Co- not resolve issue. rendered peals reversed and han, (Tex.App.— 864 S.W.2d cap a plaintiffs, applying per-plaintiff all denied) 1993, writ [14th Dist.] Houston making jointly and the two defendants applicability of (noting open Rose left the severally all to- damages, liable for cap comparative to a damages the MLIIA Id., gether cap. exceeded the scenario); Clore, 41 S.Tex. negligence Court, 254. In the Supreme at the (same). L.Rev. at 485-86 (1) argued cap applied defendants that the Wynn v. 3. Cohan plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery, rath- on a per-plaintiff per-defendant er than or Cohan, Wynn v. all but defen- In (2) basis;12 alternatively, cap the should at settled trial. 864 dant before S.W.2d basis; on a apply per-defendant summary The trial rendered rule, a per-defendant under defen- the two remaining judgment for the defendant single dants should be “counted” a de- set- ground dollar-for-dollar Thus, principal fendant. issue there that defendant elect- tlement credit13 had that is also here important was whether damages Id. ed exceeded MLIIA damages cap the MLIIA applied reversed, reasoning of appeals The court plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery, instead of the yet finding there not per-defendant per-plaintiff on a basis. responsibility all un- percentage Wynn, 864 der CPRC section 33.003.14 Supreme held Court Wynn court was applied per-defendant should be on a ba- considering not whether and thus that “the amount sis defendant ..., applicable who in this case multi- is the may multi- liable be culpable are plied by two since there two Id., culpable defen- plied at 847. number defendants.” noted, Moreover, However, supports if it either it do not ad- dants. also “We the doctors’ settle- argument, defendants not at issue here because 12. Under warned, 'per interpretation judgment. "The defendant’ ments occurred after prob- significant also would create additional joint under doctrine of and several lems § Rem.Code Ann. 33.003 14. Tex.Civ.Prac. & liability.” 1997) (requiring assessment claimant, percentage responsibility of each accord- 13. Settlement credits calculated defendant, responsible settling person, and ing to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code statute). party joined third under 1997). 33.012(b) (Vernon This section party, Wynn’s supports ally multiplied by dicta Columbia’s may position. number of defendants. culpable See id. Accord- (rejecting defen- ingly, we sustain issue two Columbia’s dant-appellee’s argument that a compara- parties’ overrule issues two the Moore jury tive-responsibility question would nul- three. lify her multiplying election credit her own damages cap). Wynn does not sup- Disposition V.

port parties’ argument, the Moore and it We portion reverse that Clore, does not resolve this issue. See against awarding and interest damages S.Tex.L.Rev. at jointly making Columbia and Columbia and the severally and remand cause liable Policy D. Additional Considerations (1) apply for the trial to the MLIIA left, then, We are with the MLIIA’s basis; (2) cap on a to per-defendant cap plain language its purpose. and These plaintiffs’ damages the aggregate awarded lead us to that damages conclude cap against excluding necessary Columbia— applicable single to a defendant who is medical, and custodial-care ex- hospital, jointly and may not be penses interest —at pre-judgment and multiplied by culpable the number of de- $1,305,691 damages cap), single re- fendants. gardless joint and several of Columbia’s agree We with Columbia that pre- or plaintiffs cul- the number dictability damages that the MLIIA was pable defendants; apportion and to provide enacted to would be if capped damages plaintiffs eroded we those to the ac- verdict, joint-and-several allowed a cording jury defendant’s to was done lia- bility expenses before. to its Funeral multiply We disagree against to included within are the Moore that we need not capped pre-judgment inter- damages; consider purpose because predict- that medical, est necessary hospital, ability already has been eroded Lucas not. custodial-care expenses States, v. United which held the damages in unconstitutional non-death cases. in TAFT, dissenting part. Justice (Tex.1988). Just be- cause the “predictability TAFT, MLIIA’s scheme” Justice, dissenting in part. does apply not in some cases does not I agree majority’s opinion in all with the mean predictability should no longer be a respects pre- would hold that but one: I goal in those cases the MLIIA judgment interest assessed under Medical Rose, still apply. does 801 S.W.2d at Cf. Liability Improvement and Insurance Act (“The §§ application of 11.02 and 11.03 (MLIIA) P1 is subchapter to wrongful death claims remains complete I damages cap. Accordingly, respectfully itself, capable of execution in accord dissent. intent, legislature’s with the indepen- First, I do following so for the reasons. any dent of to application common law had the intended for the Legislature claims.”). provision subchapter added in prevail to over then E. Conclusion 18-year-old limitation of subchap- K, We hold cap applicable ter surely it have said It would so. did Second, defendant who is not. and sever- knew how to 4590Í, §§ 1. art. Supp.2001). TexRev.Stat. 16.01 .02 structure.” “self-contained categories of from on MLIIA’s exempt 4590i, However, that the MLIIA Ann. Auld shows cap. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. (c) 11.02(b), it liability, ex- limit is instructive (expressly exempting to exists medical, necessary hospital, subchap- penses of it shows how by analogy because pro- care from custodial P to effectu- K and can be harmonized ters liability). does limit viding cap Stowers that dam- purpose “to extent ate Nonetheless, no express “exemption” interest —do ages including prejudgment — appears anywhere Tex. cap.” See not exceed the Third, ma- MLIIA. in contrast to the S.Ct. J. view, analysis I House Bill jority’s read the I Finally, importantly, dis- and most subchapter purpose to P’s show “trumps” P sub- agree bar K to do so would undermine chapter when excep- rather create another damages, quote To purpose. MLIIA’s intended damages cap. K’s tion ... MLIIA’s majority, purpose “the Comm, Practices, Bill House on Civil frequency was to ‘reduce excessive Tex. 74th Analysis, Leg., H.B. R.S. liability claims severity of care health (“Prejudgment interest on improvements through reasonable damages are eliminated. The substi- [sic] insurance, tort, in the Texas modifications tute will bar the award of thereby systems,’ practice and medical interest on which have not oc- insur- making health care its judgement. curred at time of It will Limi- ance more affordable available. past also allow interest on an es- tation of was considered inju- damages to accrue from the date of reducing medical part goal sential ry.”). premiums by malpractice Fourth, I capping prejudgment believe Commission,’ find- whose ‘Keeton consistent Horizon/CMS Legislature adopted enacting ings the Corp. Healthcare v. in which v. Inc. Hosp., article 4590L” Columbia argued that, appellant cap if the MLIIA Moore, slip (Tex.App. at 21 op. —Houston interest, included then the h.) 22, 2001, (desig- no pet. Dist.] Feb. [1st statute conflicted with the general (citations and foot- publication) nated for statute because both omitted); also Tex.Rev.Civ. notes see Stat. mandatory language. Tex. contained (b)(l)-(© 1.02(a)(l)-(ll), 4590i, § Ann. 1151, 1159-60, S.Ct. J. S.W.3d J. Supp.2001); 43 Tex. S.Ct. (Tex. 24, 2000) Aug. (designat- 1153-54,1157,1160, 34 891- publication). Supreme Court ed 93, 897, that (repeatedly stating disagreed, holding construing is to limit civil purpose MLIIA’s prevail general over the in- damages). Capping prejudgment comported interest statute with the liabili- it under statute regardless of what terest — ty-limitation unique scheme this purpose. is awarded —achieves article 4590i’s “self-contained structure.” Accordingly, Moore I would hold the Id. at may prejudgment interest recover specific Court also reasoned that more the MLIIA on those (the MLIIA cap) statute should control only up to the amount of general over the more statute). I rec- prejudgment interest Id. distinguishable ognize Auld is on the MLIIA holding extent its was based cap’s being specific more

Case Details

Case Name: Columbia Hospital Corp. of Houston v. Moore

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Feb 23, 2001

Citation: 43 S.W.3d 553

Docket Number: 01-99-00284-CV

Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.